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                                                Abstract 
 
This research project purports to offer a comprehensive analysis of how the legal 
framework in Saudi Arabia might be improved to further the development and efficacy 
of the housing finance market. The research aims to achieve the following objectives: 
enhancing the efficiency of the main participants, lender and borrower, in the housing 
finance market by providing them with the desired protection; facilitating access to that 
market; building up a proper regulatory framework for governing the market; and finally, 
addressing the legal barriers that hinder the provision of cheap liquidity in the market. 
Although the Housing Finance Laws (HFLs) 2012 were introduced and enacted with 
similar objectives in mind, this thesis argues that four issues still present significant 
obstacles to the development of the housing finance market, albeit some are a result of 
the provisions of the HFLs themselves. As a consequence, the thesis has sought to address 
the following questions; what barriers to the development of the housing finance remain 
unaddressed? How should Saudi law be reformed to provide adequate protection for 
lender and borrower in the market? Can the Land Fees Law 2016 play a critical role in 
addressing the current issue of increasing land prices which hinders access to the housing 
finance market?  How can the regulatory framework for regulating the housing finance 
market in general, and for adopting the macro-prudential policy in particular, be 
developed to achieve the HFLs’ aims? And, finally, how might Saudi laws be reformed 
to enable the launch of a securitisation market, in order to assist in the development of 
the housing finance market by providing new means of liquidity? 
It is hoped that critical analysis of the above questions will help to facilitate development 
of the housing finance market and contribute to its further improvement, by addressing 
potentially workable solutions to the obstacles listed above. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1The aims and objectives of the thesis 
 
The thesis aims to determine how the Saudi laws on housing finance might best be 
improved so as to encourage the development of an appropriately structured housing 
finance market. There are thus four principal objectives of this thesis: enhancing the 
efficiency of the main participants, lender and borrower, in the housing finance market 
by providing them with the desired protection; facilitating access to the housing finance 
market; building up a proper regulatory framework for governing the housing finance 
market; and finally, addressing the potential legal barriers that hinder the provision of 
cheap liquidity in the housing finance market. 
Although the Housing Finance Laws 2012 were introduced and enacted with similar 
objectives in mind, this thesis argues that four issues still present significant obstacles to 
the development of the housing finance market, albeit some are a result of the provisions 
of the Housing Finance Laws 2012 themselves. The four issues are: first, the lack of 
protection granted to participants in the housing finance market as a result of the decision 
of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) which deprives lenders and borrowers of the 
mortgage mechanism by which to secure their interests in financed property. The second 
issue is the increase in land prices and their negative role in the housing finance market 
through increasing the cost of borrowing and obstructing potential first homebuyers’ 
access to housing finance. However, the only solution advanced to address this issue was 
the enactment of the Land Fees Law (LFL) 2016; therefore, the thesis aims to analyse this 
law and its provisions to see whether or not the law tends to address this issue. The third 
issue is the high down payment requirement established by article (12) of the Regulation 
Real Estate Finance Law (RREFL), which has restricted the access of first-
time homebuyers to the housing finance market. Finally, legal changes are needed to 
enable the establishment of a securitisation market and thus to provide cheap liquidity in 
the housing finance market, as well as to address the liquidity constraint in Saudi caused 
by the oil prices collapse, which has a negative impact on the market.   
The thesis, therefore, seeks to address these issues through realising the broader 
objectives noted above, and proceeds from the assumption that the modest role played by 
11 
 
the housing finance market in Saudi invites further examination and analysis, in order to 
best identify appropriate avenues of reform.  
In discussing this sensitive issue, the thesis needs to define several fundamental 
concepts and address some crucial questions, which will shape the discussion: 
 
 What initiatives have been adopted by the Saudi government to develop the housing 
finance market? And, what barriers to development of that market remain unaddressed? 
 What is the Supreme Judicial Council’s(SJC) decision, which is believed to be hindering 
the development of the housing finance market by depriving lenders and borrowers alike 
of mortgage security? And, do the provisions of the housing finance laws 2012 overturn 
the SJC’s decision? Furthermore, could Islamic finance transactions (IFTs) be considered 
a solution to the problem created by the SJC’s decision? And why? Finally, can we create 
an alternative solution that might bridge the gap produced by the SJC’s decision? 
 The only solution advanced to address increased land prices was the enactment of the 
Land Fees Law 2016; can it lead to either a decrease in the market value of land or an 
increase in its supply? And what are the legal concerns emerging from the wording of the 
LFL 2016? 
 Does article (12) of the Regulation of Real Estate Finance Law(RREFL), which caps the 
Loan-to-value (LTV) at 70%, restrict the first homebuyer’s potential access to the housing 
finance market? If so, is this impact consistent with the main aims of enacting the housing 
finance laws 2012, namely to facilitate access to housing finance? If not, how can the 
regulatory framework for regulating the housing finance market in general and for 
adopting the macro-prudential policy, of which the LTV is one element, in particular be 
developed to avoid the conflict between the general aims of enacting the housing finance 
laws 2012 and the application of article (12) of RREFL? And how can the adverse impact 
on the housing finance market of applying the LTV be mitigated? 
 Why does Saudi need to launch a securitisation market in the context of the development 
of the housing finance market? If indeed it does, is there a consequent need to reform the 
housing finance laws 2012 in order to build up a well-developed securitisation market? 
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1.2 Background  
 
Housing is considered the most important asset and largest expense of households around 
the world.
1
 It is often the greatest financial investment an individual or family will make, 
and is heavily associated with security, stability and privacy.
2
 For most purchasers long–
term financing is their only viable option, as few can afford to purchase properties 
outright.
3
 In these circumstances the housing finance market emerges as a necessary 
facilitator of access to such financing.   
The quality of the housing finance market in a given country is often measured by, 
amongst other things, the rate of homeownership, as underdevelopment of the market 
often translates into low rates of homeownership.4 High rates of homeownership in the 
US, for instance, have been attributed to the development of the residential housing 
finance market, granting aspiring home buyers access to finance whilst protecting the 
interests of lenders in the case of borrower default.
5 The need for such a housing finance 
market, that is to say a regime that appropriately balances the interests of purchasers and 
lenders, is all the more urgent where public sources of finance cannot meet current levels 
of demand due to a lack of provision. 
In line with this trend, it appears that the Saudi experience is not exceptional, as a large 
proportion of the population do not own their homes, the homeownership rate being lower 
than 47%.
6
 Although rates of homeownership are not the only indicators of the quality of 
                                            
1
 V Warnock and F Warnock, ‘Markets and housing finance’ (2008) 17 Journal of Housing 
economics 239.  
2
 R Opoku and A Alhassan, ‘Housing preferences and attribute importance among low-income consumers 
in Saudi Arabia’ (2010) 34 Habitat International 219. 
3
 B Richard, ‘Fannie Mea and the secondary mortgage market’ (1971) 66 Northwestern University Law 
review 1. 
4
 S Proxenos, ‘Homeownership rates: a global perspective’ (2002) 17 Housing finance international 3. 
5
 A Sanders, ‘Barriers to homeownership and housing quality: The impact of the international mortgage 
market’(2005) 14 Journal of Housing Economics147. 
6
 Some studies suggest that just 36% of Saudis owned their homes, for more information about this study 
see:  S Alshaik and A Alwazir, ‘Saudi housing sector 2012’ (menafn.com,2012) < 
<https://www.menafn.com/updates/research_center/Saudi_Arabia/Economic/ncb091212.pdf>accessed 
25th August 2016; while Deputy of crown prince the chairman of the Council for Economic and 
Development Affairs Stated when he was interviewed by Alarabia channel that the home ownership in 
Saudi is 47%, then the Ministry of Housing confirmed later this percentage, for more information about 
the interview see: Alarabia, ‘Mohammed bin Salman and 33 titles of Saudi vision2013’ 
(alarabiya.net,25th April 2016)<http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/programs/special-interview/2016/04/25/- 
%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%86- 
%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84- 
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a housing finance market and its ability to cater to demand for finance lending, they are 
suggestive of pervasive issues impacting upon both the activities of lenders and the access 
of prospective homebuyers to the market.
7
 
Over the past several years Saudi has witnessed a significant overhaul of its financial 
system in response to the current housing crisis in the country,
8 which itself was 
exacerbated by decreased government spending in the housing sector during the period 
1985-2007. This lack of investment, coupled with a growing population and the 
importation of large numbers of foreign workers,9 has placed excessive pressure on the 
housing sector, which has been unable to meet the demand for affordable housing. As this 
crisis has grown in scale the problems it presents have become impossible to ignore, 
making the need for a financing system all the more pressing.  
The Saudi government have made several attempts to resolve this issue through the 
adoption of various policies and legislation. The most significant of these measures, 
conducted by both the government and legislative authority in Saudi, has been the 
enactment of the so-called the housing finance laws 2012. Those laws are; the Finance 
Lease Law (FLL), the Law on the Supervision of Finance Companies (LSFC), and the 
Real Estate Finance Law (REFL),10 which will be the central concern of this thesis and 
                                            
%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89- 
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9.html>accessed 10th November   
2016. However, this rate, which is only 47% of Saudis owned their homes, was officially confirmed by  
the General Authority of Statistic in Saudi, for more information visit: The General Authority of Statistic,  
‘Distribution of population in administrative districts’ (stats.gov.sa, August 
2016)<http://www.stats.gov.sa/ar/13> accessed 20th November 2016. For more information about 
homeownership rate in Saudi see; V Perry and C Motley, ‘Dreams and Taboos: Home Loan Advertising in 
the United States and Saudi Arabia’ (2010) 22 Journal of International Consumer Marketing 199 & & 
General authority for statistics, ‘ Statistic and information sector in Saudi Arabia’ (stast.gov.sa, 21st July 
2016)<http://www.stats.gov.sa/en/%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9/statistical-sector> accessed 4 
June 2016. 
7
 S Proxenos, ‘Homeownership rates: a global perspective’ (2002) 17 Housing finance international 3. 
8
 Chapter Two will discuss and shed light on the housing crisis in Saudi Arabia and the measures have been 
conducted by Saudi government to address this issue.   
9
 It is estimated, for example, that Saudi population during the 1970s reached 5 million, with the foreign 
workforce rising to over 1.2 million in 1985. While currently the Saudi population is estimated more than 
31 million, the foreign workforce constitutes more than 10 million. For more information, visit the General 
authority for statistics web; General authority for statistic, ‘Pulation by Gender , Age Groups and 
Nationality (Saudi/Non-Saudi)’ (stats.gov.sa, August 2016) <http://www.stats.gov.sa/en/4068> accessed 
12th November 2016. 
10
The background to these most recent laws has its origin in 2003, when participants in the 2003 Economic 
Forum in Riyadh highlighted the difficulties likely to hinder the finance sector and housing finance in Saudi. 
Afterwards these concerns were submitted to the Saudi government through the Al-Gassim law firm, a 
Saudi firm associated with the Allen & Overy law firm that is expert in Islamic finance, banking, finance, 
commercial cases, and drafting contracts and bills. Then, AlQassim law firm was selected to draft the bills 
of the housing Finance Laws. Subsequently, the bills received Royal Assent, coming into effect in 
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signify a major expansion and milestone in the codification of Saudi law. The paragraphs 
below will provide a brief overview of these laws.  
Introducing and establishing a new era in housing finance market, with a securitised 
market in Saudi Arabia bringing greater depth and maturity to the industry,11 are key 
factors in the enactment of the REFL. It also has the broader aim of paving the way for 
banks and financial institutions to enter into the housing market, and for the dissemination 
of information within that market. The level of liquidity in the market is targeted by the 
REFL, as it will be enhanced through the establishment of a securitisation market, which 
will play a significant role in providing the market with the desired liquidity at low cost.  
The FLL prescribes the rules on finance leasing and, more specifically, the 
responsibilities of the lessor and lessee in a Sharia’a compliant manner. Here the asset 
risk is placed on the Lessor during the lease term, but the Lessee is held responsible for 
the relevant use.  
The LSFC provides a framework for companies wishing to conduct financial operations, 
either in housing finance, production asset finance or small and medium enterprise 
finance. The law determines, for example, the capital requirements for establishing such 
companies, and obliges them to engage in finance activities in a manner that does not 
conflict with principles of Islamic law as defined by the Sharia Committee, whose 
members are themselves appointed by those companies.12    
The aim of enacting the housing finance laws was mainly to build confidence in the 
housing finance market, to provide the desired protection for its main participants, to 
facilitate the housing finance access and to regulate the relationship between the parties 
to housing finance transactions. Although, in the short term, the housing finance laws will 
not result in significant increases in lending activity, it is believed that in the long term 
they will facilitate, to some extent, the development and availability of housing finance 
in Saudi.  
                                            
2012.These laws are unique in that they are the first to control and regulate financial contracts (namely the 
finance lease contract). Furthermore, it was the first time the Saudi government had enacted law by 
engaging a law firm to draft proposed legislation. For more information see: The Economist Team, “The 
recommendations of the first Riyadh Economic Forum. 6-8 October 2003” (riyadhef.com, 6 October 2003)< 
http://www.riyadhef.com/tabid/55/Default.aspx> Accessed 12 July 2016. 
11
 K Khan, ‘Saudi Mortgage Law’ (alrajhi-capital.com, 1 March 2013) < http://www.alrajhi-
capital.com/en/research/Market/Mortgage%20law_Mar%202013_Final.pdf> accessed 6th November 2016. 
12
 Discussion of the rules and provisions of the above laws is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for 
more information about the housing finance laws see: SAMA, ‘Finance laws’ (sama.gov.sa,July 2012) < 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-us/laws/pages/financelaws.aspx> accessed 14th July 2016.   
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In adopting such an aggressive legislative programme the government intended to tackle 
and resolve numerous legal problems relating to finance in general and to housing finance 
in particular, given the acute housing shortage. Nevertheless, the deficit in housing 
finance remained the biggest task facing the government13 and it could not be addressed 
solely by the introduction of the aforementioned laws. This is not to say that these laws 
make no contribution to the resolution of the housing finance crisis, but rather that such 
a complex and difficult matter warrants further examination and analysis. In this context 
the goal of this thesis has emerged as the formulation of research that might help in 
dealing with some of the issues raised.      
Although the introduction of the FLL, LSFC and REFL has addressed, to some extent, a 
wide range of legal issues impacting upon the housing finance market, certain issues do 
remain and call for further examination and development. This latter point is made in 
recognition of the fact that the Saudi market is considered an emerging market and, as 
such, is still undergoing a process of development. Taking these factors into account it is 
apparent that housing finance is not readily available. This is due to the typically small 
size of residential lending, which is poorly accessible and depositor-based, whilst lenders 
remain vulnerable to significant credit, liquidity and interest rate risks. There is therefore 
a clear need to develop such a market so as to remedy those issues that currently obstruct 
public access to housing finance. This is especially true in the Saudi context, where the 
unique culture and religious heritage might play a further role in retarding this process of 
development.
14     
Accordingly, the principal concern of this research is to improve the legal infrastructure 
of the housing finance market in Saudi. This necessitates the removal of existing barriers 
to the procurement of housing finance, which are either left unaddressed by the housing 
finance laws 2012 or are themselves a product of their implementation.  
Finally, it is important to note here that the public housing finance market will be 
excluded from our consideration; the emphasis is solely on the development of the private 
                                            
13
 Oxford business ‘An underserved market: Making affordable housing attractive to investors’ 
(oxfordbusinessgroup.com, 15 June 2013)< http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/underserved-
market-making-affordable-housing-attractive-investors> Accessed 12th November 2016.     
14
 There is a study suggest that the housing finance markets in the countries in Middle East and North Africa 
Countries (MENA) are lack of developments due to the large population of these countries are Muslims an 
considered under Shari‘ah law which considers lending through mortgages as repellent, for more 
inf4roamtion about this study see; A Sanders, ‘Barriers to homeownership and housing quality: The impact 
of the international mortgage market’(2005) 14 Journal of Housing Economics147. 
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housing finance market. Also, it must be noted that the thesis uses the housing finance 
market as a synonym for the mortgage market. The reason for using this name (the 
housing finance market) is that the Saudi legislator gave this name to the housing finance 
laws 2012, instead of calling the measure the mortgage laws. So whenever the mortgage 
market is mentioned in this research, reference is made, primarily, to the housing finance 
market and vice versa. 
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
 
In order to achieve the objectives stated above, and to address the issues and answer the 
questions involved, the thesis has been divided into seven chapters, each one discussing 
and examining a discrete issue. Leaving the introductory chapter to one side the 
subsequent chapters proceed as follows.  
 
Chapter Two: 
Chapter Two discusses the development of the housing finance market in Saudi, its 
history, sources, and the challenges it presents. In this chapter two questions provide the 
central focus of the discussion, namely; what initiatives and proposals have been adopted 
to develop the housing finance market? And; what barriers to this development remained 
unaddressed? The aim of these questions is to conduct a review of the initiatives, whether 
implemented by the government or legislative authority, that have been adopted in 
response to the underdevelopment of the housing finance market and consequent low 
rates of homeownership in Saudi. In addition, the chapter aims to identify those barriers 
to the development of the housing finance market that remained unaddressed.  
 
Chapter Three: 
Chapter 3 purports to analyse the decision of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), issued 
on 26th August 1981, which stated that all Sharia authorities, including courts and notaries 
public, should not implement mortgage documentation for loans provided by 
conventional banks in Saudi because those loans are usurious and thus are not Sharia-
compliant.
15
 It could be argued that the SJC’s decision is hindering the development of 
                                            
15
 F Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000) 93. 
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the housing finance market by depriving lenders and borrowers of mortgage security. The 
chapter will consider whether or not the provisions of the housing finance laws 2012 are 
able to supersede that decision. This question can be explored through conceptualizing 
the SJC’s decision, in order to determine whether it should be considered from a legal, 
administrative or judicial standpoint, or some combination thereof. The chapter will then 
conclude by proposing an alternative solution that may assist in bridging the gap produced 
by the decision.  
 
Chapter Four: 
This chapter will discuss the Land Fees Law (LFL) 2016 which was enacted to address 
land prices as presented by the official statement. Although the LFL 2016 was enacted to 
address land prices in Saudi, it seems the law is incomplete, as there remains an enduring 
lack of clarity regarding the primary aim of the law. The chapter is designed to discuss 
whether or not the purpose of the LFL 2016 is consistent with existing research regarding 
land taxation and its possible impact on land prices.  
In order to properly examine and analyse the LFL 2016 two questions must be answered: 
firstly, whether levying tax on land ,imposed by the LFL, tends to precipitate either a 
decrease in the market value of land or an increase in its supply? And secondly: what are 
the legal concerns emerging from the wording of the LFL 2016? In fact, there are two 
such concerns,  one pertaining to the lack of fairness and equity, and the other pertaining 
to the possible overlap between liabilities resulting from the LFL 2016 and obligations 
stemming from zakah, an Islamic instrument which is considered similar to tax. The 
chapter will discuss these concerns and attempt to answer these questions.  
 
Chapter Five: 
This chapter deals with the capping of the LTV ratio at 70%, as stated by article (12) of 
the RREFL, and the manner in which this measure has prevented a vast segment of 
prospective homebuyers from gaining access to the housing finance market. The LTV 
ratio is usually given as “the ratio of the borrower’s loan amount to the collateral value 
assessed by the case financial institution”.
16
 For instance; if a borrower desires to buy a 
property costing £100,000, and makes a deposit of £15,000 to secure the remaining 
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 T Lin, L Chia-Chi and C Chun-Hung, ‘Impacts of the borrower's attributes, loan contract contents, and 
collateral characteristics on mortgage loan default’ (2011) 31 The Service Industries Journal1385,1392.  
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£85,000 to finance the purchase, the down payment equals 15% while the LTV will be 
85%. Accordingly, it could be argued that article (12) conflicts with the main aim of 
enacting the housing finance laws 2012, namely to facilitate access to housing finance, a 
point which raises concern about the regulatory framework that governs the housing 
finance market. Thus, to avoid such conflict, the chapter seeks to develop the regulatory 
framework for regulating the housing finance market in general and for adopting the 
macro-prudential policy, of which the Loan-to-value (LTV) is one element, in particular. 
Also, the chapter aims to answer this question: how can the adverse impact on the housing 
finance market of applying the LTV be mitigated? 
 
Chapter Six  
Chapter Six focuses on the need to set up a securitisation market in Saudi that would 
provide a workable and cheap solution to the liquidity shortage in order to develop the 
housing finance market. Although the chapter identifies a need to launch such a market 
in Saudi to help address the housing finance deficit, any such move would urgently 
require legal reform.  
The chapter, therefore, seeks to answer two questions which will be central to its 
discussion. Why does Saudi need to launch a securitisation market in the context of the 
development of the housing finance market? If indeed it does, is there a consequent need 
to reform the housing finance laws 2012 so as to build up a well-developed securitisation 
market? 
 
Chapter Seven: 
Building upon the above analysis and discussion, the chapter draws together the threads 
and reminds the reader why the four aspects of housing finance remain unaddressed and 
why the research findings of this thesis are likely to address them, and in so doing to 
realise the main objectives set out at the beginning of this thesis.    
 
1.4 Research Significance 
The principal motives behind the adoption of this subject matter are as follows. Firstly, 
the development of housing finance in Saudi has not been satisfactorily discussed from a 
legal perspective, as it is more often approached from an economic perspective, which 
makes this thesis unique in the field. Furthermore, existing research in this area directed 
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towards the housing sector in Saudi is focused on public housing finance, rather than the 
private sector.
17
 Most studies were conducted during the first era of housing shortages, in 
the late 1970s and 1990s,
18 while this thesis will mainly focus on developing the housing 
finance market to achieve many goals that will enable the private sector to flourish.  
Secondly, the Saudi government has shown its desire to clear the way for the financial 
sector, including banks and financial institutions, to play a leading role in the provision 
of housing finance lending and in mitigating public pressure for reform. However, this 
can only be achieved if conditions are optimal; this thesis thus seeks to assist in creating 
a healthy environment through addressing those obstacles to the further development of 
this sector. In particular, in the wake of the collapse of oil prices, the Saudi government 
adopted the so-called Saudi Vision 2030,
19
 which explicitly signals the government’s 
intention to pave the way for the private sector to perform many functions formerly the 
preserve of government.  
Thirdly, this research presents a comprehensive study analysing and discussing the 
possible factors that contribute in hindering the development of the housing finance 
market, and attempts to propose solutions compliant with the general principles of both 
the Saudi legal system and Islamic law, drawing inspiration from the successful 
experiences of other jurisdictions.  
Fourthly, this research is significant for those countries possessing a dual banking system, 
comprised of both conventional and Islamic banking, as this thesis advances a new 
collateral security structure that is “compliant” with the general principles of Islamic Law 
while granting the desired protection to all market participants, as is seen in Chapter 
Three. 
Finally, the thesis should be of interest to the Saudi government, as it highlights defects 
arising from prior attempts to address housing shortages, which unfortunately did not 
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 R Aldakheel, ‘Residents' satisfaction with public housing: the case of Buraidah public housing 
development in Saudi Arabia’ (PhD thesis, University of Michigan 1995); S Al-Tasan, ‘ An Evaluation of 
Housing Finance in Saudi Arabia: The Real Estate Development Fund's Policies and Alternative Options’ 
(PhD thesis, University of Durham 1998) & S Al‐Hathloul and E Narayanan, ‘Housing stock management 
issues in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’(1992)7 Housing Studies 268.  
18 Chapter Two sheds lights on the first era of housing shortage occurred in Saudi during the period 1970s 
and 1980s. 
19
 For further information about Saudi Vision2030 visit: Saudi Vision, ‘A Developed Digital Infrastructure’ 
(vision2030.gov.sa, April 2016)< http://vision2030.gov.sa/en >accessed 20th November 2016. 
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meet with success. The proposal suggested in chapter Five may be of particular assistance 
in this respect.  
1.5 Methodology 
It is crucial to note that Saudi Arabia, not being a common-law jurisdiction, has no 
referable case law from which to infer the likely outcomes of future cases, or to explicate 
the judicial reasoning in such decisions. The principle of stare decisis does not form part 
of the Saudi legal system; therefore, courts are not bound by previous cases.
20 Instead, 
Islamic law, legislations, regulations, royal decrees and royal orders, represent the main 
sources of the legal system in Saudi.
21
  
This thesis adopts several methods – doctrinal, theoretical, and contextual – to achieve 
the above aims and to answer the above questions. The doctrinal method
22
 used by the 
thesis will involve an examination of the existing legislations, regulations and statutes 
related to the housing finance market. The principal focus will be on the housing finance 
laws of 2012, the Land Fees Law 2016, and other relevant Saudi laws and regulations 
affecting the development of the housing finance market. All are reviewed in order both 
to enrich the content of the thesis and to establish a strong foundation on which to propose 
possible avenues of reform. 
Also, the thesis uses the theoretical method
23
 to investigate how the theories of taxation, 
security and securitisation could be complemented with the philosophy of Islamic law 
and the Saudi legal system.  
In addition, the methodology in some parts of the thesis can be considered as contextual, 
as the thesis examines the law within its social and economic context. The aim is therefore 
to place the legal infrastructure necessary for reform of the housing finance market in its 
                                            
20
M McMillen, ‘Rahn Concepts in Saudi Arabia: Formalization and a Registration and Prioritization 
System’(papers.ssrn.com, 31 August 2010)  
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670104> accessed 20th November 2016 & A 
Baamir and I Bantekas, ‘Saudi law as lex arbitri: Evaluation of Saudi arbitration law and judicial practice’ 
(2009) 25 Arbitration International 239. 
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 F Al-Fadhel, ‘Legislative Drafting and Law-Making Practices and Procedures under Saudi Arabian  
Law: A Brief Overview’(2012)1 IJLDLR 95. 
22
 For further information about doctrinal methodology see: T Huchinson and N Duncan, ‘Defining and 
describing what we do: Doctrinal legal research’ (2012) 17 Deakin L. Rev 83.  
23
M Dubber, ‘Critical Analysis of Law: Interdisciplinary, Contextuality, and the Future of Legal Studies’ 
(individual.utoronto.ca, June 2012) <http://individual.utoronto.ca/dubber/CAL.pdf >accessed 25th 
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proper social, economic and policy-making context to provide a comprehensive study 
that, it is hoped, will contribute to its further development.
24  
As the thesis is a doctrinal study, it draws from all available sources, including electronic 
resources and archiving services, such as Westlaw, LexisNexis, Hein Online and Google 
Scholar, together with libraries and academic collections in the UK, such as the British 
Library, Cambridge University Library, Oxford University Library, and Leeds University 
Library, etc.  
It is necessary to use the descriptive method in some parts of the thesis, especially Chapter 
Two, to establish the essential concept of the development of housing finance in Saudi. 
This method provides the background of the legislative authority and government in 
Saudi that is needed to understand the development of the housing finance market and the 
barriers hindering this development. The thesis further uses the critical analysis method 
in its remaining sections, as these sections deal with controversial issues surrounding the 
development of housing finance, thus indicating a path towards addressing the barriers 
hindering this development.  
In fact, the combination of these methods is deemed the most suitable approach with 
which to achieve the research objectives. As has been argued, conducting a critical study 
without a basis in analytical data would lead to baseless results, while conducting an 
analytical study without a critique is pointless.
25
  
Although the research will only focus on the situation within Saudi Arabia, it attempts to 
draw on other jurisdictions’ experiences and thus learn some lessons. The choice of this 
approach is derived from the belief that Saudi’s lack of experience in this field makes it 
necessary to learn from those jurisdictions that have wide experience in it.  For example, 
in Chapter Five, the thesis draws on the UK’s experience of procedures implemented 
before the adoption of the macro-prudential policy, including the LTV, which reveals 
both adequate preparation and strong cooperation between financial authorities. In 
addition, the thesis attempts to benefit from Hong Kong’s experience, stretching back to 
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the 1990s, of addressing the adverse impact of the LTV by creating a mechanism for 
mitigating it. 
In addition, the thesis seeks, in Chapter Six, to draw on the wide experience of the US in 
developing its own housing finance market and increasing the homeownership rate 
through establishing and developing the securitisation market. There were clear indicators 
by the Saudi legislator that the housing finance laws 2012 were inspired by the American 
experience of establishing a legal basis for the securitisation market. Those indicators 
were recently confirmed by the Saudi government when it declared its intention to 
establish a partnership between the Public Investment Fund (PIF), which is owned by the 
Saudi government, and the Boston Consulting Group, to help design a government-owned 
entity similar to America’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with the purpose of developing 
a housing finance market.26  
The research has, however, met with certain difficulties and obstacles. First of all, the 
topic of housing finance market in the Saudi context has not been widely studied.27 
Similarly, and partly as a consequence, there are a lack of resources related to certain 
aspects of the thesis, such as housing finance and legal studies in the Saudi context. In 
addition, as noted above, judicial precedents are not reported or published in Saudi, 
resulting in a dearth of case law.  
It is worth mentioning that the barriers selected for consideration in this research are not 
the only challenges that the development of the housing finance market faces in Saudi. 
Legal challenges can be found in every aspect of this field, for example in the lack of 
regulations and in dispute settlement, among other issues. However, the constraints of a 
doctoral research project forced the researcher to limit the scope of this thesis to those 
barriers considered major hindrances to the development of the housing finance market 
because of their importance, and the researcher hopes that the study will encourage further 
academic research into and discussion of any topic arising from and pertaining to these 
issues.  
                                            
26Z Fattah, S Bianchi and D Almashabi, ‘Saudi Arabia Said to Plan Fannie Mae-Style Mortgage Company’ 
Bloomberg (New York City, 18th November 2015) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-
18/saudi-arabia-said-to-plan-fannie-mae-style-mortgage-company> accessed 12th November 2016.  
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 For example the following researches covered the housing finance in Saudi filed: R 
Aldakheel, ‘Residents' satisfaction with public housing: the case of Buraidah public housing development 
in Saudi Arabia’ (PhD thesis, University of Michigan1995);S Al-Tasan, ‘ An Evaluation of Housing 
Finance in Saudi Arabia: The Real Estate Development Fund's Policies and Alternative Options’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Durham1998); S Al‐Hathloul and E Narayanan, ‘Housing stock management issues in 
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Finally, it must be noted that the data and findings of this thesis show the position of the 
topic from October 2012, when the thesis began, until November 2016, when the research 
was concluded.
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Chapter Two: The development of the housing finance market in 
Saudi   Arabia – history, origins and challenges 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will answer two questions: (1) what have been the initiatives adopted by the 
Saudi government in developing the housing finance market, and (2) what barriers to 
developing that housing finance market remain unaddressed?  
The aim of these questions is to conduct a review of the initiatives, whether governmental 
or legislative, that have been adopted to address the lack of development in the housing 
finance market and the knock-on effect of reduced home ownership in Saudi Arabia and 
to determine those aspects believed to hamper efforts to develop the housing finance 
market for further analysis. The objectives of this chapter are: to highlight the main 
initiatives adopted by the government and legislative authority to develop the housing 
finance market; and to prove that, despite significant governmental and legislative 
initiatives to develop that market, there are four aspects that remain unaddressed and need 
further examination and study.  
The chapter, therefore, has been divided into the following sections: (2.1) introduction; 
(2.2) an exposition highlighting the historical background of the development of the 
housing finance market in Saudi Arabia with focusing on the first phase of the housing 
crisis, followed by a discussion in (2.2.1) of factors contributing to the second, current, 
housing crisis in Saudi Arabia. This section in turn can be classified into (i) the decline 
in governmental contributions to the Saudi housing sector; and (ii) changes in 
demographics and demands in Saudi Arabia. Section three (2.3) will discuss the housing 
finance shortage crisis in KSA and sources of housing finance in the country. The fourth 
section (2.4) reviews governmental intervention and legislative initiatives to develop the 
housing finance market in KSA. Section five (2.5) identifies the barriers to development 
of the housing finance market, which are: (i) lack of protection for lenders as potentially 
undermining the development of a housing finance market; (ii) increased land prices and 
their negative role in housing finance; (iii) capping of the Loan to Value (LTV) at low 
levels, with the lack of cooperation in the housing finance market as a potential source of 
unpredictable results; and finally (iv) challenges in developing the housing finance 
market through securitisation of the market to remedy the liquidity shortage. The final 
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section of this chapter (2.6) is the conclusion, which summarises and analyses the key 
matters addressed throughout the chapter. 
   
2.2 Historical background to the development of the housing finance 
market in Saudi Arabia 
 
The development of a housing finance market in Saudi Arabia began in the 1970s when 
the Kingdom experienced rapid economic expansion as a result of the oil price boom 
during that same decade, which continued well into the mid1980s: government 
expenditure was $14 billion during the period 1970-1975, increasing to 1985-90 to $322 
billion.1 This economic boom was felt in the Saudi economy - the real estate and 
construction sectors saw a period of rapid growth. However, the consequent decline in 
employment in rural areas forced many Saudi citizens to move to larger cities in search 
of employment. The urban housing infrastructure in Saudi Arabia during this period was 
not prepared to accommodate such a significant increase in people; the limited number of 
dwellings caused an acute housing shortage,
2 which led to an increase in real estate prices, 
which in turn increased the cost of living for citizens and made it difficult for middle and 
lower income citizens to access the housing ladder.
3 This first phase may be considered 
to be the first housing crisis in Saudi Arabia (the second and on-going housing crisis, 
which will be examined later on, began in the late 1990s).    
In responding to the significant demand for housing, the Saudi government has adopted 
policies designed to develop the housing finance market and to improve housing 
infrastructure, comprised of three steps: firstly, a consideration of the government’s aims 
and objectives in addressing the housing issue; secondly, the establishment of a 
government agency to supervise and regulate the housing market; and finally, creating a 
                                            
1 S Al‐Hathloul and E Narayanan, ‘Housing stock management issues in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’(1992)7 Housing Studies 268 & A Al-Meer, ‘Organizational commitment: A comparison of 
Westerners, Asians, and Saudis’ (1989) 19 International Studies of Management & Organization 74. 
2 S Al-Tasan, ‘ An Evaluation of Housing Finance in Saudi Arabia: The Real Estate Development Fund's 
Policies and Alternative Options’ (PhD thesis, University of Durham 1998).   
3
 T Fadaak, ‘Urban housing policy evaluation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (PhD thesis, Portland 
State University1984).   
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government agency to act as financier in providing Saudi citizens with interest-free 
loans.
4   
The first policy is represented in the so-called Five Year Plan (‘FYP’),5 the function of 
which being to primarily develop an economic and social development policy for Saudi 
society6. The FYP aimed among many aims and goals to raise the living standards of 
Saudi citizens and provide them with a welfare system. General housing objectives and a 
required numbers of dwellings / housing units were incorporated in the FYP.
7
 It was 
believed that the FYP eased the Saudi government’s task of determining the budget 
required to finance housing projects in order to reduce the housing shortage. This 
objective was to be achieved by allocating the required budget to fund such projects, 
developing human resources to supervise the projects and regulating the aspects of this 
sector in order to ensure they would be compatible with the overall objectives of the FYP.  
Under pressure to increase housing stock, the Saudi government sought to establish an 
entity functioning as both supervisor and regulator in the housing sector and 
implementing the government’s housing policies and programmes. This step was the 
second policy adopted by the Saudi government, which in May 1975 established the 
General Housing Department. Given its own ambitious plans to address the housing 
crisis, the government decided to transform the Department to become the Ministry of 
Public Works and Housing (‘MPWH’), which was tasked with the duty of implementing 
the government’s policies and goals set out in the FYP.8  
The creation of the MPWH was significant not only because of its role as both supervisor 
and regulator for the housing sector, but also for its efforts in contributing towards the 
construction of many housing projects around the Kingdom. Two massive projects known 
as ‘Rush Housing’ were spearheaded by the MPWH (and which had the long-term 
                                            
4
 Y Eshmawi, ‘Policy and development: the impact of growth on urban housing in Saudi Arabia-towards a 
solution for the low-income’  (PhD thesis Massachusetts Institute of Technology1983).  
5 The first plan was prepared and submitted to King Faisal in August 1970; for more information see; M 
Nehme, ‘Saudi development plans between capitalist and Islamic values’(1994)30 Middle Eastern 
Studies 632.  
6
 R Looney, ‘Socio-economic tradeoffs in Saudi Arabia's third five year plan (1980–1985)’(1986) 20 Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences 181. 
7
 Aldakheel R, ‘Residents' satisfaction with public housing: the case of Buraidah public housing  
development in Saudi Arabia’ (PhD thesis, University of Michigan 1995). 
8 F Farsy, Modernity and tradition: the Saudi equation (Routledge 1990) 15. 
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objective of being sold to residents),
9 one of which comprised of 4,752 units based on the 
three main cities in Saudi Arabia,
10
 and the other 14,686 apartments and 9,854 villas, 
which was spread out across various cities across the Kingdom. 
The third and final policy adopted by the Saudi government was to establish a 
government-owned body that would act as a specialised financing institution. The 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy (‘MFNE’) thus established the Real Estate 
Development Fund (‘REDF’), which had the aim of funding the construction of 
affordable homes, with long-term free-interest loans, for Saudi citizens.
11
The REDF 
started its operations with a modest authorised capital SR 250 million (approximately 
$66,650,000),
12 which of course could not be expected to make a huge difference to the 
housing finance market. The Saudi government soon realised that the REDF would not 
be able to make as large a contribution to the housing finance market as originally 
anticipated, and in response the Saudi government took initiatives to increase capital by 
1995 to SR 74 billion (approximately $195,000,000,00).
13
  
The REDF’s target demographic was Saudi nationals in low and middle income brackets 
where eligible applicants
14
 could be granted up to 70 per cent of the estimated cost of the 
property, up to a maximum of SR 300,000 (approximately $80,000), with a once in a 
lifetime loan facility. Eligibility was to be determined by the borrower's age, marital 
status, gender and home ownership status besides granting loan provided to own land to 
build upon based on the REDF’s law.
15
 
The above initiatives, coupled with oil wealth caused by the boom in oil prices during the 
1970s and early 1980s, therefore helped kick-start the housing finance market, produce 
new and affordable housing and helped the Saudi government overcome the housing 
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 A Al-Mayouf and A Al-Khayyal, ‘Provision of Public Housing in Saudi Arabia: Past, Current and Future 
Trends’(2011)23  Arch. & Planning journal 59. 
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 F Mubarak, ‘Cultural adaptation to housing needs: a case study, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’ (IAHS Conference 
Proceedings, 1999).  
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 S Al-Tasan, ‘ An Evaluation of Housing Finance in Saudi Arabia: The Real Estate Development Fund's 
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12 For more information on the REDF’s history see: A Al-Saati, ‘Residents' satisfaction in subsidized 
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13 R Al Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development (Routledge 2015) 170. 
14 S Al-Hathloul and M Mughal, ‘Urban growth management-the Saudi experience’ (2004) 28 Habitat 
International 609.  
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crisis caused by urban migration and urbanisation.16 This was reflected in the second and 
third years of the FYP,17 indicating that the early achievements within the housing sector 
(both in respect of construction and ownership) were thanks to the government as opposed 
to the private sector, which contributed nothing at all. The high rate vacancy in housing 
units in the wake of third FYP has led to the excess overall housing supply and in turn a 
significant decrease in real estate value.
18
 Despite the government’s success in resolving 
the first era of the housing shortage, a second housing shortage occurred in Saudi Arabia 
in the late 1990s and continued up to the present, representing a significant challenge for 
the government and public alike. What are the reasons for this second housing shortage?  
 
2.2.1 Contributory factors towards the second, current, housing crisis in 
Saudi Arabia 
 
i. The decline of governmental contribution towards the Saudi housing sector 
 
After the 1990s, the Saudi government’s contribution towards the housing sector declined 
and the number of housing units built by the REDF decreased, dropping below FYP 
predictions. The decrease in the number of housing units built with REDF assistance can 
be attributed to a freeze in government subsidies towards the REDF. The last government 
attempt to increase authorised capital of the REDF was in 1995, when the government 
increased it from over SAR 74 billion, as mentioned above. Due to the absence of any 
significant increase in authorised capital, the construction of housing inevitably stagnated.  
The government’s decision to freeze or reduce its input in the housing sector was 
particularly noticeable during the reign of King Fahd, former king of Saudi Arabia 
between 1982 and 2005, who issued a royal order to abolish the MPWH and transfer its 
undertakings to the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (‘MMRA’). This 
unprecedented move was due to austerity policies that were partly aimed at reducing or 
                                            
16
  F Mubarak, ‘Cultural adaptation to housing needs: a case study, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’ (IAHS 
Conference Proceedings, 1999). 
17 A Al-Meer, ‘Organizational commitment: A comparison of Westerners, Asians, and Saudis’ (1989) 
19 International Studies of Management & Organization 74. 
18 S Al‐Hathloul and E Narayanan, ‘Housing stock management issues in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’(1992)7 Housing Studies 268. 
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altogether stopping the injection of capital into the housing sector, although abolishing 
the regulatory and supervisory body was questionable.
19
 
In regards to the REDF, the decline in governmental subsidies naturally caused its 
operations to dwindle and reflect the decline in the housing finance market. For example, 
during the 1970s, a total of 47,063 loans were provided, compared to 23,340 during the 
1990s.    
The austerity measures imposed by the Saudi government may be attributed to either of 
two factors: the first being the significant cutback in Saudi Arabia’s financial surplus 
caused by falling oil prices in the mid-1980s,20 which led to an economic depression and 
forced the government to change its priorities, which was then followed by the economic 
consequences of the First Gulf War,
21 which is estimated to have cost the region $676 
billion22 and the Saudi economy a post-war debt of SAR 664 billion.
23
 The second 
possibility is the belief that the excess housing supply rendered housing stocks sufficient, 
causing the Saudi government to focus its efforts, investment and resources elsewhere. 
The Saudi government thus played an indirect role in the housing sector during the fourth 
and fifth plans due to the over-supply.   
The government’s strategy was evident in the fourth plan when the housing sector 
witnessed a high rate in the number of vacant housing units, reflecting the policy adopted 
by the government. However, the demand for new housing grew rapidly from 1988 
onwards,
24
 due to population growth owed in part to the increased number of foreign 
workers. 
ii. Changes in demographics and demands in Saudi Arabia 
 
Saudi Arabia is considered to be the most densely populated country in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (‘GCC’), with its population increasing from just under 4 million in 
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196025 to over 31 million in 2016.26 The significant growth in occurred most prominently 
during the period 1970-1994 when official censuses were conducted by the government 
and the population sizes were found to be over 7 million and 16.95 million respectively- 
a 141 per cent increase.
27
 By comparison with the global population, the Saudi population 
rate grew by 2.9 per cent between 2003 and 2009, whereas the global population grew by 
1.3 per cent.28 It is expected that the population growth of Saudi Arabia will continue but 
at a slower pace,29 and is expected to reach 38.5 million by 2030.30  
This demographic change
31 has had a negative impact on the housing sector by putting 
great pressure on a sector that was already unprepared to accommodate so many 
additional people – an increase in population naturally leads to a rise in the demand for 
housing, especially in the main large cities, Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah, which 
acquired the vast majority of the population for many reasons, as will be shown later.
32
 
However, Saudi Arabia was experiencing an increased shortage in housing stock, a sharp 
decrease in home ownership due to population growth and a decline in governmental 
contribution towards the housing sector.  
The demographic change in Saudi Arabia has coincided with a new pattern of lifestyle 
changes adopted by Saudis for various purposes, and generating a new demand for 
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housing. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s there were seven universities
33
 in the main 
large cities in KSA: Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, Abha, Makkah and Madinah, which led 
many young Saudis who wished to pursue higher education to leave their families to study 
at those universities. This move of course put great pressure on the housing sector in these 
cities, particularly as some of these students, who were married, took their wives and 
children with them; of course a big family requires spacious accommodation. In addition, 
many young professionals are leaving their parents in search of better paid jobs in the big 
Saudi cities which offer more opportunities than small cities; and such a move also 
requires the establishment of a new household, creating fresh demand for housing in these 
cities.
34
 Both trends have created a new source of housing demand, putting more pressure 
on a sector that is not prepared to meet additional demand.       
The above has been accompanied by another factor, namely an increase in wages, which 
has exacerbated the situation.35 For example, between 1975 and 1980 the average income 
per capita of a Saudi working male increased from SAR 18,002 ($4,800) to SAR 30,754 
($8,200).36 More recently, the average per capita income increased from SAR 40,705 
($10,853) in 2004 to SAR 94,275 ($25,136) in 2012.37 It can be argued that the increase 
in average incomes should have helped people own homes or at least enable them to 
obtain home purchase loans from public or private financial institutions. However, there 
is a link between the increase in average income and house prices.38 As studies have 
revealed, in many countries around the world, increases in average incomes only increase 
house prices.39 Thus rather than allowing Saudi citizens purchase homes, increased 
salaries have increased property prices and in turn led to difficulty in buying houses in 
the Kingdom. 
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The consequence of such growth population is represented in the acute shortage in 
housing, and the inability of the public sector (embodied in REDF) to cater for the huge 
demand for housing finance. For example, the number of REDF loan applications during 
the period 1975-1994 was 598,850 whereas the number of REDF loan applications 
submitted during the period 2011-2015 and whilst remaining on the waiting list as more 
than 1.7 million.40 The long waiting list is a reflection of the absence of a housing finance 
market able to improve and develop itself in order to cater a huge demand for housing 
finance. This raises the question: is the REDF the only housing finance provider and, if 
so, does the Saudi market require other such market players? Furthermore, to what extent 
has such a modest role played by housing finance providers contributed towards the 
housing shortage in the Kingdom?  
 
2.3 The housing shortage crisis in Saudi Arabia, and sources of housing 
finance in Saudi Arabia 
 
Broadly speaking, in Saudi Arabia wealthy families have the ability to help their children 
either by providing a home as a gift or financially assisting them in purchasing a helping 
them purchase a home. Middle and working class families, however, find purchasing a 
property more difficult due to heavy reliance upon savings and lending. It follows, 
however, that if middle and working class families have to save up for the entire purchase 
of a property then most of them would be excluded from homeownership.
41
 The second 
option for people is to therefore resort to lenders in order to gain the desired housing 
finance and thereby enable them to purchase a property. However, has the housing finance 
market been able to cater for such demand?  
Housing finance in Saudi Arabia is available in the public and private sectors. As 
mentioned above, the public sector is represented by the REDF, considered to be the main 
housing finance provider in the Kingdom.42 Since 1974, when it was established by the 
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government, the REDF has provided interest-free loans for the lower and middle income 
buyers, with repayment periods typically around 25 years, comprised of monthly 
instalments equivalent to SAR 1,667 ($445).43 The REDF typically provides loans 
equivalent to SAR 500,000 ($133,330); however, it does not disburse the loan in a lump 
sum but in four instalments.44 The purpose of the REDF loan is to help Saudi citizens 
build their own private homes45 or to purchase a ready-built home instead.46 Therefore, 
these loans become the preferred option for Saudis for funding property purchases. 
However, due to the limited capital within the REDF and the decline in government 
subsidies, excess demand has been created for REDF loans, leading to longer waiting 
times of between 15 and 20 years.47 Providing free-interest loans could therefore be 
considered a negative factor in changing the borrowing culture of Saudi Arabia and 
impacting on the competition principles with the banking sector. 
The World Bank, in its annual report about the financial sector in Saudi Arabia, has 
reiterated this issue, stating that despite the REDF being the main provider of housing 
finance, with a portfolio of SAR 78 billion ($20.8 billion), it is unable to cater for the 
huge demand, with waiting times of up to 18 years, adding that ‘the demand for housing 
will continue and increase, reflecting the young growing population’.48 Consequently, 
more than 1.7 million applicants are still waiting to obtain loans from the fund despite 
governmental intervention in injecting SAR 43 billion ($11.5 billion) into the fund, 
followed by further SAR 14.8 billion ($3.9 billion) in 2011.49 
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Long waiting lists is not the only issue, however: REDF loans are also deemed to be 
insufficient in enabling the borrower to buy a home. The cost of dwellings and houses 
has been increased over recent years. For example, between 2002 and 2006 house prices 
increased by 13.7 per cent annually,50 a total of 68.5 per cent over four years. These 
increases made the loan provided by the REDF insufficient to buy a home. According to 
a report published by the Alrajhi bank in 2013, an apartment 190 square-metre cost SAR 
788,500 ($210,269)51, against an REDF loan of SAR 500,000 Riyal ($133,333). The 
inadequacy of the REDF loans therefore posed a problem within the Kingdom.  
The second source of housing finance loans is the banking sector, which was officially 
established in October 1952; its establishment coinciding with the creation of the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (‘SAMA’), which acts as a central bank.52 The banking sector 
consists of eight domestic banks and twelve foreign banks authorised to operate in Saudi 
Arabia.53 Both the domestic and the international banks contribute to the Saudi housing 
finance market, but their role is less prominent than it is thought to be. For example, the 
SAMBA bank, a domestic bank operating in Saudi Arabia, issued a report entitled ‘Saudi 
Arabia’s Housing market structural issue, financing and potential’, which highlighted the 
fact that bank mortgage lending in Saudi Arabia was at very low levels compared with 
that in neighbouring countries and developed countries alike. The report added that, 
whilst banks accounted for 6 per cent of Gross domestic protect (GDP) in Kuwait, 7 per 
cent in the United Arab Emirate and over fifty per cent in many other developed countries, 
they contributed just 3 per cent of GDP in Saudi Arabia.54 The idea that the role of the 
banking sector is modest was supported by another international report, namely that of 
Standard & Poor’s, which indicated that as of 2012, the banking sector in Saudi Arabia 
had contributed to the housing finance market only 5.1 per cent of total banking system 
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loans.55 This compares with the double-digit penetration figures of residential mortgages 
as a percentage of GDP generally seen in most other G-20 countries, such as about 40% 
in France or roughly 50% in Germany according to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).56  
Of course, the consequences of such a modest role played by public and private sectors 
in the housing finance market is significant due to the homeownership rate, which is often 
used as a measure of the quality of a country’s housing finance market,
57
 decreasing 
sharply below 47 per cent – this is not commensurate with a country that has vast oil 
reserves and is considered one of the largest oil exporters in the world.58 
Indeed, the lack of performance of public and private sectors in the housing finance 
market exacerbated the housing shortage, and made satisfying great housing needs in 
Saudi Arabia difficult by the government alone. According to estimates of the Ninth FYP, 
issued in 2007, 1.25 million housing units would be required to meet current demand, 
whereas the Saudi government’s target was to build 950,000 housing units, signifying a 
deficit of 300,000 housing units.59 Other studies suggest that demand for housing is 
expected to rise from 195,000 units in 2011 to 264,000 units in 2020,60 whereas in 2010 
Al Shoaibi, head of the Saudi Shura Council’s Economic Affairs and Energy Committee, 
has stated that the country would need between 18 million and 20 million homes over the 
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next ten years.
61
 The Saudi government has consequently had to respond to the acute 
shortage, and has intervened again in developing the housing finance market. 
2.4 Governmental intervention and legislative initiatives in developing 
the housing finance market in Saudi Arabia 
 
Responding to the acute housing shortage in Saudi Arabia, various initiatives were taken. 
These were targeted at developing a housing finance market for two reasons: to increase 
the homeownership rate, and to facilitate access to housing finance market. Initiatives 
have taken the form of government initiatives and legislative initiatives. 
Government intervention began in 2007 when the Saudi government
62 established the 
General Housing Authority (‘GHA’) to supervise and regulate the housing sector through, 
for example, designing the country’s future housing policies, conducting research and 
studies relating to the housing sector, and setting up housing projects to increase the rate 
of homeownership.
63 Nevertheless, the Saudi government realised that the issue of 
housing exceeded the capacity of GHA, and so a ministry was required.  
In 2011, King Abdullah, the former king of KSA 2005-2015, issued a number of royal 
orders relating to the housing sector. The first order involved changing the GHA to 
become the Ministry of Housing and granting the required powers to enable it to exercise 
its function of meeting the expectations of the government and public alike. The second 
royal order was to allocate SAR 250 billion ($66,649,800,000) to build around 500,000 
new homes.64 
Aside from the above initiatives, it is widely believed that the REDF’s policies played a 
crucial role in undermining the effectiveness of the Saudi real estate finance market. 
Therefore, the government’s initiatives involved subjecting REDF policies to scrutiny, 
and finding a strong indication of a need to reform the conditions for owning land due to 
a pre-requisite of REDF loans being conditional upon owning land or having obtained a 
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site upon which a property is to be built.
65 This reform aimed to improve the effectiveness 
of the REDF whilst making securing a loan from the REDF easier. The government did 
eventually abolish the condition of having a plot ready, and began permitting citizens to 
submit applications without needing to already have a plot. However, this move opened 
the floodgates to 1.7 million applicants, who joined more than 500,000 existing applicants 
on the waiting list.66 This unexpected number of applicants exceeded the capacity of the 
REDF and was not the result the government was seeking.  
The government intervened again later on, but this time in order to address the 
consequences of the increased waiting list, by seeking to increase the capacity of the 
REDF and injecting SAR 43 billion ($11,465 billion), followed by another SAR 14.8 
billion ($3,946 billion) in 2011.67 Nevertheless, the Saudi government needs to think 
carefully before adopting future policies in respect of housing. In particular, it is evident 
that citizens have been fundamentally been let down by government intervention, which 
has only resulted in making matters more difficult for prospective home buyers. 
Government initiatives consequently led to the construction of just 50,000 housing units 
between 2011 and 2016, when in actual fact the housing sector required 120,000 new 
units to be built every year to meet demand.68 There clearly must not be a repetition of 
this crisis in the future, particularly in light of the government’s limited capacity for 
carrying out such a huge task. It would be incredibly naïve to do nothing on the other 
hand, as this would repeat past failures whilst bringing about a different result. It is 
evident that the successful initiatives within the housing sector during the 1970s and 
1980s cannot be repeated by government efforts alone, and so other parties must be 
involved in assisting the government. 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the government recognised implicitly its inability 
alone to satisfy the enormous housing needs of citizens and therefore required involving 
other parties, such as the banking sector and financial institutions. This trend was 
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highlighted explicitly by the Housing Ministry, when it revealed its intention to become 
a regulator and observer rather than a financer or provider of housing finance. In 
particular, the Housing Ministry realised that the waiting list of applicants for REDF loans 
had reached more than 1.7 million applicants,69 which made realistic fulfilment of the 
government’s obligations to the housing sector questionable. 
However, the housing finance market does not represent a healthy environment for the 
banking sector, which seeks warranties and protection for their interests. The modest role 
played by the banking sector in the housing finance market may be a reflection of the 
belief that this sector needs reform and develop in order to attract investment from the 
banking sector.   
Establishing a housing finance market is not an easy task either, as it requires the adoption 
of new policies and the enactment of legislation to establish a well-developed market, 
especially in light of the many potential hurdles it may face during its establishment and 
development. This is primarily due to two factors: firstly, many Saudis are highly averse 
to borrowing because they rely on the interest-free loans provided by the REDF, despite 
the potential to have to wait twenty years for a loan. Typical home purchases are 
completed only when an individual has either saved enough to make a cash-only 
purchase, or is able to resort to borrowing from family members. Thus, there is a need for 
the Saudi financial culture to undergo a significant transformation from traditional and 
conservative methods to new and modern forms. Secondly, establishing a new financial 
market requires an increase in confidence, which cannot be achieved if potential 
participants do not feel that their interests are protected. 
In response to the need for reform of the housing finance market and increasing its 
effectiveness, legislative authorities
70
 have launched a number of initiatives aimed at 
developing the real estate finance market. There are three initiatives can be ordered as 
follows: 
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First, there is strong sentiment that Article 10
71
 of the Banking Control Law,
72
 which 
prevents banks from owning real estate for either trade or financial purposes, minimises 
the role of banking sector in the housing finance market.
73 Retaining the title of real estate 
being financed is considered to some extent good protection for lenders’ interests, whilst 
banks, who are considered the biggest players in the housing finance sector due to their 
massive portfolios, are prohibited from such protection. More than thirty years have 
passed since Article 10 was enacted, and there have been no major amendments despite 
calls to take further steps to deal with such legal obstacles.
74
 Due to the importance of 
granting banks and financial institutions the desired protection to extend their operations 
whilst at the same time increasing their effectiveness, Article 10 was amended in 2012,
75
 
and now permits banks to own real estate solely for the purpose of housing finance.
76
  
Second, housing finance laws that were enacted in 2012
77
 can be considered as 
revolutionary in the development of the housing finance market. In 2003, the participants 
at the Economic Forum in Riyadh highlighted the difficulties likely to hinder the finance 
sector in general, and in particular the real estate finance market in the Kingdom.
78
 After 
these concerns were submitted to the Saudi government, the Al-Gassim law firm79 was 
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selected to draft housing finance bills. Subsequently, the bills received royal decree, and 
were enacted in 2012. These laws were unique in that they were the first to control and 
regulate financial contracts (namely the finance lease contract). Furthermore, it was the 
first time the Saudi government had enacted law by engaging a law firm to draft proposed 
legislation. In enacting these laws, the government aimed to tackle and resolve many legal 
problems relating to finance in general, housing finance and the housing shortage. 
The housing Finance Laws 2012 included the Finance Lease Law (‘FLL’), the Law on 
the Supervision of Finance Companies (‘LSFC’) and the Real Estate Finance Law 
(‘REFL’)80, which will be the central focus of this thesis. When these came into effect, 
they signified a major expansion and milestone in the codification of Saudi law.  
The above laws introduced and established a new era in housing finance, with a 
securitised market in Saudi Arabia bringing greater depth and maturity to the industry,81 
and have been the key factors in the enactment of the REFL. They also aimed to pave the 
way for entry into the housing finance market by banks and financial institutions, and for 
the dissemination of information within the market. The level of liquidity in the market 
has been given good attention by the REFL, as it has been enhanced and increased through 
the establishment of a securitising market, which will play a significant role in providing 
the market with the desired liquidity at a low cost. With regard to a borrower’s 
creditworthiness, banks are obliged to check before granting credit through an authorised 
credit bureau.  
The FLL prescribes the rules on finance leasing and specifically, for example, the 
responsibilities of the lessor and lessee in a Sharia’a compliant manner. Here, the asset 
risk is placed on the lessor during the lease term, but the lessee is held responsible for its 
relevant use.  
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The LSFC provides a framework for companies seeking to conduct financial operations, 
either in housing finance, production asset finance or small and medium size enterprise 
finance. The law determines, for example, the capital requirement for establishing such 
companies, and obliges them to engage in finance activities in a manner that does not 
conflict with principles of Islamic law as defined by the Sharia Committee, whose 
members are appointed by those companies.  
Third, the development of housing finance laws was not limited to the finance aspects or 
simply to grant desired protection for lenders. It is more comprehensive than this: 
therefore, whilst enacting the above laws, another aspect of the housing finance market 
was developed through establishing a quasi-judiciary committee to hear disputes arising 
following the implementation the housing finance laws.
82
 It could be argued that the aim 
of this initiative was to establish a comprehensive legal framework for the housing finance 
market which would include dealing with three primary aspects regarding the market: 
supervision, regulation and dispute resolution. It can also be added that the aim may be 
to accelerate litigation through establishing a committee whose members are experts in 
the housing finance laws. 
As mentioned above, the aim of above initiatives has been mainly to develop a housing 
finance market through boosting confidence in the market, granting protection for its 
main participants, and regulating the relationship between parties to housing finance 
transactions. Some decision makers have announced following the enactment of the 2012 
housing finance laws that such laws would provide specific methods of financing housing 
in Saudi Arabia, giving lenders additional guarantees and other inducements to invest in 
this sector.83 The Minister of Finance has also stated that the laws would give the housing 
finance market further guarantees in order to balance rights in a finance agreement, 
provide appropriate methods of financing housing projects in the country and reduce the 
borrowing cost for prospective homebuyers.84 Besides the government members’ 
announcements, optimistic voices were heard in the Shura Council in Saudi. The 
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secretary of the Shura Council, for example, stated that the bills outlining the new laws 
would provide a new means of real estate finance in Saudi Arabia, which would facilitate 
the setting up of new finance companies alongside the banks that currently provide this 
service.85 The early announcements reveal how optimistic decision-makers were about 
the potential for housing finance laws to develop the housing finance market, which in 
turn would be reflected in addressing the housing crisis. 
The above initiatives are only part of the story because the housing shortage and the acute 
deficit in housing finance outweighed the government’s intervention despite the latter’s 
magnitude. This is not to say that the initiatives did not contribute towards resolving the 
housing finance crisis, but rather this complex and difficult matter needed further 
examination and analysis. It is clear that the development of the housing finance market 
depends on a mixture of legal, economic and political factors. The success in dealing with 
all of these factors may probably lead to achieving the development of a housing finance 
market, which in turn would lead to an increase the operations of housing finance and the 
homeownership rate. Therefore, any factor hindering achieving these aims may be 
considered a potential barrier needing to be addressed. 
The growth and efficiency of a market economy is dependent upon increased access by 
individuals and businesses to trade within that market at a reasonable rate. The growth of 
wealth of an individual is particularly dependent upon the availability of affordable 
housing finance. The housing finance market can therefore easily be affected by legal, 
economic and political changes.  
 
2.5 Barriers to developing the housing finance market 
 
The development of housing finance market is grounded in the belief that a well-
developed housing finance market promotes homeownership, which in turn promotes 
economic and political stability.
86 The development of such a market aims to meet the 
following targets in rode to increase the rate of home ownership: addressing any barrier 
preventing the main participants in such a market from extending their operations, 
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providing the desired protection for the main participants in the market, reducing 
borrowing costs, and finally finding an alternative source for liquidity but at a low cost. 
Accordingly, the following require further examination and investigation where 
development of the Saudi housing finance market is concerned: 
 
i. Not protecting lenders as a potential cause for undermining the development of a 
housing finance market 
 
A well-functioning housing finance system requires adequate legislation in order to 
provide stakeholders, whether borrowers or lenders, with comfort, confidence and 
protection.87 This section, however, will place emphasis on lenders, asking why their role 
in the housing finance is considered modest, and will attempt to find a solution that may 
enhance that role. There are two issues might hinder lenders in the housing finance 
market, and reduce their role. The Supreme Judicial Council’s decision and the uncertain 
legal framework relate to foreclosure, as will be explained below. It is noteworthy that 
foreclosure here refers to the delay and expense inherent in foreclosure laws and 
regulations and their negative impacts on the housing finance market.88 Also, it refers to 
the ambiguous laws meant to deal with the process of foreclosure, which make lenders 
and financers reluctant to expand their operations in the market due to the uncertainty 
created by these laws, as will also be explained in detail later. Accordingly, the reference 
to foreclosure here is not meant in the strict legal sense of extinguishment of the 
borrower’s equity in the property: a remedy which of course the Saudi courts do not 
grant.89  
Generally speaking, Saudi people and companies, as well as all foreign partnerships and 
companies operating in Saudi Arabia, are entitled to acquire legal ownership of real estate 
in the country.90 In Saudi Arabia, original title deeds, as well as all mortgage documents 
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 Deloitte, ‘Saudi mortgage laws; A Formula for a well-functioning market?’ (deloitte.com, August 
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concerning real estate, are issued by the Sharia courts or by notaries public, both of which 
are under the authority of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC).91 
In many jurisdictions, real estate is considered the main source of security for lenders,
92
 
and the predominant guarantee for loans is therefore mortgaged real estate. Accordingly, 
lenders urge their customers to mortgage property in the lender’s favour93 because 
mortgaged real estate provides stronger security for lenders.94 However, conventional 
banks in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to register mortgages because the SJC believes that 
all loans provided by these banks are usurious, and are thus not Sharia-compliant. This 
prohibition dates back to an SJC decision of 26 August 1981, according to which all 
Sharia authorities, including courts and notaries public, should not implement mortgage 
documentation for such loans. The decision remains in force and has remained 
unchanged, so much so that the financing of real estate by commercial banks in Saudi 
Arabia has been hindered. It is worth noting, however, that although the above-mentioned 
decision was issued with reference to conventional banks, Islamic banks and conventional 
banks, which set up transactions to comply with Islamic law, are not exempt, and they 
therefore, too, are affected by that decision.  
The banks, however, have created two methods to circumvent the SJC’s decision, in order 
to enable them to register mortgages with either Sharia courts or notaries public. For 
instance, the first method is that some banks ask the borrower to mortgage the property 
being financed in favour of an employee of the bank. A public notary cannot refuse to 
register that property.95 The second  is for the borrower to give the original deeds to the 
bank in order to pledge his property to the bank, thus satisfying the bank that he will not 
sell it or transfer it to a third party.96         
Although these and other alternative methods may seem acceptable to some extent, they 
involve risks. With the first method, for example, the bank employee may exercise his 
                                            
91 The above commitment is based on two laws: the judicial law which was approved by the Royal Decree 
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right as a mortgagee against the mortgagor. In this case, the bank can take no action 
against him because the financed asset is mortgaged in favour of the employee. With the 
second alternative method, there is a legal defect in the judicial system that mitigates the 
protection provided by this method, since the Sharia courts in Saudi lack a system for 
registering documents electronically.97 Therefore, sometimes a borrower in bad faith will 
exploit the absence of electronic registration by applying to the Sharia courts, arguing 
that he is the owner of the property, has lost the original deed to it, and desires to obtain 
a duplicate deed from the Sharia courts. Usually the Sharai courts  would not refuse to 
issue such a deed as long as the property belongs to the person, who would then exercise 
his rights over the property by selling it or transferring it to a third party. This risk of 
course mitigates the protection provided by this method and undermines its 
effectiveness.98 
Thus whilst drafting the 2012 housing finance Laws,
99
 the Al-Qassim law firm referred 
to this problem throughout the draft as a major issue that needed to be resolved.100 The 
law firm suggested that the earlier SJC decision, which was the root of the problem, 
should be overturn either by the SJC itself or by a royal decree at the time the housing 
finance laws 2012 were approved. However, the housing finance laws have not overturn 
the SJC’s decision, nor has the royal decree. The problem still therefore exists, and Saudi 
banks still suffer from the SJC’s decision. 
The second issue that hinder the lenders in the housing finance market is the uncertain 
legal framework relating to foreclosure. Many Saudi banks have indicated that the 
absence of a clear legal framework governing foreclosure has impeded home financing 
by banks.101 AlRajhi Bank, for example, pointed out that financing options in the 
Kingdom are limited because the uncertain legal framework relating to foreclosure has 
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 The Al Qassim Law Firm submitted all documents and bills to the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and 
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led to constraints on lending.102 The SAMBA bank has given the same reason for 
concern.103 However, these banks do not make it clear why the issue has hindered their 
activities. 
The lengthy procedures for enforcement of foreclosure might account for the banks’ 
complaints about the Saudi legal system. In the event of a borrower defaulting, for 
example, a mortgagee cannot enforce the provisions of the mortgage agreement, whether 
by selling the property or by collecting rent on it, without consent from a competent court. 
The mortgagee, therefore, has to apply to the court for consent to enforce the provisions 
of the mortgage agreement. Following this, a petition is presented to the Emiraha to 
enforce the wording of the petition. However, the Emiraha may refer the case back to the 
court if it has objections.104 Such procedures are considered problematic by lenders in 
Saudi Arabia, who desire little more than a comprehensive legal framework to clarify 
their duties and obligations. Some writers have suggested another difficulty, namely that 
‘there is very limited precedent of actual enforcement of security, and as such the topic 
remains uncertain’.105 
With these considerations in mind, the new housing finance laws enacted in July 2012 
include a law called the ‘Execution Law’, which contains provisions that may offer a 
solution to the ambiguity surrounding foreclosure on property. Some specialists have 
stated, in the wake of the enactment of the new laws, that the Execution Law ‘will assist 
in the recovery of an asset for and on behalf of the financer upon a borrower’s default’106. 
Another specialist, summarising the concept underlying that law, stated that ‘such law 
provides for judges to hear enforcement disputes and insolvency action’.107 This law has 
been eagerly awaited for some time because it creates so-called ‘execution judges’, who 
are empowered to enforce judicial judgments and to hear enforcement disputes. It also 
establishes so-called enforcement instruments, which can be brought before an execution 
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judge.108 It is fair, therefore, to assert that such a law may resolve the issue in question. 
However, it has not been tested, and much time must pass before it can be evaluated.  
In fact there is an example which shows that, despite the enactment of the Housing 
Finance Laws 2012, the SJC’s decision still stands and has not been overturned by these 
laws. As mentioned above, the REDF109 provides loans of a maximum of SAR 500,000 
($133,300); however, some applicants, who are considered financially able, may want to 
buy properties costing more than SAR 500,000, but the REDF cannot provide loans above 
the maximum. Accordingly, it has changed some of its policies by coming to agreements 
with national banks to finance property purchases of above SAR 500,000. The banks, 
however, seek to secure their loans by mortgaging in their own favour the property or 
asset being bought by the applicant. The banks, when creating this condition, believed 
that the government, as represented in the REDF, might have the authority to force the 
courts to reverse the SJC’s decision and grant them the desired protection provided by a 
mortgage.  Unsurprisingly, the courts have refused to allow mortgaged real estate in 
favour of banks110 and that of course contributes to the SJC decision. Consequently, 
earlier agreements have not been enforced despite having been concluded in the wake of 
the enactment of the new housing finance laws 2012.  
For all the above considerations, Chapter Three will be allocated to analysis of the SJC’s 
decision and to finding out how to create a mechanism that offers the desired protection 
for both borrowers and lenders in order to develop the housing finance market without 
upsetting the decision of the SJC.  
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 ii. Increased land prices and their negative role in the housing finance market 
 
Broadly speaking, land prices are considered the main components of housing costs and 
demand: housing costs are inseparable from land prices, and the interaction between them 
is very strong, because as long as the price of land increases, so too will house prices.111  
It is difficult to treat housing as a single good due to there being bundled components 
within housing as a whole, and their value constitutes the overall value. It has long been 
recognised that the value of housing is controlled by changes in the prices of these 
heterogeneous components.
112
 However, ‘it is important to recognize that the values of 
these bundled components do not necessarily move in conjunction with one another: 
Overall changes in home values will in fact reflect a weighted average of the changes in 
the value of each individual component.’
113
The most significant component in the change 
in housing value is land value, as this is considered to be the main component of housing 
prices.
114  
The interaction between the housing prices and land prices may explain the strong relation 
between them, as a rise in land prices would in turn increase the overall cost of housing.
115
 
Thus, understanding the relationship and interaction between housing and land prices is 
very important, in order to reveal the extent to which land prices can impact upon housing 
costs. The Ricardian rent theory, for example, states that ‘the demand for land is derived 
from the demand for housing in a particular city’.116 Accordingly, ‘if the land market is 
efficient, the land prices are primarily determined by property prices’.117 
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The Saudi housing finance market has been significantly impacted by land prices, since 
their value constitutes nearly 50 per cent of the total cost of housing.118 Such a 
phenomenon has been recognised by international and national organisations, and has 
been considered a barrier to the development of a housing finance market, which 
consequently needs intervention to resolve it. For example, the World Bank has pointed 
to insufficient land availability as a key constraint upon housing finance in Saudi Arabia, 
which in turn has led rapidly increasing prices in major cities.
119 The National 
Commercial Bank (‘NCB’) has considered that land prices should not exceed more than 
30 per cent of the total cost housing,
120
 in the main regions; Makkah, Riyadh and the 
Eastern Province, housing developers are unable to meet the demand for affordable 
housing.
121
 These reports, in fact, have reinforced the Ricardian rent theory, which linked 
between land prices and property prices as being barriers to the development of the 
housing finance market. However, what is interesting is that the reports have alluded to 
the belief that the impact of this factor is not limited to hindering the development of 
housing finance but to hindering the deliverability of affordable housing. Housing 
developers are unable to the meet the demand for affordable housing since the increase 
in land prices has led to overvaluation of house prices.
122
 
Prospective first home owners have not been spared the impact of increased land prices 
due to difficulty in obtaining housing finance. As the Saudi Deputy Housing Minister has 
made clear, delays in the Ministry’s plans to provide housing and/or housing finance 
products was attributed to the increase land prices.
123
 To demonstrate the rate of increase 
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in land prices, according to the Alrajhi Capital, land prices have been increasing at around 
15 per cent per year, implying a 90 per cent increase in six years.
124
 
Such a significant phenomenon should not be ignored if this market is to be developed. It 
would be ill-advised to do nothing, but simply to introduce several initiatives without 
taking into account the potential of the role played by increased land prices in 
undermining those initiatives. The increase in land prices may be attributed to 
urbanisation,125 land shortage,126 and speculation/monopolisation. The following section 
will shed some light on these causes. 
Urbanisation resulted in an acute housing shortage in the Kingdom in the 1970s because 
they affected both land prices and the housing sector by increasing their value, in turn 
lead to difficulty in owning a home during that period.127  
In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Saudi Arabia experienced significant urbanisation 
in the wake of increase oil prices.128 Such urbanisation covered entire regions in Saudi 
Arabia. The level of urbanisation increased fourfold from just 15 per cent in 1950 to 72 
per cent in 1986.129 This largescale urbanisation was accompanied by increasing land 
prices, which went on to boost housing costs and, at the same time, the difficulty of 
owning a home.130However, Saudi nowadays is not witnessing urbanisation,131  as the 
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vast majority of Saudis already live in urban areas such as cities, while few people still 
live in the countryside;132 hence we exclude this possible cause from consideration.  
Nevertheless, from 2005 up to 2014, Saudi Arabia has witnessed heavy government 
expenditure on infrastructure, made possible by increased revenue from higher oil prices. 
Estimates suggest that in 2013 the Kingdom planned to spend $514 billion to build 
industrials cities and airports,
133
 in addition to the construction of twenty universities, 
airports, hospitals and rail links since 2005. In addition, the government adopted three 
projects in the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 to set up a metro system in three cities- Riyadh, 
Makkah and Dammam,
134
at a cost of SAR 84 billion ($22,3991 billion), SAR 62 billion 
($16,5327 billion) and SAR 80 billion ($21,3325 billion) respectively.
135
 
The second potential cause to increase land prices is land shortage. In considering this 
factor, it is necessary to examine some of the figures associated with the Kingdom’s 
geography and the extent of undeveloped land, to see whether or not there is a land deficit. 
Saudi Arabia is the second largest state in the Arab world, with a total area of 
2,150,000 square kilometres.136 This vast territory is split into 13 regions, the biggest of 
which are Makkah, Riyadh, and the Eastern province. Alongside these figures is Saudi 
Arabia’s population of over 31 million, or 15 people per square kilometre.137 Therefore, 
theoretically, there is no deficit in land in Saudi Arabia, and such a potential deficit will 
be excluded from this analysis. However, land shortage may be related to another factor, 
which is the third cause.  
The last potential cause comprises monopolisation and speculation, which need greater 
clarification and discussion. Broadly speaking, wealthy Saudis prefer long-term 
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investment in undeveloped land, known in the country as ‘white land’138 because it is 
more convenient to invest in land that does not require heavy expenditure upon it, given 
that its value would increase anyway.139  
White land constitutes a large area of total urban growth boundaries in Saudi cities. The 
High Commission for the Development of Arriyadh (HCDA)140 has indicated that 
undeveloped land in the capital of the Kingdom (Riyadh) represents 78 per cent of total 
vacant land in the city.141 This vacant white land is targeted by wealthy Saudis and 
influential people who invest in these assets but neither develop nor sell them unless the 
value doubles. This practice of holding undeveloped land without developing or selling 
has been criticised by both the public and observers: the latter regard such a practice as 
monopolisation because it results in artificial increases in land prices.  
Many specialists and Shura Council members have debated and discussed this subject in 
order to find a means to cause land prices to reduce. They believe that neither the market 
nor the government can force landowners to sell their land or reduce land values without 
legislation granting them these powers. As a result, the Housing Minister has announced 
that reducing land prices is a priority for the government,142 and the government in turn 
has drafted a land taxation bill with the aim of reducing land prices. These measures have 
been welcomed by the public who, of course, would like to see a drop in land prices to 
provide access to the housing finance market, since this factor increases the cost of 
lending money with which to buy a home.   
However, enactment of the land taxation bill is complicated by a general debate as to 
whether or not taxation is contrary to Islamic law. The Council of Ministers, which, next 
                                            
138 Z Fattah, ‘Saudi Arabia’s affordable housing shortage” (businessweek, 28 March 2013) 
<http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-28/saudi-arabias-affordable-housing-shortage> accessed 
12th November 2016. 
139
 K Khan, ‘Saudi Mortgage Law’ (alrajhi-capital.com, 1 March 2013) < http://www.alrajhi-
capital.com/en/research/Market/Mortgage%20law_Mar%202013_Final.pdf> accessed 12th November 
2016. 
140 The High Commission for the Development of Arriyadh was established for developing the city in all 
economic, social, cultural, architectural and environmental aspects. The Commission is also responsible for 
drawing up policies and procedures aimed at raising the efficiency of services and facilities connected with 
improving the living standards and the welfare of citizens. 
141 Argaam, ‘High Commission for the Development of Arriyadh: undeveloped lands represent 78% of the 
total area of the capital’ (Argaam, 6 June 2012)    <http://www.argaam.com/article/articledetail/275558/> 
accessed 12th November 2016. 
142
 S Altulani, ‘Housing Minister; We will levy tax on lands and the government policy is to reduce lands 
cost’ Alyaum (Dammam, 26 April 2014) <http://www.alyaum.com/article/3080287>accessed 15th 
November 2016. 
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to the Shura Council, is considered the body of legislative authority in Saudi,143 after 
studying the bill referred it to the Council of Senior Ulama (CSU), an official institution 
consisting of twenty religious scholars appointed by the King,144 to seek religious opinion 
on it. The CSU discussed and examined the bill and issued an order dated 25th August 
2004, which confirmed that the government should not levy tax on land because tax does 
not comply with Islamic teachings; there are many reasons behind the increase in land 
prices and levying tax on land would not be the only solution; and, therefore, the 
government would be able to resolve this issue without levying taxes.145 
The CSU’s decision did not provide any justification, however, which leaves open the 
possibility for anybody to create a justification for their own respective matters. 
Nevertheless, the CSU’s decision has not been welcomed by all. Al-Salem, for example, 
comments that the CSU’s decision deserves praise but is not exempt from criticism as it 
could not convince the public, and furthermore, the CSU in its decision did not suggest 
an alternative solution to the problem.146  
Although referring the bill to the CSU creates ambiguities, as the latter is not part of the 
law-making process within the Saudi legal system, the legislative authority in the 
Kingdom did not approve enactment of the land taxation bill, a decision which might be 
attributed to the CSU’s decision, mentioned above. However, again in 2016, the Saudi 
legislative authority surprised both the markets and its main participants when it enacted 
the Land Fees Law (LFL) 2016, having altered the conceptual basis of the LFL from land 
taxation to land fees. The question arises here as to whether or not the LFL 2016 is able 
to address land prices and in turn contribute in the development of the housing finance 
market. This question leads us to another: whether the LFL 2016 will achieve the aim 
expressed in the official statement on its enactment, which is to precipitate either a 
decrease in the market value of land or an increase in its supply. Also, the wording of the 
LFL 2016 raises some concerns, requiring further examination, in regard to lack of 
                                            
143
 Both Council of Ministers and the Shura Council play crucial role in law making in Saudi Arabia, 
however, discussion their merits and role is beyond the scope of this thesis, therefore, for more information 
see; F Al-Fadhel, ‘Legislative Drafting and Law-Making Practices and Procedures under Saudi Arabian 
Law: A Brief Overview’(2012)1 IJLDLR 95. 
144
 F Al-Fadhel, ‘Legislative Drafting and Law-Making Practices and Procedures under Saudi Arabian Law: 
A Brief Overview’(2012)1 IJLDLR 95. 
145 M Aloni, ‘Lands and real estate include in Zakat bill’ Aleqtesadiah (Riyadh, 13th October 2013) 
<http://www.aleqt.com/2013/10/13/article_792667.html > accessed 1st June 2014.  
146O Aldubabian,‘CSU supports increasing land prices’ al-Hayat (London,16th September 2016) 
<http://www.alhayat.com/m/story/4632026> accessed 20th November 2016. 
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fairness. For all these considerations, Chapter Four will analyse and examine these issues 
in greater detail.     
 
iii. Capping Loan to Value (LTV) at low levels: absence of cooperation in the 
housing finance market as a potential cause for unpredictable results.   
 
As has been seen at the beginning of this chapter, the enactment of the housing finance 
laws 2012 was synchronised with huge promises that they would enhance the mechanism 
of housing finance and make access to the financial market much easier. Those promises 
were accompanied by the belief that the laws would facilitate accessing the housing 
finance market and increase housing finance at a faster pace. Housing finance, however, 
faced constraints in its operations, as imposed by article 12 of the Regulation of the Real 
Estate Finance Law 2012 (RREFL).which capped the loan-to-value (LTV) at a low level 
(70 per cent). It is already apparent that the new housing finance laws, including the 
REFL, have not provided the development of such market with the boost that was widely 
anticipated before their implementation. Therefore, the hope and promises that came with 
enactment were dispelled by the implementation of the laws, which made accessing to 
the housing finance market much more difficult for Saudi families. 
Generally speaking, macro-prudential policies, of which LTV is one, along with other 
tools such as debt-to-income (DTI)147 play a significant role in the financial market in 
general and in housing finance marker in particular, due to their impact on reducing 
systemic risk and financial instability.148The importance of designing and employing 
macro-prudential tools by financial institutions and banks is derived from the belief that 
such tools may limit the exposure and vulnerability of the banking sector to volatiles in 
property prices. Nevertheless, there are a number of advantages to using the LTV, such 
as decreasing the default rate of borrowers and maintaining the financial system. Also, 
setting a higher capital and liquidity requirement by capping LTV will grant lenders 
protection against drops in property prices.149 
                                            
147 Debt-to-loan ratio is a way of enabling the lender to measure the ability of a borrower to manage the 
borrower’s monthly repayments. For more information see D Cook, C Schellhorn and L Spellman, ‘Lender 
certification premiums’ (2003) 27 Journal of Banking & Finance 156.   
148 G Gabriele and R Moessner, ‘Macroprudential policy – a literature review’ (2013) 27 Journal of 
Economic Surveys 846.    
149
 For more information about the advantages and disadvantages of the LTV see; S Ghosh, ‘Credit growth 
and macro-prudential regulation: is ownership important?’(2015) 57 international Journal of Law & 
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At the same time, there are a number of disadvantages due to the higher liquidity 
requirement involved in capping LTV at low percentage. Liquidity constraints, for 
instance, are significantly affected by the down payment requirement, because it forces 
households to depress consumption in order to accumulate the down payment.150 
Moreover, adopting LTV may lead to exclusion of some segments, such as first home 
buyers and those on low incomes, from the financial market due to their inability to fulfil 
the high capital requirement.151 It is therefore argued that the homeownership rate in 
Germany,152 which has adopted low LTV of between 40 per cent and 60 per cent, is low 
whilst the average first time buyer is older than those in many countries where average 
LTVs are higher.
153
  
It is surprising that whenever the Saudi government and legislative authority try to find a 
solution to enable them to address the housing shortage and the deficit in housing finance, 
article 12 of the Regulation of the Real Estate Finance Law undermines these efforts. 
Thus, there is strong sentiment that the adverse impact of applying low LTV on first-
home buyers and the housing finance market means that there is potential lack of 
coordination between the governmental agencies, resulting in a contradiction between the 
aims of enacting the laws and their implementation. Indeed SAMA,154 when suggesting 
capping the LTV at low levels via article (12) of the RREFL, appears not to have taken 
into account the major aims of enacting the housing finance laws, otherwise it would not 
                                            
Management 167 & G Engelhardt, ‘Consumption, down payments, and liquidity constraints’ (1996) 28 
Journal of Money credit and banking 255. 
150 G Engelhardt, ‘Consumption, down payments, and liquidity constraints’ (1996) 28 Journal of Money 
credit and banking 255. 
151 D Igan and K Heedon,‘Do loan-to-value and debt-to-income limits work? Evidence from 
Korea’(papers.ssrn, March 2011)<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974849>  
accessed 4th November 2016. 
152 There are many theories have attempted to explain the reason behind the low homeownership in 
Germany ,e.g; some has said Germany has a rather small owner-occupied sector, It has stayed on an almost 
constant level since 1945, while others attributed the low homeownership in Germany in despite its strength 
economy to the belief that “the financial burden of homeownership as well as the reduced mobility and 
flexibility in the labour market may limit the advantages of owning a house”; for further discussion about 
the homeownership in Germany see: I Helbrecht and T Geilenkeuser, ‘Homeownership in Germany: 
Retirement strategies of households in a tenant society’(2010) 47 Teorija in praksa 975; P Westerheide, 
‘Market stability, housing finance and homeownership in Germany’ (2012) Challenges of the Housing 
Economy: An International Perspective153 &  T Zumbro, ‘The relationship between homeownership and 
life satisfaction in Germany’(2014) 29 Housing Studies 319. 
153 S Proxenos, ‘Homeownership rates: a global perspective’ (2002) 17 Housing finance international3. 
154 During the discussion and studying the bill of housing finance laws 2012 , before its enactment, SAMA, 
which participated in drafting these laws recommended to draft article (12) of the bill of Real estate finance 
law to be allocated to capping the LTV at 70%.  
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have done so.  The development of the housing finance market requires good cooperation 
between the authorities to prevent unexpected results that conflict with the interests of 
both the public and the government alike.   
The above discussion raises considerations as to the extent to which cooperation between 
the Saudi authorities regarding housing finance exists, and whether or not Saudi legislator 
is aware of the adverse impact of applying the LTV on housing finance. If so, to what 
extent is that impact inconsistent with the general aims of enacting the housing finance 
laws 2012? If so, moreover, how can the regulatory framework for regulating the housing 
finance market in general, and for adopting the macro-prudential policy in particular, be 
developed to achieve the Housing finance laws2012 aims? Finally, is there an alternative 
solution that can be adopted to mitigate the adverse impact of the LTV, if it should seem 
necessary to keep it at a low level? 
These questions require us to consider whether or not Saudi legislators have conducted 
research or published reports indicating the reason behind capping the LTV ratio at 70 
per cent.  These questions will be answered in Chapter Five.   
 
iv. Challenges in developing the housing finance market through establishing 
securitisation of the market to remedy liquidity shortage 
 
Since political, economic and legal circumstances influence the housing finance market, 
it is not surprising that they may have inadvertent consequences. The function of 
regulator, therefore, is to deal carefully with these circumstances and propose a complete 
solution to address unintended side-effects.  
For example, when this thesis began in 2012, the Kingdom was enjoying one of its best 
economic eras155 due to the huge financial surpluses resulting from oil sales and export.
156
 
Of course, the huge financial surplus was re-injected back into the financial system to 
enable it to expand operations in lending, including housing finance. Further unintended 
                                            
155 In 2012, the Saudi budget archived the highest revenues in the last 50 years equals: 1247 billion  
Saudi Riyals, of course, thanks to the oil prices during that period, for more information about the Saudi 
budgets see:  SAMA, ‘ The gross domestic product of Saudi’(sama.gov.sa, April 2013) 
(http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar- sa/Indices/Pages/GrossDomesticIncome.aspx) accessed 12thNovember 2016. 
156 Saudi Arabia is considered the world's largest oil exporter; for more information about its role in this 
industry see; B Samsam, ‘World oil production capacity model suggests output peak by 2006-07’(2004) 102 
Oil and Gas Journal 18 & S James, ‘World oil: market or mayhem?’(2009)23 The journal of economic 
perspectives145.  
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side-effects occurred between 2014 and well into 2016 due to the sharp drop in oil prices 
and the consequent negative impact upon the Saudi economy and lending operations. 
Naturally, a shortage of liquidity is expected in the wake of the drop in oil prices due to 
the strong nexus between liquidity and oil prices. A study on the impact of the decline in 
oil prices on the Saudi economy, published by the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’), 
showed that ‘a 1 per cent decline in oil prices leads to a 0.3-0.4 per cent decline in credit 
growth, a 0.1-0.2 per cent decline in deposit growth, and higher nonperforming loans’.157 
This was felt in the Saudi economy during the 1980s and 1990s when oil prices collapsed 
and negatively impacted upon the economic and the level of liquidity in the Kingdom.158 
The Saudi government has adopted various financial means of addressing the liquidity 
shortage, including privatisation.
159
 For example, in late 2002, the Saudi 
Telecommunications Company was 30 per cent privatised, creating a huge government 
fund.160 This suggests that the ability to offset the liquidity shortage was a result of the 
drop in oil prices.  
The unintended effect, which is liquidity shortage, resulted from the drop in oil prices, 
and represents a threat to the housing finance market because of the latter’s need for 
liquidity. This threat, coupled with the inability of primary lenders and banks to directly 
access capital markets due to the lack of a housing finance market, provides a mechanism 
for the cheap and efficient sale of housing finance loan holdings, and therefore makes the 
effectiveness of the housing finance market questionable. The Saudi housing finance 
market is traditional, and depends on granting credit to a borrower and holding that credit 
in a bank’s portfolio for long period of time, typically around 30 years, until the whole of 
the credit is paid off. These features make housing finance market suffers an acute 
shortage of liquidity much more than in other markets, such as bond and stock markets, 
                                            
157H Abusaaq and others, ‘Saudi Arabia selected issues’ (imf.org, 
14July2015)<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15286.pdf > accessed 15th November 2016.    
158 R Auty, ‘How natural resources affect economic development’ (2000) 18 Development Policy 
Review 347. 
159
 It is known amongst economists that privatisation achieves many goals including creating the liquidity. 
This matter is beyond the scope of this research. However, for more information about it see: T Jean, 
‘Privatization in Eastern Europe: incentives and the economics of transition’ (1991) 6 NBER 
Macroeconomics 221. 
160
 For more information about the factors that have been adopted to resolve liquidity constraints, see: M 
Al-Jasser and A Banafe, ‘Globalisation, financial markets and the operation of monetary policy: the 
experience of Saudi Arabia’(bis.org, July 2005) < http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap23u.pdf> accessed 
10th March 2016. 
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which place it at a disadvantage and make it less attractive to investors.
161
 The purchaser 
of shares in the stock market, for example, knows that his investment can be almost 
instantaneously converted into money, whereas this feature does not exist in the Saudi 
housing finance market.  
The development of the housing finance market requires the creation of a means of 
enabling the flow of additional funds into the market in order to improve the quality of 
the housing finance market. Such development depend on the belief that fiscal innovation 
will play a crucial role in achieving a high percentage of homeownership, as has been 
observed in the United States, for example. The American housing finance market was 
developed in order to enable financial institutions to sell housing finance loans to 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which has created a new source of liquidity 
for financial institutions and enabled them to increase their volume of housing finance 
lending.
162
 Some commentators and observers have therefore attributed the high 
percentage of homeownership in the United States to the development of a housing 
finance market that offers the desired liquidity and protection for the main participants in 
the market.
163
 
The question arises here, is the Saudi government willing to adopt a solution enhancing 
liquidity within its housing finance market? If so, to what extent is the solution permanent 
and distant from the oil markets? It should be borne in mind that the Saudi government 
intends to give way to the banking sector, through Saudi vision 2030, in order to carry 
out the task of providing housing finance and creating a healthy environment in which 
the sector may flourish, including the provision of cheap liquidity.     
For these reasons, it could be argued that the solution may be found in adopting the idea 
of securitisation, which without doubt is considered to be one of the main innovations of 
the American system, which as can be seen above, has enhanced the efficiency of the 
housing finance market and has increased the rate of homeownership.
164
The mechanism 
                                            
161 J Prime, Investment analysis  (Prentice-Hall inc 1946) 45. 
162 A Sanders, ‘Barriers to homeownership and housing quality: The impact of the international mortgage 
market’(2005) 14 Journal of Housing Economics147.  
163 M Hwang, ‘Financial real estate development: a case study of the US real estate market in the 2000s’in 
S Wachter, M Cho and M Tch (eds),The Global financial crisis and housing A new policy 
paradigm(Edward Elgar 2014)150. 
164
 Integrated Financial Engineering, Mortgage securitization: lessons for emerging markets (PD&R, 
2007)9. 
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of securitisation involves the conversion of housing finance loans into assets or bonds 
units, which can be traded in the secondary housing finance market and create the desired 
liquidity for primary lenders. Access to the secondary market grants many features to 
primary lenders in the housing finance market due to reduction in risk exposure and the 
increase in their volume of housing finance lending.
165
 This, of course, would be reflected 
in the increased availability, affordability, and continuity of the supply of mortgages at 
the consumer level.
166
 It is evident that if the former features are achieved then a large 
percentage of the Saudi population could afford to purchase their own property.167  
For all the above considerations, the establishment of a securitisation market might be 
considered very important for the development of the housing finance market. However, 
there are some concerns related to the causes of the global financial crisis 2007.168 In the 
wake of enactment of the housing finance laws 2012, some members of the AlShura 
Council announced that the laws had taken into account the contributory causes of the 
global financial crisis of 2007, in order to prevent such a crisis occurring in Saudi 
Arabia.169 However, this superficial announcement may have been an exaggeration, 
inasmuch as one of the major factors generating the crisis, a lack of transparency in 
securitisation structures, had not been adequately heeded by the Saudi legislator in the 
Housing finance laws 2012. Also, article (17) of the Real Estate Finance Law 2012 fails 
to establish a legal basis for securitisation, by preventing an entity that should perform 
the function of securitisation from carrying out an important process within it, namely 
issuing bonds. In addition, there is uncertainty surrounding specification of property 
rights in the event of the borrower’s default under the Saudi legal system.   Accordingly, 
there is a need to examine and investigate the legal gaps that can hamper the efforts to 
                                            
165
 A Sanders, ‘Barriers to homeownership and housing quality: The impact of the international mortgage 
market’(2005) 14 Journal of Housing Economics147. 
166
 B Richard, ‘Fannie Mea and the secondary mortgage market’ (1971) 66 Northwestern University Law 
review 1. 
167 Integrated Financial Engineering, Mortgage securitization: lessons for emerging markets 
(PD&R,2007)6. 
168S Wachter,M Cho and J Tcha, ‘The blobal financial crisis and housing: a new policy paradigm’ in S 
Wachter, M Cho and M Tcha(eds),The global financial crisis and housing(Edward Elgar 2014) 9. 
169 Securitisation coupled with the global financial crisis 2007 due to the role played by it, as will be 
explained in details in chapter six, for a brief background about the role played by this innovation in the 
global financial crisis see; V Acharya and others, ‘The financial crisis of 2007‐2009: Causes and  
remedies’(2009)18  Financial markets, institutions & instruments 89. 
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establish a securitisation market in Saudi Arabia in order to develop the housing finance 
market. Chapter Six will be given to a discussion of this matter in greater detail. 
 
        2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates that Saudi Arabia has witnessed two housing shortage phases. 
The first was between the 1970s and 1990s, whilst the second began in the late 1990s and 
continued until today. It is evident that in both phases the housing shortage was 
synchronised with a drop in the homeownership rate among the Saudi population. 
However, as the homeownership rate fell sharply, in the second phase homeownership 
reached just 47 per cent. This chapter has shown that the homeownership rate is usually 
used to measure the development of the housing finance market, which suggests that the 
low homeownership rate in Saudi Arabia is due to the lack development in the housing 
finance market.   
The Saudi government has sought in both phases to develop the housing finance market. 
The first phase witnessed vast and successful government initiatives that led to demand 
outstripping supply and an increase in real estate values. However, the second phase did 
not witness equal success in developing the housing finance market, despite government 
intervention, an outcome which can be attributed to the demand for housing finance 
surpassing government initiatives in this sector. 
It has been observed that the Saudi government targeted the private sector to help in 
catering for the huge demand for housing finance. The government has therefore sought 
to develop the housing finance market to create a healthy environment for the private 
sector to flourish. Despite the government’s initiatives and series of legislative 
enactments to develop the housing finance market, as has been seen in this chapter, four 
matters remain undeveloped, and can be considered barriers to the development of 
housing finance. The following chapters will discuss in details the issues to resolve in 
completing the development of the Saudi housing finance market.
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Chapter Three: Building up the housing finance market through 
granting efficient protection to borrowers and lenders 
 
3.1 Introduction  
  
This chapter aims to analyse the Supreme Judicial Council's (SJC’s) decision,  issued on 
26th August 1981, which stated that all Sharia authorities, including courts and notaries 
public, should not implement mortgage documentation for loans provided by 
conventional banks in Saudi because those loans are usurious and thus are not Sharia-
compliant. It is believed that the SJC’s decision is hindering the development of the 
housing finance market by depriving lenders and borrowers alike of mortgage security. 
The chapter will ask whether or not the provisions of the housing finance laws 2012 
overturn that decision. This question can be explored through conceptualizing the SJC’s 
decision, to determine whether it should be considered a legal, administrative or judiciary 
decision. Then the chapter will aim to create an alternative solution that might bridge the 
gap produced by the decision. 
The chapter is divided into the following sections: the first section (3.1) is the introduction 
to the chapter. Section two (3.2) emphasises the importance of providing the desired 
protection for lenders and borrowers in the housing finance market in general, then moves 
from the general to the particular to focus on the role of banks in the housing finance 
market in Saudi Arabia and the role played by the SJC, which deprives lender and 
borrower alike of the optimal security device: mortgage. The chapter then attempts, in 
section three (3.3), to analyse the SJC’s decision. This requires shedding light on the 
judicial system in Saudi to determine the precise position of the SJC, by examining its 
authority over other courts and asking whether or not those courts are bound to respond 
to its orders. The analysis will involve three subheadings: (3.3.1) the judicial system and 
the role of the SJC pre and post the new Law of the Judiciary 2007; (3.3.2) the legal 
standing of the SJC’s decision; (3.3.3) the attempts to overturn the SJC's decision. Then 
section four (3.4) examines the extent to which Islamic finance transactions
1 (IFTs), 
                                            
1
 Islamic Finance has been defined as; “Islamic finance is limited to financial relationships involving 
entrepreneurial investment subject to the moral prohibition of (i) interest earnings or usury (riba) and 
money lending, (ii) haram (sinful activity), such as direct or indirect association with lines of business 
involving alcohol, pork products, firearms, tobacco, and adult entertainment, (iii) speculation, betting, and 
gambling (maisir), including the speculative trade or exchange of money for debt without an underlying 
asset transfer, (iv) the trading of the same object between buyer and seller (bay’ al inah), as well as (v) 
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which were created to avoid conflict with the SJC’s decision, grant lenders and borrowers 
the desired protection in housing finance contracts. To do this, the section branches off 
into three subheadings, addressing the elements that diminish the protection granted to 
lender and borrower by IFTs: (i) the risk of recharacterisation of the IFTs; (ii) the lack of 
priority in IFTs; and (iii) lack protection of the borrower’s equity. Then the chapter will 
introduce in section (3.5) a moderate solution that could address the lack protection 
without upsetting the SJC’s decision through creating a new collateral security structure 
in the housing finance market. The final section of this chapter (3.6) is the conclusion, 
which summarises and analyses the key matters addressed throughout the chapter.  
 
3.2 Background to the importance of providing intensive legal 
protection to borrower and lender in the housing finance market 
 
The well-functioning housing finance system requires legislation governing this field to 
provide stakeholders, whether borrowers or lenders, with the same degree of comfort, 
confidence and protection.2 This concern is raised due to a potential creditor wanting to 
know whether and to what extent his interests, such as the priority over other claims to 
the financed property or assurance of the borrower’s ability to repay due debts, will be 
secured and protected when he concludes a housing finance contract. At the same time, a 
potential borrower wants to protect and secure his interests in the housing finance 
arrangement through being granted ownership of the property.  
A study published in 2008, which analysed a sample of 62 countries, including developed 
countries and a wide range of emerging economies, found that a more effective housing 
finance system exists in countries which provide stronger legal rights for both borrowers 
and lenders (through collateral security and bankruptcy arrangements), and which have a 
more effective credit information system in addition to a more stable macroeconomic 
environment.3 Another study shows that strong protection granted to lenders will lead to 
                                            
preventable uncertainty (gharar) such as all financial derivative instruments, forwarding contracts, and 
future agreements”. For more information see: F Vogel and S Hayes, Islamic law and finance: religion, 
risk, and return (Brill, 1998) 71. 
2 Deloitte, ‘Saudi mortgage laws; A Formula for a well-functioning market?’ (deloitte.com, August 
2012)<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/xe/Documents/realestate/me_real_estate_mortgag
e_whitepaper_072013.pdf> accessed 10th November2016. 
3 W Veronica and W Francis, ‘Markets and housing finance’(2008)17 Journal of Housing Economics 239, 
also for further information about the importance of offering the protection for the main participants in the 
mortgage market see: L Chiquier, O Hassler and M Lea, ‘Mortgage Securities in Emerging 
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lower interest rates and thus, of course, should result in a decrease in the cost of housing 
finance.4  
The above studies point to the importance of legal rights for lenders and borrowers alike 
in enhancing the efficiency of the housing finance market. For understandable reasons, 
lenders desire protection of their interests to minimise the adverse consequences of non-
payment and insolvency if and when they do occur. At the same time, the general 
principles of equity require that the same level of protection be provided for borrowers to 
prevent overreaching by lenders, for example, or to protect them against lenders’ 
insolvency.  
However, in the Saudi context the provision of this protection for lenders and borrowers 
is restricted by the SJC’s decision, which deprives them of the strongest type of security: 
mortgage.5 On the other hand, it is argued that an alternative mechanism created by banks 
to protect their interests in the housing finance market does not offer the adequate 
protection for both lender and borrower, as will be seen later in section 3.4, a factor which 
weakens these mechanisms. 
It should not underestimate the role that might be played by the institution of mortgage 
in promoting a powerful ideology of homeownership. By mortgaging real estate the 
individual is able to obtain a loan of substantial capital funds which can then be applied 
to the purchase of a house.6 Through mortgage, the dream of homeownership becomes a 
reality for ordinary people who cannot afford to purchase a dwelling outright. Therefore, 
the mortgage facility helped to address the first housing shortage era in Saudi, when entire 
dwellings and houses built with the help of REDF loans were mortgaged in favour of the 
REDF.7 Quite apart from the role of mortgage finance in facilitating housing finance 
activities in Saudi Arabia, many jurisdictions throughout the world have benefitted from 
this mechanism to promote the ideology of homeownership.8    
                                            
Markets’(documents.worldbank.org, August 2004) < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/654661468765314141/pdf/wps3370.pdf> accessed 12 th 
November 2016. 
4 Q Jun and S Philip, ‘How laws and institutions shape financial contracts: The case of bank loans’(2007) 
62 The Journal of Finance 2803.  
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 See chapter two, section 5 . 
6 K Gray and S Gray, Elements of land law (5th edition, Oxford 2009) 695. 
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 S Al-Tasan, An Evaluation of Housing Finance in Saudi Arabia: The Real Estate Development Fund's 
Policies and Alternative Options (University of Durham, 1998).  
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 For example, during the 1990s, the homeownership rate in the UK was 67% of all households, of which 
in turn 62% were subject to some current mortgage liabilities. For more information about this point see; 
K Gray and S Gray, Elements of land law (5th edition, Oxford 2009) 694-699.  
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Naturally, when lenders in the housing finance market are deprived of such a security 
device, negative outcomes are predicted for housing finance sector, particularly in cases 
where an alternative security device cannot replace the mortgage. Therefore, we might 
wonder intuitively what the nature of the SJC’s decision is, and what its causes and 
impacts are. These speculations lead us to analyse the SJC's decision in the light of the 
Saudi legal system. The aim of this analysis, as mentioned before, is to find a legal 
solution which will overturn this decision, or to find an alternative mechanism with which 
to grant optimal security to both borrower and lender in the housing finance market.  
 
3.3 Analysing the SJC’s decision and its impact on the housing finance 
market 
It is clear that security for loans is an important consideration for lenders, playing a 
substantial role in promoting the finance market by providing stability and enhancing the 
degree of realization by lenders. Axiomatically, when this element is absent or weak the 
lenders will be reluctant to lend and provide financial support, or will provide financing 
at a higher cost.  
In 1982, the SJC in Saudi circulated a letter asking all Sharia courts and public notaries 
not to mortgage real estate in favour of banks that provide loans with interest (riba)9 a 
practice considered to violate Islamic law.10 This decision deprives banks of the mortgage 
facility which is designed to provide lenders with a valuable form of security over the 
housing finance they advance.  
In order to understand the SJC’s decision it is necessary to bear in mind the nature of the 
judicial system in Saudi, the hierarchy of the courts,  and thus to see how compliance with 
this decision became binding for all courts and public notaries.  
 
3.3.1 The Judicial system and the role of the SJC pre and post the new Law 
of the Judiciary2007 
The judicial system in Saudi is multifaceted. It is divided between the so-called Sharia 
courts, which have jurisdiction over all cases, the Board of Grievances, which is 
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 There is no doubt that Riba is prohibited by the first two main sources of Islamic law, which are the Quran 
and the Sunnah. For more information about this concept, its forms and the concept behind the prohibition, 
see: U Chapra, ‘The nature of riba in Islam’ (2006) 2 The journal of Islamic economics and finance 7.   
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concerned with administrative cases to which the government is a party and numbers of 
committees,11 which have been created to having jurisdiction over disputes arising in 
specific areas; for example, the Banking Disputes Resolution committee (BDC).12 These 
courts and the Board of Grievances, in addition to other committees, are governed by, 
first, the general teachings of Islam, and then by a number of legislations and regulations 
enacted by the legislative authority to govern many aspects of life such as; commerce, 
finance, banking, ect.  
The SJC’s decision was made under an old judicial law (the Law of the Judiciary 1975) 
which was approved by the royal decree no (M/64) dated 14/7/1395H (24th July 1975). 
According to the Law of Judiciary 1975 the Saudi courts, or the so-called Sharia courts, 
consist of three kinds of courts. The Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to hear 
cases relating to civil and criminal matters;13 the Appellate courts have jurisdiction to 
hear appeals against judgements of the first instance courts. The last kind is the Supreme 
Judicial Council (SJC), which had a role, and continues to have a modified role, in the 
hierarchy of the courts14 where it was authorised to oversee and supervises all level of 
Sharia courts.15 The Minister of Justice chairs the SJC along with ten other judges, 
appointed by the King, to represent the SJC’s member.16 The SJC plays many roles: 
administrative, consultative, judicial.17 For example, the SJC was authorised by law to 
study sharia matters referred by the Minister of Justice in order to clarify the manner in 
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 R Aba-Namay, ‘The recent constitutional reforms in Saudi Arabia’ (1993) 42 International and  
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 Article 6 of Law of Judiciary 1975 stated that:  
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17 Article 8 of Law of Judiciary approved by royal decree no. M/64, 14 Rajab 1395 (23rd July 1975) (“Law 
of Judiciary 1975”). 
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which those principles are to be applied within the relevant courts of the judicial system.18 
Also, the SJC might study matters referred by the King to ascertain and state its opinion 
on them.19  
However, the SJC’s judicial roles have been amended by the new law which was 
approved in 2007 (the Law of the Judiciary 2007)20 to assign the SJC a more 
administrative role. For example, article (6) of the new law defined the new jurisdiction 
of the SJC as including, but not being limited to, issuing regulations related to a judge’s 
personal affairs, issuing judicial inspection regulations, etc. It is clear that these 
jurisdictions are considered administrative matters, whereby the SJC exercises a 
monitoring and regulatory role over the judges’ affairs and, where necessary, issues 
regulations to facilitate the exercise of this role.  
Under the new law courts are set up in a three-tiered system consisting of the Supreme 
Court, the Courts of Appeal and the First Instance Courts while the so-called; the SJC 
authorised by the Law of Judiciary 2007 to look into the personnel affairs of the judges, 
or in other word the administrative role. On other hand, the judicial role has been 
transferred from the SJC to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, under the Law of Judiciary 
2007, the component court that is supposed to review SJC’s decision in respect of the 
prohibition on banks to extend mortgages is the Supreme Court. 
To summarise the main difference between the Law of Judiciary 1975 and its amendments 
by the Law of Judiciary 2007 regarding the role of the SJC, it could be said that the SJC 
had administrative, judicial roles under the 1975 law, but that this position has changed 
with the 2007 law, which created a new entity called the Supreme Court and authorised 
it to exercise the judicial role, while the administrative role remains under the authority 
of the SJC.   
 
3.3.2 The legal standing of the SJC’s decision 
 
Consideration should be given to an important element of the decision made by the SJC, 
namely the question of the SJC’s legal standing in terms of its authority and 
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 Article 8 of Law of Judiciary approved by royal decree no. M/64, 14 Rajab 1395 (23rd July 1975) 
(“Law of Judiciary 1975”). 
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responsibilities. The impact of this decision cannot be understood without first 
determining its legal nature; that is, whether it is to be considered judicial or 
administrative or something else. This point will facilitate analysis of the decision in order 
to see whether or not the provisions of the housing finance laws 2012 have overturned 
the SJC's decision. 
In light of the general principles outlined by the Law of the Judiciary 1975, the SJC 
possesses both an interpretive role that does not amount to legislative action, as will be 
shown later, and a judicial function, in addition to its authority to supervise the lower 
courts as set forth in that law, which is somehow regarded as an administrative function.21 
Among a number of functions and responsibilities specified in article (8), there are two 
functions that might be considered interpretive and judicial. For example, article (8) 
delegates the SJC to express an opinion as requested by the Minister of Justice on matters 
related to the judiciary, and also authorizes the SJC to express its opinion on issues related 
to Sharia matters as requested by the Minister of Justice,22 specifying “expression of 
opinions as requested by the Minister of Justice on matters related to judging and review 
of Sharia matters as to which the Minister of Justice finds it necessary to declare general 
Sharia principles”.23 
Although the above statements explicitly authorise the SJC to play both an interpretive 
and a judicial role, there are some opinions emerging from the SJC’s members which 
treats these functions as administrative, and as not amounting to judicial or interpretive 
functions. Frank Vogel, in his book: Islamic Law and Legal System Studies of Saudi 
Arabia, interviewed some members of the SJC, asking them whether or not the SJC plays 
a judicial role. The answers were surprising, because Alghusun, a member of the SJC and 
the Board of Senior Ulama, has a specific philosophy regarding this matter: he believes 
that the provisions constituting the Law of the Judiciary 1975 are considered 
administrative clauses; accordingly the authority delegated to the SJC by these clauses is 
administrative as well.24 This opinion was affirmed by the Chairman of the SJC from a 
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 F Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000) 108. 
23 Article (8) of Law of the Judiciary 1975. 
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different standpoint when he told Vogel, in response to the latter’s question about the 
SJC’s role, “the council’s decisions could bind judges only on administrative matters”. 25 
Vogel, in the same book, adduced some statements from which it can be inferred that the 
SJC plays an interpretive role, when he asked official government members: shall the 
judges follow the SJC when deciding a disputed point or are they free to apply their own 
ijtihad (opinion)? Of course, this question calls for an indication of the interpretive role 
of the SJC, because there is no controversy about the administrative one, which is 
axiomatic, while there are problematic aspects of the interpretive role. Al-Faryan, deputy 
Minister of Justice, answered that judges are bound by the SJC’s decisions unless they 
can persuade the SJC regarding why they did not apply its decision and instead applied 
their own ijtihad; in that case it is unlikely that their judgement would be reversed.26 
The same question was directed to the president of the Bureau of Experts of the Council 
of Ministers, who stated that in general the SJC’s decisions bind the judges except in two 
eventualities: if they do not mind if their judgement is abolished by the SJC, or if they 
can persuade the SJC that their ijtihad (opinion) is not covered by its decision.27 These 
statements from experts in the Saudi legal system give a clear indication, to some extent, 
of the interpretive role played by the SJC. Even SJC members opposed this opinion, on 
grounds that the correct interpretation of articles (6) and (7) of the Law of the Judiciary 
1975 expressly indicates that the interpretive role is compatible with the pronouncements 
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of experts in the Saudi legal system. This point leads us to ask: is the SJC’s decision in 
relation to mortgages administrative or interpretive or something else? If it is interpretive, 
then it will support the conclusion of this argument. 
In fact, even though the aim of this decision might give the impression that it is merely 
an operational matter, preventing both judges and general notaries from “authenticating 
the mortgage of commercial bank loans on which such banks take interest from the debtor 
a certain percentage”,28 it is in its nature an interpretive, not a judicial ruling for many 
reasons. Firstly, the justification offered by the SJC for its decision is that loans provided 
by the commercial banks involve interest, which is prohibited in Islamic law. This ruling 
is considered a statement of general Sharia principles, because it establishes a general 
rule which all judges and general notaries are bound to follow, and this is compatible with 
article (8) of the Law of the Judiciary 1975 which authorised the SJC to play this role. 
Secondly, the reason for not defining the decision as judicial lies in the fact that the 
decision did not result from a lawsuit or trial. Rather, it was made in the wake of requests 
by many notaries and judges that the SJC relieve them of the role of registering and 
enforcing mortgages for commercial banks, because they believed that the banks’ loans 
involve usury, which of course does not comply with Islamic law, so that if they engage 
in it they will commit a sin. It seems that notaries and judges referred to a hadith of the 
Prophet (BUH) condemning the writer of a usurious loan.29 Hence, following this request, 
the SJC issued the aforementioned decision. 
However, Vogel, in the same book, claimed that this decision is an administrative order 
because “notaries have no power to find facts, the order provides them with a mechanical, 
rule-of-thumb procedure to follow”.30 This claim might in some respects be untrue. 
Judges are empowered to find facts, since they are empowered to form judgements and 
make decisions about a lawsuit or a trial. Secondly, the decision was made, as mentioned 
above, in the wake of the request made by the notaries and judges asking to be relieved 
of this function because they did not want to commit a sin: which implies that they just 
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wanted a legal tool that they could rely on when refusing to register and enforce a 
mortgage for a commercial bank.31 
Finally, whether we consider the SJC's decision administrative or interpretive, the reality 
is that the provisions of the housing finance laws 2012, and in particular the Real Estate 
Finance Law 2012, could not overturn the SJC's decision. Thus, it could be argued that 
the existence of the SJC's decision, despite the enactment of the housing finance laws 
2012, might be attributed to the previous result, namely that administrative and 
interpretive decisions require the same level of decision to overturn them. Thus, the SJC's 
decision still operates despite the enactment of the housing finance laws 2012 which 
support the former explanation. Nevertheless, in the last 30 years there have been many 
attempts to overturn the SJC's decision, to mitigate its negative impact on the finance 
sector in general and housing finance in particular.   
 
3.3.3 The attempts to overturn the SJC's decision 
 
There is no need to show the impact of this decision on the banking sector because it is 
clear enough without proof that the banks thereby lose one of the strongest mechanisms 
for securing their rights. However, the question that might arise here is whether or not 
there were attempts to review or resolve this issue, particularly with the emergence of 
Islamic banking at the end of the 1980s, which provided products that comply with the 
general tenets of Islamic law.  
In fact, there were many attempts to review and overturn this decision. For example, in 
the wake of the SJC’s decision issuance, banks turned to the King to complain about it, 
pointing to the huge risks resulting from the decision, as well as to the losses they were 
incurring by it, and asked the authorities to find a proper solution to the problem. The 
response was a royal order issued not to resolve the issue, but to clarify it, to the effect 
that not all banking operations involve riba, and that therefore notaries and judges should 
not refuse to authenticate a mortgage in favour of the banks unless they find an explicit 
clause referring to the interest, in which case they have the right to refuse to do so.32 This 
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royal order was circulated to all courts, including judges and notaries, by the Ministry of 
Justice, which is considered part of the government, asking them to implement this order.  
Although the royal order was issued by the King,33 it neither resolved the issue nor added 
anything new. It was merely a tool reiterating the judges’ duties, because if looked at it 
from another standpoint, it will be seen that the order did not ask the judges to ignore the 
SJC’s decision and implement the mortgage in favour of the banks – which usually do 
not use the term riba or interest in their contracts, but instead use synonyms for interest, 
such as profit, in order to circumvent the courts. It was not surprising, therefore, that the 
royal order did not make a huge difference; the judges and notaries continued to reject 
registration and enforcement of the mortgages.34 
It is worth shedding light on some considerations related to the above attempt to overturn 
the SJC’s decision. Saudi judicial system, namely that judges, who are respected in the 
community, do not carry out decrees or regulations which are considered improper or 
invalid due to inconsistency with the general principles of Islamic law. They instead reject 
them, thus contradicting the King, or simply ignore them and refrain from implementing 
them.35 The legal umbrella under which they derive their power from is article (1) of the 
Law of the Judiciary 1975, which stated: “Judges are independent and, in the 
administration of justice, they shall be subject to no authority other than the provisions of 
Shari’ah and laws in force. No one may interfere with the Judiciary”.  
The provision of article (1) of the old judiciary law was not changed in the Law of the 
Judiciary 2007,36which include the same provision in article(1). Based on this article, no 
one has the authority to force judges to do something that they regard as distasteful, 
especially if it conflicts with Islamic law, because when legislation, including a royal 
order, conflicts with Islamic law, Islamic law will usually prevail. 37 Accordingly, it might 
be said that the practice of judges in relation to royal order is regarded as implicitly 
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reflecting the principle of judicial independence, which gives judges the freedom to make 
judicial decisions without intervention by other authorities, executive or legislative.38  
Another attempt to review the SJC’s decision was made when, after nearly 20 years, it 
was mentioned during drafting the housing finance laws 2012, that the SJC’s decision 
was regarded as an obstacle hindering the banks’ operations and that it needed to be 
abolished in order to support their role in housing finance market.39 The law firm, that 
drafted the housing finance laws 2012, suggested that the SJC’s decision should be 
overturned by the royal decree that was expected to approve the laws. This suggestion 
was based on the conviction that a royal decree, considered the highest legal instrument 
in the Saudi legal system, could overturn the decision. However, this attempt was not 
given consideration either when the housing finance laws 2012 were being studied, or 
when the approval of the laws was issued, due to the decision’s continued validity, which 
affirms the claim that this attempt to overturn the decision did not work.  
No official statement was made about this matter, but it might be surmised that the 
legislative authority in Saudi considered some points that led it to ignore the suggestion. 
For instance, the Basic Law of Governance (BLG) 1991, which is considered Saudi 
constitutional law, gives judges and judicial institutions absolute power to implement the 
general principles of Islamic law and places emphasis on an important point, which is the 
independence of the judicial authority, stating that “there shall be no power over judges 
in their judicial function other than that of the Islamic sharia”.40 The interpretation of this 
article has given the SJC’s decision immunity from intervention by other authorities, 
including the King.  
For all above considerations, it could be argued that the SJC’s decision shall only be 
reviewed or overturned by the Supreme Court under the Law of the Judiciary 2007 and 
that the fate of any action taken by other authorities, including the King, to review the 
decision will be to fail. 
Notwithstanding unsuccessful attempts to overturn the SJC’s decision, the circumstances 
have helped lenders in Saudi to create a new financing mechanism which grants them the 
adequate, to some extent, protection; that is, the establishment of the Islamic finance 
                                            
38 A Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia’(2004) 19 Arab Law Quarterly 5 
39
 The above suggestion was mentioned in the draft of the housing finance laws 2012 that was referred to 
the government to be studied prior to its approval. I have got that draft due to having worked as legal advisor 
at the Council of Ministers. 
40
 Article (46) of the Basic law of Governance. 
73 
 
industry. However, this mechanism has not been accepted by the SJC, for the same 
reasons that it rejected the banks’ right to mortgage property. The next section will explain 
this matter in detail.   
 
3.4 Islamic finance transactions (IFTs) and the housing finance 
market: solution or dilemma   
 
A significant event, occurring during the period between the first and second attempts to 
overturn the SJC’s decision, which made such an overturn, theoretically, worth pursuing, 
was the establishment of Islamic finance in Saudi.  
Generally speaking, the banking system was officially established in October 1952, its 
introduction being synchronised with the creation of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) or central bank,41 and all banks established under the authority of SAMA were 
conventional banks, which implies that they operate transactions involving usury. This 
factor renders the SJC’s decision acceptable at that time. However, in 1988, for the first 
time, SAMA permitted banks to operate by conducting the IFTs, initially the Al-Rajhi 
Company for currency exchange and commerce, which was common practice among 
ordinary people as it was an Islamic bank and this allowed many conventional banks to 
operate Islamic finance transactions when they took note of the huge public demand for 
Islamic finance products.42  
Of course it can be argued that the establishment of the Islamic finance in Saudi was not 
sufficient to convince the SJC to overturn its decision, although its reason for preventing 
banks from registering and enforcing mortgages, namely the presence of usury, no longer 
existed in banks to the extent that they provided the IFTs. What then was the SJC’s 
justification? This argument is rational and justified, but it is difficult to identify the 
reason behind the SJC’s insistence on its decision, since there is no official statement or 
judicial judgement or opinion to indicate or guide us towards the SJC’s viewpoint. 
However, it might be observed that there are two potential hypotheses which could 
explain the continued application of this decision and the SJC’s unwillingness to review 
it despite the emergence of the IFTs. 
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The first hypothesis rests on the modernity of the IFTs in Saudi, which was established 
during the 1980s. That modernity might be considered an excuse for the courts, judges 
and notaries not to endorse and accept the IFTs, by defining them as not Sharia-
compliant. Of course this has led to regard all banks’ operations, whether conventional or 
Islamic, as involving usury. Lack of understanding of the correct nature of Islamic finance 
and its products may be considered the reason why judges and notaries do not accept it, 
but regard it merely as a set of techniques for circumventing the SJC’s decision. The IFTs 
was born in an environment of suspicion and distrust because Islamic finance 
transactions, which were subject to the different views of religious scholars as to whether 
to approve or disapprove them, according to the circumstances and arguments 
surrounding these modes.  
At the beginning of the establishment of the IFTs were, and to some extent still are, 
approved or disapproved by the Sharia boards.43 However, the central banks and 
conventional banks, as well as individuals, are sometimes confused by the different 
rulings of the Sharia boards on IFTs, as some of these boards construct a specific form of 
finance transaction to make it consistent with Islamic law, while other boards deem such 
forms of IFTs contrary to the general teachings of Islamic law.44 This instability in the 
rulings on the IFTs resulted from the absence of consensus on them among Muslim 
scholars and the Sharia boards, which was justified, inasmuch as such an emerging 
industry needs time and considerable effort to attain stability through application of the 
ancient principles of Islamic law to modern banking instruments and products so as to 
bring them into compliance with the general teachings of Islam.45  
It might be argued, however, that the judges should not be confused by the different 
rulings on IFTs issued by the Sharia boards, because a judge is supposed to have the 
capacity and knowledge needed to examine the structure of the IFTs and consider whether 
or not their forms comply with Islamic law. In particular, under the Saudi legal system 
that requires the study of Islamic law by those chosen to be judges, because the latter are 
supposed to be knowledgeable about Islamic law and have a good background in Islamic 
finance. This argument is sound to the extent that judges are chosen from among 
graduates of Sharia (Islamic law) colleges which teach a number of disciplines relating 
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to Islamic law; however, not all graduates from these colleges are experts in Islamic 
finance which is considered an independent discipline.  
Even though Islamic finance is designed to be compliant with Islamic law and to create 
instruments subject to the general principles of Islamic law, it is very difficult to say that 
people who are experts in Islamic law will also be experts in the IFTs. Therefore, it was 
documented that the IFTs industry faced some challenges when first established, 
including the lack of teaching, training and research in this field.46 The requests issued at 
the beginning of the Islamic finance industry emphasise the shortage of qualified people 
who possess a thorough knowledge of Islamic law as well as of modern economics and 
finance.47  
For all above considerations, it could be argued that despite judges and notaries having 
graduated from Sharia (Islamic law) colleges, they do not necessarily possess a good 
understanding of Islamic finance, which in turn might explain why the SJC has not 
overturn its decision. The reluctance of the SJC to review and overturn its decision might 
be attributed to a lack of understanding of the IFTs, causing it to deem these forms of 
Islamic finance a means of circumventing the SJC’s decision.  
The fear and reluctance surrounding the IFTs, however, should disappear as the industry 
matures, since it has been developed, improved and served through the setting up of 
forums and seminars, in addition to teaching programmes in many universities.48 These 
projects have helped to make the community, including notaries and judges, aware of the 
industry and its products, and they can ensure that it operates according to the general 
principles of Islamic law. These elements and efforts were not enough to convince the 
SJC to review its decision to exempt from its decision Islamic banks and conventional 
banks which provide the IFTs. 
However, it might be said that this insistence by the SJC on its decision and its 
unwillingness to review it could point to another issue that has not been taken into 
account, and is considered the second hypothesis with which to explain the continuation 
of this decision up to the present. The second hypothesis supposes that pressure on the 
                                            
46 M Iqbal,A  Auṣāf and K Tariqullah, Challenges Facing Islamic Banking (Islamic Research and Training 
Institute 1998) 48. 
47
 T Zaher and M Hassan, ‘A comparative literature survey of Islamic finance and banking’ (2001) 
10 Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 155. 
48
 R Wilson, ‘The development of Islamic finance in the gulf cooperation council states’ in D Held  
and K Ulrichesn (ed), The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order 
(Routledge 2013) 146. 
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SJC has diminished because the banks have found suitable ways and mechanisms with 
which to provide themselves with protection, to some extent, for their loans and at the 
same time avoid upsetting the SJC’s decision.  
In fact, the banks did not stand still and do nothing about that decision, because they 
wanted to expand their operation and to make a profit. Therefore, they developed many 
ways to avoid facing such a decision, as will be shown later. But it was found that none 
of these methods provided complete protection for both creditors and debtors; they either 
protected the creditor at the expense of the debtor or vice versa. For example, some banks 
ask the debtor to mortgage his/her property in favour of an employee of the bank; then a 
public notary cannot refuse to register that property.49 But this method does not protect 
the debtor against the creditor’s insolvency nor is it a perfect tool for protecting creditors, 
because the employee in whose favour the real estate was mortgaged might use this trust 
to exercise his right as mortgagee against the mortgagor, even if he leaves the bank.50 
The above hypothesis, which combines the SJC’s deep distrust of the IFTs with the 
alternative means found by the banks to provide security and protection, might explain 
the retention of the SJC’s decision up to the present. However, banks have continued to 
search for ways of providing the desired security along with full protection of their 
interests. It is worth glancing for a moment at most of the ways adopted by national Saudi 
banks to secure their loans through the use of the IFTs after developing them to serve 
their interest without the need to resort to Sharia courts or public notaries. 
It was found that the banks tend to establish, under Company Law 1965,51 a new company 
owned by a bank and another person who is usually a member of the board of directors 
of the bank; the function of this company is to enter into the finance agreement, so that 
the finance agreement will be tripartite, involving a bank, a customer and this company. 
How does this contract or agreement work? In brief, the main function of this company 
is to buy and resell a property to a customer on behalf of the bank, whose function is 
limited to financing the transaction, through applying Islamic finance transactions, such 
as: ijarah muntahiah be atmlik and ijara with waad be alhibah.52 Therefore, this form or 
                                            
49 M Iqbal,A  Auṣāf and K Tariqullah, Challenges Facing Islamic Banking (Islamic Research and Training 
Institute 1998) 41.  
50 S Khan, ‘Secured Lending in Saudi Arabia’(1984) 3 Int’l Fin. L. Rev 27. 
51 Company law was approved by Royal Decree no. (M/6) dated 22/3/1385H (22nd July1965). 
52 The concept behind the means of converting a finance transaction to an Islamic transaction, or in other 
words how to Islamise a conventional transaction, is: first, owning the property that is meant to be financed, 
and then reselling or leasing it to the borrower. For example, ijarah muntahiah be atmlki is very similar to 
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contract is a three-party contract between a bank, a customer and a company owned by 
the bank. The question arises here: Why do banks resort to establishing a company in 
order to implement IFTs? In fact, the banks have resorted to the method of establishing a 
company to circumvent article (10) of the Banking Control Law 1966 (BCL),53 which 
prohibits banks from undertaking any activity relating to real estate unless that activity is 
necessary to conduct its banking business or for the purpose of its employees’ housing, 
or from acquiring real estate in return for a debt due to the bank, because if the bank had 
acquired an item of real estate for finance purposes and registered it in its name, it would 
have contravened this article. 
It is noteworthy that above-described agreement was designed in the late 1990s or 2000s 
and appeared not during the 1980s, because the articles54 that have emerged concerning 
the SJC’s decision were published at the mid of the 1980s and at the beginning of 
the1990s respectively, and did not mention this mechanism of the IFTs. Also, the IFTs 
were used in the beginning as a means of expanding operations concerning personal loans, 
or short-term loans. The housing finance sector did not need this mechanism, due to the 
REDF’s provision of interest-free loans for individuals. However, the circumstances 
changed, making it increasingly urgent to develop IFTs to cater for the huge demand for 
housing finance loans from 2006 up to the present. The question that needs to be answered 
in this context is: do the IFTs grant the adequate protection for lender and borrower alike 
in the housing finance market? 
 
                                            
a hire purchase contract whereby the bank buys a property and then releases it to the borrowers who will 
be eligible to own it at the end of the contract, while the bank still has the right to terminate the contract in 
the case of brorrower default. By contrast, the so-called ijara with waad be alhibah is a lease with the 
promise of donation whereby the bank concludes two contracts with the borrowers: the first contract as a 
lease contract, involving the same condition of allowing the bank to terminate the contract in the case of 
default, while the second contract is merely a promise from the bank to the borrower that the latter will 
donate the financed property if the borrower has paid all obligations under that contract. For further 
information see: P Scherer, K Torchani and J Elsen, ‘Islamic banking and finance in the light of German 
regulatory law’ (2013) 28 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 27. 
53
 The BCL was approved by Royal Decree no. (M/5) dated 22-2-1386 (11th July 1966). 
54
 So far, there are two articles and one book have turned up which refer to above matter: M 
Alameldin,‘Banking Disputes in Saudi Arabia’ (1991) 36 Int'l Fin. L. Rev 10 & S Khan, ‘Secured Lending 
in Saudi Arabia’(1984) 3 Int’l Fin. L. Rev 27 & F Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi 
Arabia (Brill 2000) 112. 
78 
 
 
3.4.1 Emerging legal challenges to Islamic finance transactions in the 
protection sector 
 
There is no doubt that the foregoing method (the IFTs) has achieved many goals such as: 
Islamizing conventional finance agreements and converting them into Islamic 
transactions; in addition, avoiding the SJC’s decision and hence freeing lenders, 
particularly banks, from the authority of the SJC pertaining to mortgages, thus giving 
them plenty of space to conclude any of the aforementioned the IFTs. This step has been 
welcomed by many individuals who were looking for any transactions that could enable 
them to avoid committing the sin involved in concluding conventional transactions, as 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.  
Therefore, the IFTs might be considered a strategy for helping lenders and borrower alike: 
helping the borrower to avoid committing the sin of riba, and helping the lender to avoid 
confronting the SJC’s decision and obtain good protection for their loans.  
Given the benefits of this vehicle in the protection field, the significant advantage to the 
lender of reserving and retaining the title to financed property will be found in the ground 
that no ownership rights vest in the borrower until the debt owed is fully paid. A further 
advantage for the lender is that, given the retention of title, no further procedure is needed 
to enable him to assert his rights against the third party. In addition, this device might be 
considered a simple technique used by the lender to obtain stable credit from the 
borrower. 
But despite the above advantages and despite the fact that the IFTs are very important 
devices in the modern financial markets in Saudi, playing a substantial role in the lending 
market in general, and recently in the market for home loans, we should not ignore the 
risks that might flow from the IFTs, inflicting considerable harm on the element of 
protection. Those risks, as will be discussed in detail later, stemmed from the belief that 
the Saudi legal system, along with the financial system, is still developing; in addition, 
there are many legal defects that aggravated these risks. This is not to say that the Saudi 
legal system, including its legislative, judicial and executive authorities, cannot meet the 
demand by the financial markets and participants to develop the IFTs and other financial 
tools in order to achieve the desired protection for all parties. Rather, what should be 
emphasised is that the Saudi legal system is developing, which explains why some legal 
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defects have emerged from the application of IFTs. In contrast, developed legal systems 
which have financial tools similar to the IFTs have the capacity, through application of 
certain principles, to mitigate the risks generated by those tools and thus to grant both 
lenders and borrowers the desired protection in this field.  
To understand how the developed legal system and its principles play a crucial role in 
mitigating the risks that might flow from financial tools similar to IFTs, it might be useful 
to briefly shed light on the English law, which will be used as a good example of a 
developed legal system. English law is a rich system containing many financial tools, 
similar to IFTs, that were established to meet commercial and industrial entrepreneurs’ 
need for capital and at the same time to provide the desired protection for both lender and 
borrower. For example, the finance lease, hire purchase and repurchase agreements on 
financial markets – so-called repos
55
– are financial forms and agreements,56 resembling 
IFTs, which were introduced to meet the market’s need for capital.  
Therefore, when Lord Scott, in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd,57 explained the history and 
development of the floating charge,58 which was brought in to cater to the specific need 
of companies for more capital, he pointed out that this modern form of security, which 
had become firmly established, was not created by statute; rather, equity lawyers and 
judges contributed to its development.59  
Some of these financial tools are subject to the risk of recharacterisation, which of course 
impairs the protection they provide. This risk, however, is mitigated to some extent by 
the application of stare decisis under English law, which enables lawyers and participants 
in the financial markets to predict the courts’ orientation towards such financial tools and 
then know the risk involved in these financial tools and know that the courts are bound 
                                            
55
 A ‘repo’ was created to serve both parties where  a seller would sell securities to a counterparty buyer for 
cash, with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase the same or equivalent securities at a specific price at a 
later date. K Ong and E Yeung, ‘Repos & securities lending: the accounting arbitrage and their role in the 
global financial crisis’ (2010)  Capital Markets Law Journal 1.  
56 For further discussion about the financial tools and their history under English law see: A McKnight, 
‘The reform of English law concerning secured transactions: Part 1’ (2006) 21 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 497. 
57
 [2005] 2 AC 680 at paras 95,97. 
58 G McCormack, ‘Creating charges’ in Gore-Browne and others(ed), Gore-Browne on Companies(Jordans 
2005). 
59 G McCormack, ‘Creating charges’ in Gore-Browne and others(ed), Gore-Browne on Companies(Jordans 
2005).  
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by the previous decision, as an application of the stare decisis principle .60 For instance, 
the financial tools that involve transferring the title as a security – such as a repurchase 
agreement
61
 whereby a dealer, or "repo seller", sells a security to a financer, or for cash
62
 
– are subject to two characterisations: as a true sale, or perhaps, through 
recharacterisation, as a loan secured by a mortgage of the receivables.
63
 
In Re George Inglefield, Ltd.,
64
 for example, in order to determine whether the contract 
between the parties was a true sale or a loan secured by the title, three indicia were 
prescribed with which to distinguish a sale transaction from a transaction of mortgage or 
charge:65  
“First, in a sale transaction, the vendor is not entitled to get back the subject matter of the 
sale by returning to the purchaser the money that has passed between them. In the case of 
a mortgage or charge, the mortgagor is entitled (until he has been foreclosed) to get back 
the subject matter of the mortgage or charge by returning to the mortgagee the money that 
has passed between them.” 
“Second, if a mortgagee realizes the mortgaged property for a sum that is insufficient to 
repay him, the mortgagee is entitled to recover from the mortgagor any balance, whereas 
in a sale and purchase contract the purchaser has to bear any loss suffered on a subsequent 
sale of the asset by him."  
“Third, if a mortgagee realizes the subject matter of the mortgage for a sum more than 
sufficient to repay (together with interest and costs) the money that has passed between 
him and the mortgagor, he has to account to the mortgagor for any surplus. Whereas, in 
                                            
60A Berg, ‘Recharacterisation after Enron’ (2003) Journal of Business Law 205. 
61 Repurchase agreement was identified by  1(a) the Global Master Repurchase Agreement as :  “one party ... 
(Seller) agrees to sell to the other ... (Buyer) securities ... (Securities) ... against the payment of the purchase 
price by Buyer to Seller ["first leg"], with a simultaneous agreement by Buyer to sell to Seller Securities 
equivalent to  such Securities at a date certain or on demand against the payment of the repurchase price by 
Seller to Buyer second leg”. A Ruchin, ‘Can Securities Lending Transactions Substitute for Repurchase 
Agreement Transactions’ (2011) 128 Banking LJ 450. 
62 L Schroeder, ‘A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos Backwards’ (2002) 76 Am Bankr LJ 7 565. 
63 K Ong and E Yeung, ‘Repos & securities lending: the accounting arbitrage and their role in the global 
financial crisis’ (2010)  Capital Markets Law Journal 1.   
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 Re George Inglefield, Ltd., 48 T.L.R. 536, 539 (C.A. 1932); Welsh Dev. Agency v. 
65 M Daley, ‘Funded participations - mitigation of grantor credit risk’(2009)24 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 288. 
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a sale and purchase contract, any profit realized by the purchaser is for the purchaser's 
account.”
66
 
This case became judicial precedent and the three indicia might give lawyers and financial 
participants a sufficient level of certainty about the criteria for distinguishing between a 
sale transaction and a mortgage or charge to refer to them when they desire to conclude a 
repurchase agreement. Thus, the participants are aware of the court’s orientation towards 
such an agreement, which enables them to use this case as one of stare decisis to avoid 
the risk of recharacterisation.67 
Also, in Welsh Development Agency v. Export Finance Co., Ltd 
68
, it was held that a court 
will uphold a transaction structured by the parties as a sale for the purposes of the 
registration of company charges provisions of the UK Companies Act, unless: (i) the 
transaction is, in substance, a mortgage arrangement and not a sale, or (ii) the transaction 
is a sham.
69
 Again such indicators suggest the courts’ orientation towards such a financial 
agreement, leading the participants and financial markets to take extra care when 
concluding these agreements in view of the fact that courts are bound by the principle of 
stare decisis. 
In contrast, the absence of the stare decisis principle from the Saudi legal system and 
reliance instead on de novo case-by-case enforcement in the Saudi Arabian courts has 
denied participants knowledge of the court’s orientation towards the nature of IFTs, thus 
making it more difficult to predict their nature, since IFTs are subject to the risk of 
recharacterisation.70 Also, it could be argued that the absence of existing specific 
legislation to govern these financial tools increases the fear that they will provide 
insufficient protection, as will be explained in detail below.  
                                            
66M Raines and G Wong, ‘Aspects of Securitization of Future Cash Flows Under English and New  
York Law’ (2002) 12  Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L 453.  
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 P Spink and C Ong, ‘Substance versus form: Anglo-Australian perspectives on title financing 
transactions’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 199. 
68 [1991] AC 270.  
69 M Raines and G Wong, ‘Aspects of Securitization of Future Cash Flows Under English and New  
York Law’ (2002) 12  Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L 453.  
70M McMillen, ‘Rahn Concepts in Saudi Arabia: Formalization and a Registration and Prioritization 
System’ (papers.ssrn.com, 31 August 2010)< 
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Accordingly, in light of the absence of the stare decisis principle from the judiciary 
system in Saudi, along with the absence of legislation to regulate and prescribe the 
provisions of IFTs, it is believed that there are three significant dilemmas which weaken 
the security protection granted by the foregoing IFTs, and that the contracting parties in 
the IFTs are likely to incur the risks stemming from these dilemmas, which are as follows: 
 
 
i. The risk of recharacterisation of the IFTs   
As has been explained earlier, the borrower acquires loans through the IFTs, namely 
ijarah muntahiah be atmlik and ijara with waad be alhibah, which rely on the mechanism 
of buying a property determined by the borrower, then concluding another transaction 
with the borrower which includes leasing the property to him while the homeownership 
remains with the lender, who promises to transfer the homeownership to the borrower 
when the whole debt is paid in full. In these transactions, the question arises: what is the 
legal nature of the agreement between the lender and his borrower; is it a lease or sale 
transaction? The lender’s retention of title to the financed property, and the contractual 
relationship between lender and borrower, requires us to consider the borrower as a lessee 
in these transactions. However, if we look at these transactions from another viewpoint, 
in particular by considering that the borrower acquires this loan in order to own the 
property and these mechanisms are mere vehicles for achieving double interests for both 
borrower and lender, as mentioned above, then the borrower could be regarded as the 
buyer of the financed property. Another point supports the latter legal identity, namely 
the intention of the borrower, who, when he concludes the transactions, tends to consider 
himself a buyer not a lessee. This intention can be discovered and observed in many ways 
as will be shown below. 
There is no doubt that a borrower who goes to a lender, bank, to gain the finance needed 
to buy a house considers himself a buyer not a lessee, regardless of the name given to the 
contract, because names do not change the legal nature of things. It is clear, also, that the 
contracting parties concluded these transactions for specific purposes; for example, the 
lender attempts to circumvent the SJC’s decision through the use of the IFTs, while the 
borrower desires to obtain finance without committing the terrible sin represented by riba.  
These different aims or goals of the contracting parties can be considered a matter of form 
and substance, because what counts in revealing the legal nature of such transactions is 
the intention of the parties when they concluded the contract. Another presumption might 
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indicate the intention of the borrower to consider the contract one of sale not lease; namely 
the instalments because usually the instalments in sale contracts to somehow are higher 
than their counterparts in lease contracts.71 For example, if a normal house costs £500 in 
monthly rent, the same house might cost £650 if it is sold in instalments. Of course, these 
figures are approximate because the precise figures depend on many other elements, such 
as the interest or discount rate applicable to the transaction. These presumptions form the 
central consideration according to which these transactions tend to treat the borrower as 
a buyer rather than a lessee.  
Nevertheless, it is evident that the IFTs might be subject to the risk of recharacterisation 
since they can be considered a lease or a sale contract, which of course might have a 
negative impact on the protection they grant. The possible negative impact of such a 
recharacterisation can be discerned in the risk that might be borne by the lender and the 
borrower alike. For example, there are two scenarios which in fact are related to each 
other, with the second scenario dependent on the first. In the event of the insolvency of 
the borrower, the lender has a right based on the IFTs to terminate the finance contract 
and retain the title, pursuant to the clauses included in that contract which grant the lender 
this right in the case of the borrower default on paying the instalments owed.72  
However, the risk that might affect the protection granted to the lender resides in the 
possibility of the borrower having recourse to the court to repossess the title from the 
lender. The borrower can base his litigation on the legal clause granting him ownership, 
in that the lender is a mere financer while he is the buyer of that property and the 
formulation of the contract was worded for specific purposes, namely circumventing the 
SJC’s decision and avoiding involvement in conventional contracts which of course 
involve riba.   
Support for acceptance of above litigation by the court can be derived from the general 
principles of Islamic law, especially as presented by the Hanbali School and adopted by 
the judicial authority in Saudi,73 which demonstrates that the intention of the contracting 
                                            
71 G Canner and others, ‘Payment of household debts’ (1991) 77 Fed. Res 218 & F Reiss, ‘Buying  
versus renting farmland’ (1972) 12 Illinois Agricultural Economics 37. 
72A Boumediene, ‘Is credit risk really higher in Islamic banks?’( papers.ssrn.com, August 2011)  
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689885 > accessed 12th November 2016.  
73 S Shamma, ‘Law and Lawyers in Saudi Arabia’ (1965) 14 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1034 & S Solaim, ‘Saudi Arabia's judicial system’ (1971) The Middle East Journal 403 & A Al-
Ghadyan, ‘The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia’ (1998) 13 Arab Law Quarterly 235. 
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parties enjoys full legal effect.74 The borrower would build his litigation on this principle, 
by saying that his intention when concluding the contract was to buy the house, not rent 
it from the financer; and further that this intention rested on a view of the contract as a 
sale contract, not a lease contract.75 In this case, the court may resort to adopting the 
above-mentioned principle that the intention of the parties enjoys full legal effect, and 
accordingly hold that the financed property shall be repossessed by the borrower because 
the contract is a sale contract, not a lease contract, and the borrower is therefore the owner 
of the property being financed. The rationale of this potential judgement is, as mentioned 
earlier, that the intention exerts the full legal impact under the general principles of 
Islamic law. In Alshedi real estate company v Alrajhi bank,76 for example, the claimant 
(the borrower) accused the defendant (the lender) of trying to sell the property being 
financed under an IFT whereas the property belonged to him because the homeownership 
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 It is noteworthy that the general principles of Islamic law, which were interpreted by the four schools, 
Hanafi, Malki, Shafai, Hanbali, control and govern the matters related to retention of title. However, as 
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was granted to the lender as a security. The court ruled that the defendant should stop the 
sale process because he only retained the homeownership as a security.  
It could be argued that as long the court has directed its orientation towards the legal 
nature of IFTs, then there can be no concern over the potential effect of recharacterisation, 
since both the market and the participant will be aware of the legal nature of IFTs before 
concluding a housing finance contract. However, there is a point to take into account 
before responding to the former argument, which is that the judiciary system in Saudi 
does not apply the principle of stare decisis;77 in other words, it is difficult to rely on the 
above case as a fixed judicial orientation that will not be changed in the future.78 
The lack of application of stare decisis within the Saudi judicial system has increased the 
risk involved in IFTs because, as mentioned above, the transactions impose two legal 
natures on the borrower: lessee and buyer, each of which has duties and rights differing 
from those of the other.79 In addition, the absence of adherence to stare decisis appears 
here as an important element, since its presence would have helped in deducing the 
orientation of the court towards the legal nature of the borrower/buyer in the IFTs, if the 
decision had been published within the legal system in Saudi and the binding precedent 
principle were applied.80 In other words, adherence to the foregoing principle may lead 
to reduction of the risk involved in the IFTs, in turn enabling the financial markets to 
include investors, and encouraging customers to take extra care when dealing with such 
transactions. Meanwhile, the adoption of these principles will give the markets sufficient 
scope for developing and improving the financing tools to render them consistent with 
the courts’ judgements.81 
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 Stare desicis is Latin word means let the decision stand and in practice means that any court made a 
decision then the courts which are equivalent or lower that court are bound to apply the same decision in 
the same cases. For further information of this concept, see: J Holland and J Webb, Learning legal rules(9th 
edition, Oxford 2016) 152 & E Finch and S Fafinski, Legal skills(5th edition, Oxford 2015)127.  
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Arabia’(1998)13 Arab Law Quarterly 235. 
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judgement on Beconwood Securities Pty Ltd (Beconwood) and others v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
86 
 
Another case affirms that the risk of recharacterisation might impair the protection 
provided by the IFTs, and at the same time illustrates the reluctance of the Saudi judicial 
system to consider an IFT either a sale or a lease transaction. A claimant who had 
concluded an Islamic finance transaction with the defendant (a rental car company) 
argued that he had rented a car from the defendant through an Ijarah munthiah be 
altamleek transaction; however, the car being damaged, he argued that the court should 
oblige the defendant to replace the damaged car with a new one. The claimant build his 
argument on the belief that the contract between him and the defendant is lease contract. 
The defendant, however, rejected the claim, arguing that the contract between them was 
a sale contract and that title was thus retained by the defendant to secure his rights, 
because at the end of the Ijarah munthiah be altamleek agreement, the title of the car 
would be transferred to the renter (the claimant). However, the court recharacterised the 
agreement as a lease contract.82         
For all the above considerations, it could be said that, although IFTs offer a level of 
security for both the lender and the borrower, they involve a huge risk concerning the 
potential recharacterisation of the legal nature of IFTs. This factor might reflect 
negatively on the certainty of the arrangement, with the result that the markets and the 
participants might not increase their operations in the housing finance market by means 
of IFTs while the Saudi judicial system is still reluctant to consider them either sale 
contracts or lease contracts. 
                                            
Group Limited and others.  Beconwood entered into a securities lending and borrowing agreement which 
involved transferring shares in the amount of around AU$7m to Opes Prim Stockbroking, in return for a 
loan facility of AU$1,35m. Later, Opes supplied Beconwood’s securities to Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Limited and others under a separate borrowing and lending agreement.  However, Opes 
collapsed and insolvency procedures started; then Beconwood resorted to the court to retain possession of 
the securities which were transferred to the borrower. He tried to recharacterise the agreement as a mortgage 
or charge to enable him to repossess the title of that agreement. He built a legal foundation for his claim by 
arguing that the agreement, in reality, was a mortgage pursuant to the mechanism of that agreement because 
Beconwood borrowed money from Opes in return for securities transferred to the latter to secure the loan. 
The Federal Court of Australia, however, dismissed this argument, holding that title to the shares was 
absolutely transferred to Opes, who had the right to dispose of it. 
The impact of the above judgement on the financial market is globally significant, since the court upheld 
a new principle in this agreement, indicating to investors who want to conclude such transactions that any 
attempt to recharacterise the legal nature of this transaction or its parties will be dismissed by the court, as 
happened in the case in question. Accordingly, both investors and individuals will be aware of this 
principle when concluding transactions of this type, due to the publication of this judgement. For further 
discussion about this case and its effect of the financial markets see: W Jeremy and E Julia, ‘ Securities 
lending: title transfer upheld down under’(2008) 2 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev 348. Also see; L Michael, 
‘ Securities “lending” agreement transfer legal title to securities’ (2008) Company Law Newsletter 231. 
82To see this judgement see: Board of Grievances, ‘ The Judgments and principles for 1429’ (bog.gov.sa, 
July 2010) <http://www1.bog.gov.sa/ScientificContent/JudicialBlogs/1429/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 
10th November 2016. 
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With respect to the second scenario, it is worth glancing for a moment at the feature 
granted by the mortgage to the lender (mortgagee), which is considered significant, and 
then determining whether or not the IFTs grants such a feature. Pursuant to the general 
principles of mortgage stipulated in the Mortgage Law,83 which included the general 
principles of mortgage (rahn) in Islamic law, the mortgagee is granted priority against 
other lenders in the financed property.84 Therefore, the lender or mortgagee will gain this 
right if he uses the mortgage mechanism as a device for securing the loan.85 The inability 
to record or enforce the mortgage method due to the SJC’s decision has forced lenders, 
including banks, to use alternative methods that are supposed to grant them the desired 
security, as embodied in the IFTs. However, these transactions do not provide the same 
feature, because the loans resulting from the IFTs are considered ordinary debt, not 
privileged debt, and do not grant the lender priority against other lenders. So if the 
borrower succeeded in repossessing the title of the financed property, which is what might 
happen according to the above first scenario argument, the lender would then lose the 
advantage of priority against other lenders, in the case of the borrower’s insolvency, in 
regard to the property financed. 
One will notice here the difference between the rights stemming from a mortgage, which 
grants lenders strong protection and secures their loans,86 and the counterpart rights 
stemming from the IFTs, which grant ownership to the lenders with the possibility of 
repossession by the borrower, as mentioned above. In addition, the debts arising from the 
IFTs rights will forfeit the advantage of being treated as privileged debts. 
The risk of recharacterisation of the IFTs is really a double-edged sword because it can 
be used by both contracting parties to enforce their own rights, which of course gives an 
indication of the uncertainty surrounding the security that IFTs offer. The insecurity that 
                                            
83 Article (1) of the Mortgage Law that was approved by the Royal decree no (M/75) dated 2ed July 2012 
stipulated the same concept, whereby the mortgagor has priority against other lenders. 
84 In fact the mortgage in the west has the same feature mentioned above in Islamic law which is the 
mortgagee is granted priority against other lenders in the financed property, for further information about 
this topic see: G Nelson and D Whitman, ‘Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation Principles: 
Saving Billions of Dollars for Refinancing Homeowners’(papers.ssrn.com,9th May 2006) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932083> accessed  10th November 2016. 
85M McMillen, ‘Rahn Concepts in Saudi Arabia: Formalization and a Registration and  
Prioritization System’ (papers.ssrn.com,31August2010) < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670104> acceded 24th November 2013.  
86
 H Chaplin, ‘The story of mortgage law’ (1890) Harvard Law Review 1 & R Skilton, ‘Developments  
in Mortgage Law and Practice’(1942)17 Temp. LQ 315. 
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hovers over IFTs due to potential recharacterisation might be mitigated if the court’s 
orientation towards these transactions were known and bound by other courts. However, 
that practice does not exist within the Saudi judicial system. Ultimately, the risk of 
recharacterisation might, in fact, extend to affecting another matter, namely the lack of 
priority of IFTs should the lender succeed in repossessing the title, in which case the risk 
of impairing the lender’s right could arise, as will be discussed below.     
 
ii. The lack of priority in IFTs 
It is evident from the above section that IFTs are subject to the risk of recharacterisation 
when a dispute arises between lender and borrower, which causes the court in some cases 
to consider the IFT a sale contract rather than a lease contract. In this case, the borrower 
is entitled to repossess the title of the property being financed while the lender is entitled 
to the due debt arising from the housing finance transaction which means the lender’s 
loss of the protection. However, there is another possible scenario, in case the borrower 
succeeds in repossessing the title of the property being financed, but the borrower then 
goes bankrupt. The question arises here: Do the IFTs protect the lenders’ rights against 
other lenders involved in the property being financed?      
The substantial shortcomings of the IFTs as security devices might be fully grasped when 
they are compared with mortgages. Although the IFTs have served lenders by granting 
them good security devices in place of mortgage, uncertainly still prevails in case the 
borrower defaults and simultaneously goes into bankruptcy. In fact, the legal rights due 
under the IFTs might be impaired by any equities subsequently arising, because the IFTs 
do not provide the same advantage afforded by mortgage to a mortgagee, who is given 
priority over other creditors.87 It is worth noting that, by a fundamental principle of 
mortgage law generally, fixed legal rights acquired through a mortgage will not be 
affected by other due financial claims should the borrower declare insolvency; this 
principle was stated in article (18) of the mortgage law.88  
                                            
87 Although the mortgagee has priority over other lenders, there are some cases where the mortgagee’s 
position has subjected to some changing in particular when the mortgagee’s priority clashes with the tax 
claim, for further information about this case see: P Alces, ‘Unexpired Leases in Bankruptcy: Rights of the 
Affected Mortgagee’(1983) 35 U. Fla. L. Rev 656 &  G Gilmore, ‘Circular Priority Systems’ (1961) 71The 
Yale Law Journal 53. 
88 Mortgage Law was approved by Royal decree no [M/49] dated 3 /7/2012. 
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Such a substantial deficiency as the lack of a priority feature will reduce the value of the 
lender’s security interests, granted to him by the IFTs, so that the lender must bear the 
risk arising from these transactions. As mentioned earlier, any feature that reduces the 
effectiveness of security devices will lead of course to an increase in the interest rate to 
cover the risk created by this negative feature, and in the end the borrower will bear that 
increase.89  
In these circumstances, either the lack of alternative security devices available under the 
Saudi legal system, or the legal limitations that prevent the lenders from using a perfect 
security device, that is, mortgage, will cause lenders to feel obliged to accept the IFTs 
and deal with them despite the risk involved in these transactions.   
Therefore, to grant good protection to the lender through IFTs it is necessary to find a 
remedy for that lack of protection, which is the lack of priority. To do this, it is necessary 
to review the categories that are granted the advantage of priority against other creditors 
in the case of a debtor’s insolvency under the Saudi legal system; then, to attempt to 
deduce the criterion used by the legislator to grant priority to those categories. Finally, 
the criterion which will be deduced will be applied to our case to see whether or not it is 
possible to grant the lender this right within Islamic finance transactions (IFTs).      
The Saudi regulator has granted some categories the advantage of priority over other 
creditors through protecting their rights in the event of a debtor’s insolvency. For instance, 
all due debts to the government have been given this advantage.90 Also, the mortgagee’s 
right in mortgage transactions has been protected by granting him priority against other 
creditors91and reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with bankruptcy.92 
Another category which has been protected under the Saudi legal system is alimony, 
which was ensured by law; therefore, when the wife or husband declares insolvency, the 
right arising from alimony is granted priority against other creditors.93  
Although the Saudi legislator did not explicitly mention the approach of giving some 
creditors priority over others, it could be argued that the legislators might adopt certain 
                                            
89S Harris and C Mooney, ‘A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices 
Seriously’ (1994) Virginia Law Review 2021. 
90 According to article (19) of State Revenue law which was enacted by the Royal decree no (M/86) Dated 
18/11/1431H. 
91
 According to article (21) of Mortgage Law. 
92
 According to article (21) of Mortgage Law. 
93According to article(37) of  Civil pension law which was enacted by royal decree no (M/41) dated 
26/7/1393. 
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criteria, such as protecting the public purse or safeguarding the interests of weaker – 
perhaps involuntary – creditors who are not in a position to bargain effectively for 
security.    
However, it has been noted that when the legislator tends to grant some categories this 
advantage, he asserts in law or regulation the right of priority, to give it legitimacy. 
Accordingly, as long as the legislator is convinced that he should grant some categories 
this advantage, there is no legal obstacle to doing so.  
The due debts from housing finance loans or the IFTs deserve special treatment since 
these debts arose from tools which are considered a long-term financing device, namely 
the IFTs. In particular, these tools are employed in place of mortgage to protect the 
lenders’ interests. Usually, the period of paying back these loans is between 15 and 25 
years, in contrast to personal loans whose payback takes between 2 and 7 years. These 
differences make it necessary to give the lender within the IFTs good protection, 
including the priority over other creditors in the event that the borrower goes into 
bankruptcy and has already repossessed the title from the lender. In addition, the need to 
grant this advantage to lenders who deal with the IFTs is especially important since this 
advantage will enhance trust in the housing finance market and make lenders feel that 
their interests will be protected during the whole period of the housing finance loan. 
Finally, granting lender this advantage will not influence the borrower’s interests where 
the impact of this step will be limited to the third party, while the borrower’s will not be 
affected.  
Is it questionable to apply to lenders in the IFTs the advantage that was granted to the 
aforementioned categories? Based on the above considerations, there is no legal obstacle 
to granting lender this advantage, besides which, the benefits that will be gained are 
obvious and do not need more proof. Also, the borrower’s interests will not be 
undermined by this suggestion, since the law guarantees his interests and there is no way 
that suggestion could mitigate them. In view of these considerations, it is safe to say that 
this proposal will enhance and reinforce financing activities and grant the lender adequate 
protection.  
 
iii. The lack of protection of the borrower’s equity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Borrowers use the IFTs, which are considered a title retention device, in certain high-risk 
transactions to fill the gap between the amount of credit available and the amount of credit 
required by prospective sellers to enable them to purchase homes. The reasonable 
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assumption of the borrower is that if he completes payment pursuant to the contract he 
will receive title from the lender, who retains title to the property being financed under 
the IFTs. However, the consequences of retention of title by the lenders might lead to 
unsatisfactory outcomes, which of course would conflict with the main purpose of 
creating such transactions, namely to enhance and facilitate the mechanisms of housing 
finance.  
The retention of title by the lender jeopardises the position of the borrower and exposes 
him/her to two legal risks: first, the risk that the title of the property being financed might 
be transferred to a third party without the borrower’s consent; and second, as revealed by 
comparison with mortgage, the risk that the borrower under an IFT might be exposed to 
additional loss, as will be explained below in detail.  
1- Naturally, borrowers seek protection to protect their interests because the 
prospectively financed home will become one of the most important assets of the 
borrower, if not the best and most valuable one.94 This is particularly true of 
medium-income borrower, who must give the transaction greater attention and 
care to ensure that the finance mechanism provides them with good protection.95  
In fact, borrowers are not generally given the same protection as lenders by the 
IFTs. As has been seen, the lender (bank) within the IFTs enjoys to some extent 
the perfect assurance represented by ownership, through the company owned by 
the lender (bank) that protects lender’ interests despite the above-mentioned risks 
that might impair it, as embodied in the risk of the recharacterisation the 
transaction and the potential risk that might result from it. An ownership of course 
is considered to some extent a perfect security device.96 Meantime, the borrower 
is granted possession of the financed property and enjoyment of its use during the 
term of contract as long he pays the due instalments; but such possession cannot 
prevent the occurrence of events that may result in damage to the borrower and 
impact on his interests – because possession “is good against the whole world 
except the person who can shew a good title”.97  
                                            
94
 A Dupuis and D Thorns, ‘Home, home ownership and the search for ontological  
Security’(1998) 46 The Sociological Review 24. 
95 T Shapiro, ‘Race, homeownership and wealth’(2006) 20 Wash. UJL & Pol'y 53. 
96 B Azmy and D Reiss, ‘Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership 
Security Act of 2002’(2004) 35 Rutgers Law Journal 645. 
97 J Christospher, ‘Concurrent fee simple and the registration act’ (2002)130 The Law Quarterly Review 8.  
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The impact of possession on the borrower’s protection can be observed when it is 
compared with mortgage, in which both parties have the same level of security, 
with the mortgagor enjoying the ownership and title to the financed property, 
while the mortgagee enjoys the perfect security granted to him through the 
property being mortgaged in his favour. 98 However, recording financed property 
in favour of the company owned by the lender (bank) under the IFTs makes the 
ownership subject to transfer to the third party under any circumstances, which 
can be and should be contractually prevented, that in turn will jeopardise the 
borrower’s equity for loss.  
For instance, if a lender declares insolvency or enters negotiations with creditors 
under the Law of Settlement Preventing from Bankruptcy,99 all properties which 
were financed by the lender under the IFT will be seized by the court or liquidator, 
being considered part of the lender’s assets, as he owns the titles of those 
properties. The borrower in this case cannot establish his rights without incurring 
the delay and expense of trial, which of course works against the principle of 
strong protection.100 The situation might be worse inasmuch as IFTs are not 
required by the Saudi legal system to be registered, because IFTs are concluded 
between the lender and borrower without further registration requirements. This 
leaves the borrower’s interest unsecured in light of the ownership of the property 
being financed having been granted to the lender.101 
It might be argued that this scenario is imaginary and the chance of its arising is 
slight, making it difficult to rely on it to demonstrate the lack of protection granted 
                                            
98 For further information about the rights and liabilities of the mortgagee and mortgagor see: L Warm, 
‘Some Aspects of the Rights and Liabilities of Mortgagee, Mortgagor and Grantee’ (1935) 10 Temp. 
LQ 116 & F Denton, ‘Right of a Mortgagee to Recover Damages from a Third Party for Injury to Mortgaged 
Property in Ohio’ (1937) 3 LJ Student B. Ass'n Ohio St. U 161. However,  for further information about 
mortgage in Saudi see: M McMillen, ‘Rahn Concepts in Saudi Arabia: Formalization and a Registration 
and Prioritization System’ (papers.ssrn.com,31August2010) < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670104> acceded 11th November 2016. 
99
 The Law of Settlement Preventing from Bankruptcy was approved by the Royal decree no (M/ 16) dated 
25th January 1996. It is noteworthy the Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced on 17 th March its 
intention to regulate all aspects of bankruptcy and asked those who were interested, such as lawyers, 
financers, etc., to contribute by contacting the Ministry and providing any suggestions or advice on this 
topic.       
100
 P Garrett, ‘Land Contracts as Security Devices’ (1965) 12 Wayne L. Rev 391.    
101
 It must be noted that the new mortgage law 2012 obliges all mortgage contracts to be registered. 
However, the IFTs cannot be considered as a mortgage contracts because they are not, they are just housing 
finance contracts are used to replace the mortgage contract that deprived by the SJC’s decision.    
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to the borrower by IFTs. But in fact, this situation is not imaginary and the risk is 
not slight: some local Saudi newspapers, for example, reported a case that 
illustrates how granting ownership to the lender under an IFT might expose the 
borrower’s interest in the property being financed to the risk of transferral of the 
title to a third party. A trader entered into an IFT with a financial institution to 
obtain finance, to be paid back in instalments over 10 years, to buy a building.102 
The financial institution required, in order to secure its interest, that the title of the 
building be transferred to it until the debt owed was fully paid at which point the 
trader could recover the title. However, when a dispute arose between the trader 
and the financial institution about the application of some the provisions contract, 
the latter did not turn to the court to settle it, but instead exploited the situation 
and exercised its discretion to starts selling the property, as it owned the title of 
the building being financed, so that there was no need to resort to the court. The 
trader in turn resorted to the court to repossess the building and to prevent the 
financial institution from selling it; but the dispute was still being heard by the 
court, which had not yet reached a decision on the case.103  
The above case showed that IFTs offered, to some extent, good protection to the 
lender but not to the borrower, because the ownership granted to the financial 
institution made it possible for it to transfer the title to a third party, leaving the 
borrower’s interest at risk of loss. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the authority 
of lenders within IFTs, in order to maintain the rights of borrowers. 
2-The comparison with mortgage revealed that the borrower under an IFT might 
be exposed to extra loss due to the ownership granted to the lender. There is no 
doubt that the purported transformation of the title to the lender via IFTs is 
regarded as a loan secured by the title of the property being financed. In case the 
borrower should not meet his liabilities under the IFT by paying the owed debt, 
                                            
102A Albarqawi, ‘Real estate cases ended by obliging the company to remove the advertising’ Sabaq  
(Riyadh, 1st July 2016) <http://linkis.com/sabq.org/Rsj3A> accessed 12th November 2016.   
103
 The above concern was observed by the Ministry of Justice when the deputy Prime Minister of Justice 
alluded that all mortgage contracts must be registered according to the Mortgage law 2012 because the 
Ministry of Justice observe that some lenders require to transfer the title of the property being financed to 
secure their rights under the housing finance contracts without registering these contracts which might 
expose the borrowers to the risk of losing their properties. Probably, the deputy minister of Justice alluded 
to the IFTs because there is no legal provisions require them to be registered. See: Aleqtisadiah, ‘ The 
Mistery of Justice: the Public notaries are entitled to apply the Mortgage law 2012’ Aleqtisadiah (Riyadh, 
10th December 2016)   <http://www.aleqt.com/2016/12/10/article_1109093.html> accessed 15th December 
2016. 
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then the lender, as the owner of the property being financed, could sell it without 
the need to resort to the court. The question that arises here is whether or not the 
lender, when realising the subject matter of the housing finance for a sum more 
than sufficient to repay (together with interest and costs) the money that has 
passed between him and the borrower, must account to the borrower for any 
surplus. There is no certain answer to this question since there is no legal provision 
legislating and regulating this case. However, it is probable that the general 
principle of a sale transaction would be applied in this case, implying that the 
lender is the owner and is entitled to the value of the property being financed, so 
that if the borrower wants to acquire his interest in proceeds exceeding the unpaid 
amount of the loan, then he needs to turn to the court, which of course would cost 
money and time.  
In contrast, the mortgage and its principle are clear under Islamic law
104 and they 
became much clearer when the Saudi legislator enacted the Real Estate Mortgage 
Law 2012, which explains this case in detail.
105 Article (29), for example, states 
that if a mortgagee realizes the subject matter of the mortgage for a sum more than 
sufficient to repay the money that has passed between him and the mortgagor, he 
has to account to the mortgagor for any surplus. Therefore, if the borrower used 
the mortgage to finance the purchase of a home, the mortgage would not have 
exposed his interest to the kind of risk involved in IFTs.   
For all the above considerations, it could be argued that IFTs do not give the borrower 
the same protection as that granted to the lender.   
In light of the above analysis of IFTs and the protection provided by these transactions to 
both parties, the question arises here: is there a possibility of evaluating the IFTs so as to 
fill the above legal gaps and at the same time to create new individual financing 
techniques that maintain the interests of both parties?106 The following section will 
answer this question.   
                                            
104 K Eid, ‘The rights & duties of a mortgage secured debt from the point view of the Saudi Legislator’ 
(2011) 3 Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research In Business  96 & W Gnichtel, ‘Lease 
Financing in Saudi Arabia’ (1984) 3  Int'l Fin. L. Rev 34. 
105
 The Real estate finance Law was enacted by the Royal decree no( M/ 25) dated 12/08/1433 (12 th July 
2012).    
106 M McMillen, ‘Islamic Sharia –compliant project finance: collateral security and financing structure 
and financing structure case studies’(2001) 24 Fordham International Law Journal 1184. 
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3.5 Old wine in new bottles: creating a new collateral security 
structure in the housing finance market 
 
Considering the above criticisms of IFTs, and the belief that the SJC's decision is to some 
extent immune from attempts to overturn it, along with the fact that the absence of stare 
decisis principles and reliance on de novo case-by-case enforcement in the Saudi Arabian 
courts make it difficult to predict the outcome of court action, there is an increased need 
for the executive and legislative authorities to address this issue. It is necessary to rethink 
the situation and seek an alternative collateral security structure which would grant the 
same level of protection to both lender and borrower. Although it would be difficult for 
such a mechanism to grant the perfect security provided by a mortgage, it would at least 
deter several criticisms the grounds for which are inherent in IFTs. 
Implementing the proposed technique would involve addressing a variety of legal and 
financial issues, some of them being noted in this chapter. However, the alternative 
solution needs to be developed and evolved to meet certain requirements; for example: 
keeping ownership under the authority of the borrower to grant him the desired protection 
against the lender’s insolvency; establishing an entity independent of lender and borrower 
to hold the collateral on behalf of the lender; and finally, keeping granting both parties, 
lender and borrower, the same level of protection. 
The most difficult task in developing such a technique is to find a person or create an 
entity that will hold the collateral and keep it at the same distance from lender and 
borrower, and will be trusted by both parties to the housing finance agreement. These 
characteristics, however, can be found and in fact are embodied in the Islamic concept of 
the adel. Islamic law has long experience with the idea of the adel, who is similar to a 
trustee in the western sense.107 In simple words, the adel is a trusted and honourable 
person selected by both lender and borrower to hold the collateral.108 Usually, the adel is 
                                            
107
 For information about the concept of trustee, its function in the personal property in the west see: G 
Gilmore, Security interests in personal property (The law book Exchange,Ltd,1999)1280. 
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 M Gaudiosi, ‘The influence of the Islamic law of waqf on the development of the trust in England: The 
case of Merton College’ (1988)136  University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1231. 
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required to have specific fiduciary responsibilities towards both parties. As we are 
looking for a technique to serve the whole housing finance sector rather than purely 
individual matters, we need to apply the adel concept to an entity rather than a person. In 
doing so, it may seem difficult to find an entity that can be trusted by different banks, 
financial institutions, and individuals from different parts of the country and with 
different orientations. However, these fears might be allayed if we succeed in developing 
this concept and establishing a special purpose vehicle (SPV) owned by the government 
to fulfil such fiduciary responsibilities. Involving the government in the proposed 
technique should grant the entity trust, efficiency and strength.  
The government is advised to establish a special purpose vehicle (SPV) under article 155 
of the Companies Law109 which grants the right to establish a special purpose vehicle 
SPV to exercise fiduciary responsibilities. This company will be considered a third party 
in all housing finance contracts. To make the picture clearer, the borrower will retain 
ownership of the property being financed to grant him the proper protection in this 
bargain. At the same time, to secure the lender's rights and interests, the property being 
financed will be mortgaged in favour of the SPV owned by the government. This way, 
besides granting the borrower the desired protection, the arrangement limits his powers 
to act in relation to the property, thus securing the lender's interests while not violating 
the SJC's decision. 
The SPV owned by the government (the adel) is obliged to refrain from selling the 
property given as security without a final judgement being issued by the high court to 
give the lender the right to sell the property to satisfy the debt in case of borrower default. 
Also, the SPV cannot revoke the mortgage without the consent of both lender and 
borrower, when the borrower has paid the entire debt. To prevent negligence or fraud, the 
consent should be provided in writing and signed by a person recognized by the SPV. 
In order to ensure the success of such a collateral security structure, it would be necessary 
to determine the functions, responsibilities, ownership, and capital of the proposed 
company and enact them in the form of a regulation or law. This step of course will make 
sure that such a SPV achieves its desired goals and aims.  
The question arises here as to whether the government would be willing to adopt this 
proposal to enhance the efficiency of the housing finance market and protect the rights of 
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 The new Company law was approved by the Royal Decree no(M/3) dated 28/01/1437H. 
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all parties. In fact, the need to adopt such a proposal is not limited to the above advantages, 
but rather extends to the benefits of establishing a securitization market, which is regarded 
as impossible given the role played by the SJC's decision, as will be shown in chapter six. 
In the last ten years the government has established many SPVs to exercise different 
functions in different fields, such as the SANAPL investment and the National Water 
Company, which enhance the possibility of adopting this proposal. Establishing the newly 
SPV will have a positive effect on the national economy and contribute to the 
development of the housing finance market.       
   
3.6 Conclusion  
 
The SJC’s decision, as noted, has overshadowed the legal rights of both lender and 
borrower by depriving lenders of one of the greatest security devices, which is the 
mortgage. Therefore, the decision has played a substantial role in hindering lenders from 
extending and increasing their financing operations in general and housing finance in 
particular. The negative impact was not limited to lenders but has affected borrowers as 
well by increasing the cost of housing finance due to the weakness of the protection 
granted to lenders.    
The chapter has reviewed many failed attempts in the last 25 years to overturn the SJC’s 
decision, which gives an indication that any attempt to do so will be doomed. Therefore, 
the motivation to overturn this decision must stem from the Supreme Court itself, to give 
the action legitimacy and secure its acceptance by the courts and public notaries.  
The Saudi legal system is fertile ground for granting the lender an alternative security 
device which would give the desired protection represented in Islamic finance 
transactions. The IFTs have served both lenders and borrowers by providing a good tool 
for individuals wishing to conclude a financing contract without committing the sin of 
riba through entering into conventional transactions, and simultaneously granting to some 
extent good security for lenders with which to protect their loans while circumventing the 
SJC’s decision. This is the bright side of these transactions. But on analysis it was found 
that there are three main risks surrounding the IFTs: the risk of recharacterisation of these 
transactions due to their fluctuation between sale and lease contracts, while there is a huge 
difference between the protection offered by the sale and by the lease; the lack of 
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protection granted to the borrower; and finally the absence, in these transactions, of 
priority given to the lender. 
It may be concluded that the current level of protection present in the IFTs has the 
potential to reduce housing finance activities due to the lack of protection granted to both 
lender and borrower. Procedures could be adopted that would enhance trust in the 
financing market and at the same time would enable lenders and borrowers to become 
more fully informed about the risks they are running.     
Nevertheless, the chapter has presented a new technique for creating a collateral security 
structure derived from both Islamic law and the Saudi legal system, which gives the 
proposal immunity against potential violation of the principles of Islamic law. The 
development of the housing finance market, in fact, needs an innovation of this type 
which can satisfy all parties, whether the government, religious people, the judicial 
authority or the private sector, because its structure avoids upsetting the general teachings 
of Islam, which is of greatest concern to the judicial authority and religious people, while 
protecting the lenders' interests in the housing finance market.
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Chapter Four: Can the Land Fees Law 2016 contribute in developing 
the housing finance market? The challenges and difficulties 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to analyse the extent to which the Land Fees Law 2016 can play a 
critical role in addressing the current issue of increasing land prices. It is believed that, as 
mentioned in Chapter Two, increasing land prices are hindering the development of 
housing finance by depriving the developer, financers and first home buyers from gaining 
access to the market. The chapter will ask, therefore, whether the LFL 2016 via imposing 
a fee, tax, on land, will tend to precipitate either a decrease in the market value of land or 
an increase in its supply. This question can be explored by reviewing some economic 
researches and studies regarding the effect of land taxation on land values and supply. 
Then the chapter will discuss a legal concern that emerges from the wording of the LFL 
2016 regarding the lack of fairness and possible overlapping of liabilities and obligations 
arising from the LFL 2016 and Zakah, which is considered an Islamic instrument similar 
to tax.  
For the sake of clarity, and in order to provide the appropriate context, the discussion in 
this chapter is presented in the following sections: (4.1) an introductory section; (4.2) a 
section which attempts to shed light on the legislative and policy aims underpinning the 
enactment of the LFL 2016, and whether the aim of its enactment is to achieve political 
success or to deal with land prices; (4.3) examines the effect of land taxation on lands. 
However, the section will start by providing some background to the subject of land 
taxation and its forms, before moving from the general to the particular to focus on the 
effect of land taxation on lands. The chapter then attempts, in section four (4.4), to discuss 
the potential lack of fairness and possible overlap liabilities resulting from the LFL 2016 
with other obligations raising from Zakah. The discussion will involve two subheadings: 
(4.4.1) the wording of the LFL 2016 and the lack of fairness; (4.4.2) the possible of 
overlap between the liabilities and obligation resulting from the implementation of 
LFL2016 and Zakah. The final section of this chapter (4.5) is the conclusion, which 
summarises and analyses the key matters addressed throughout the chapter.   
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4.2 Land Fees Law (LFL): achieving political success or resolving land 
prices 
In 2015, the so-called:  The Council of Economic and Development Affairs 
(CEDA),1recommended that approval of the LFL 2016 to be accelerated. This suggestion 
was approved by the Council of Ministers and was subsequently referred to the Shura 
Council, by the King’s order, to be studied, albeit subject to a 30 day deadline.
2
 It is 
evident from the King's order that the LFL 2016 takes the form of legislation rather than 
of government policy; the clarification was needed because, before this order was issued, 
it was uncertain which of the two forms the provision of the LFL 2016 would take. The 
law has since been studied by the Shura Council and approved finally by Royal decree,
3 
which is the final law-making procedure that must be satisfied before implementing the 
law. According to article (6) of the LFL 2016, the implementation of the LFL will itself 
be gradual, and will initially affect only the three largest cities in Saudi: Riyadh, Dammam 
and Jeddah, while the law also defined the lands which are to be eligible for taxation as 
those over 5000m2 in size. The question that needs to be answered is whether the 
enactment of the LFL 2016 aimed to address the increase in land values or to achieve 
political success. During the law-making process, the LFL 2016 underwent many 
questionable vicissitudes which require some clarification, because these ambiguities pre 
the final stage of the law-making process raised some suspicions about the aim of enacting 
the LFL as a means of addressing land prices. First of all: the referral of the LFL 2016 to 
the CSU for study and determination of religion opinion on it, despite the fact that the 
CSU is not part of the law-making process under the Saudi legal system,
4
 leads us to 
question the aim of that referral. It could be argued that the legislative authority in the 
country wanted to make sure that the LFL was consistent with Islamic law and so 
attempted to avoid any step that might contravene it. This argument might be accepted if 
                                            
1
 The CEDA is one of two Subcabinets established by King Salman, the current king of Saudi Arabia, when 
assuming the throne in 23 January 2015, while the second body is; the Council of Political and Security 
Affairs. As appears from their names, the first concerns about economic and development affairs in the 
kingdom while the second council concerns about security and politically internationally and nationally.  
2
 Royal order (B/ 23) Dated (19th October 2015). 
3
 Land fees law was approved by the royal decree (M/4) dated 13th/11/2015 and then the implement 
regulation of the law which enables the government agencies from implementing the law was approved by 
the Council of Minsters dated 13th June 2016.      
4
 For further information about the law-making process in Saudi see: F Al-Fadhel, ‘Legislative Drafting 
and Law-Making Practices and Procedures under Saudi Arabian Law: A Brief Overview’(2012)1 IJLDLR 
95. 
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the CSU’s decision had been taken into account when the LFL 2016 was enacted. 
However, there is no significant indication that the legislative authority considered the 
CSU’s decision when enacting the LFL 2016. Thus, regardless of whether or not the 
CSU’s decision was rational and correct, the decision was clear in stating that the 
government should not levy tax on land because tax does not comply with Islamic 
teachings; besides which, there are many reasons for the increase in land prices, so that 
levying tax on land is not the only possible solution. Hence, the government could resolve 
this issue without levying taxes.5 In other words, the decision means that there is no 
legitimacy, from an Islamic perspective, in the levying of taxes or fees on lands, while 
there are means other than taxation for addressing the issue of land prices. This implicit 
meaning of the CSU’s decision confirms that the legislative authority did not take it into 
account when enacting the LFL 2016, because if they had done so they would not have 
enacted and approved such a law.   
The above argument is important for understanding the aim of the enactment of the LFL 
2016, so as to determine whether or not the law can serve the development of the housing 
finance market. The aim of the LFL 2016 has been inconsistently presented, as the former 
Minister of Housing (Mr. Alduwahi) described it in terms of decreasing the market value 
of land, whilst the current Minister of Housing (Mr. Alhuqail) stated that the LFL 2016 
seeks to increase the market supply of land, in which there is currently a shortfall. These 
different official statements about the aim of the LFL 2016 might confirm that the law is 
incomplete in view of the persistent lack of clarity with respect to its primary aims. There 
is indeed a level of uncertainty and lack of clarity surrounding the aim of enacting the 
LFL 2016. That uncertainty can be discerned in the official statement issued by the 
Minister of Housing, who asserted that enactment of the LFL 2016 does not aim to 
increase government revenue, but rather to encourage landlords to develop their lands, in 
order to reorient the balance between demand and supply.
6
 This statement was issued 
                                            
5
 M Aloni, ‘Lands and real estate include in Zakat bill’ Aleqtesadiah (Riyadh, 13 October 2013) 
<http://www.aleqt.com/2013/10/13/article_792667.html > accessed 1st June 2014.  
6
 In interview with Al-Arabiya channel the Housing of Ministry stated that the aim of the land taxes law is 
not to raise the government revenue, for more information about this interview visit; alarabiyanet,‘the 
price of 1.5 million housing units could drop to the half’(alarabiya.net, 9July2-16)< 
http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/2016/06/09/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%
84-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A3
%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8
%AF-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B
6%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1.html>  accessed 19th 
October2016. 
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after falling oil prices spurred rumours that the government was in fact targeting surplus 
land taxes as a means of resolving budgetary shortfalls. The budgetary situation of Saudi 
has changed radically in recent years and, on this argument, it would not be naïve to 
suppose that the government is not trying to increase revenue.   
However, the above official statement denying the government’s intention to finance the 
deficit budget by levying fees, taxation, on land is not quite accurate, because the revenue 
produced by taxes is often an important resource for governments.
7 From an economic 
perspective, property taxes, including land taxation, have generated a significant 
proportion of the government’s revenue and it is difficult to deny this fact. Accordingly, 
an economist who carried out research about property taxes in Latin America asserted 
that property taxes constitute the best option for a government that seeks to increase 
public revenue. He noted that: “the property tax remains the predominant option for 
raising revenues at the local government level in Latin America”.
8 This assurance from 
an economic perspective about the function of land taxation in generating a good 
proportion of government revenue might refute the Minister of Housing’s denial that the 
aim of enactment of the LFL 2016 was to generate a new source of finance for the 
government. In particular, its enactment occurred in the wake of falling oil prices along 
with the government’s expressed desire to diversify its income away from reliance on oil 
to other sources, as mentioned in Saudi Vision 2030.
9 Rationally, taxation is considered 
one of the main resources with which governments can increase revenue and address 
budget deficits,
10
 so it would be naïve to believe that the government, when enacting the 
LFL 2016, did not aim to address the budget deficit caused by falling oil prices.    
Another argument might incorporate the idea that the enactment of the LFL was aimed at 
achieving political success. In fact, the accelerated procedures for enactment of the LFL 
2016, represented in CEDA’s recommendation to accelerate the LFL’s approval, 
followed by the King’s order to the Shura Council to finish studying the LFL, albeit 
                                            
7
 R Pollock and D Shoup, ‘The effect of shifting the property tax base from improvement value to land 
value: an empirical estimate’ (1977) 53 Land Economics 67; C Ding, ‘Land policy reform in China: 
assessment and prospects’ (2003) 20 Land use policy 109 & B Dachis, D Gilles and T Matthew A, ‘The 
effects of land transfer taxes on real estate markets: evidence from a natural experiment in Toronto’(2011) 
lbr007 Journal of Economic Geography1. 
8
 C Cesare, ‘Toward More Effective Property Tax Systems in Latin America’ (2002) 14 Land Lines9. 
9
Saudi Vision, ‘A development digital infrastructure’ (vision2030.gov.sa,April 2016)< 
http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/97> accessed 13th November 2016. 
10 D Shoup, ‘The ideal source of local public revenue’ (2004) 34 Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 753. 
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subject to a 30-day deadline occurred against a backdrop of huge public demand, pressure 
from which has apparently led to the enactment of the LFL 2016 on the assumption that 
this would serve to normalise the housing market by lowering land values, while 
simultaneously punishing landlords who own massive lands illegally. During the last five 
years a huge public demand arose for the government to levy taxes on such landowners, 
a demand based on the belief that the landowners had gained those massive lands by 
illegal means.
11
Many local newspaper columnists and social network activists demanded 
that the government accelerate enactment of a land taxation law.
12
 Although the 
allegations and demands were not accompanied by any evidence confirming the charge, 
it might be argued that the government catered to those demands to gain political and 
economic success at the same time. From a political perspective, enactment of the LFL 
2016 succeeded in responding to public demand, thus helping to allay public tension 
which has been increasing in recent years in relation to land prices. From an economic 
perspective, enactment of the LFL 2016 paves the way for the government to levy more 
and more new taxes and fees and to increase the current fees, inasmuch as the 
government’s accession to the public’s desire and demand for enactment of the LFL 2016 
removed potential public opposition to the levying of new taxes and fees to address the 
budget deficit and falling oil prices. This argument may be true to the extent that the LFL 
2016 was followed by the imposition of new taxes and fees, thus strengthening the 
assumption that, through the law’s enactment, the government aimed to prepare the 
ground for further taxes and fees.  
In fact, many concerns remain unaddressed regarding the aim of the LFL 2016. However, 
this may be due, in part, to a lack of research supporting the vision of the law. When the 
                                            
11
 For example, there were three Saudi activists who have written many articles in the local Saudi 
newspapers and stoical networks demanding the government to levy taxes on lands to address the increase 
land prices because they believe that Taxation will lead to decrease land prices. Of  course, Saudi activists 
have significant impacted on Saudi community who have been persuaded by their arguments. For example 
see this article that was written in 2012, three years pre the enactment of the land fees law 2016: K Albwardi, 
‘Specialists, the approval of land taxation will survive the Ministry of Housing’ Alhayat(Riyadh, 13th July 
2012)<http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/3560177/%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B5%D8%B5%D
9%88%D9%86--%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B6-
-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%85-
-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%D9%8A-%
D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D9
%82%D8%B0-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B
3%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86>accessed 25thNovember 2016.   
12
 E Alzamel, ‘The successful land taxation conditioned by these conditions” Makkah (Makkah, 1st 
November 2015)<  http://makkahnewspaper.com/article/106008/Makkah/%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7% 
D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84- %D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D8
%B4%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-> accessed 27th November 2016.  
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effects of land taxation in other jurisdictions are reviewed, there would appear to be no 
potential negative impacts on the value of land itself, as will be seen later. This is not to 
say that landowners, who often reap significant capital gains benefit from rising house 
prices, are exempted from contributing to the community that permits and facilitates their 
wealth. The argument, rather, is merely that it is difficult to find empirical or theoretical 
evidence to support the notion that land taxation decreases the value of the land that is 
taxed. There is thus no need to consider such an outcome as an aim of the LFL 2016. 
The Saudi legislator has determined the issue to be the unacceptable increment in land 
values, which presents obstacles to all participants in the housing market, whether first-
time homebuyers, financers, or developers. However, failure to determine the aims of the 
LFL in sufficiently clear terms may lead to unpredictable and undesirable results. In 
particular, some economic studies suggest that it is likely that any increase in rates of land 
taxation will ultimately be borne by the final consumer of developed land.
13
 
For all the above considerations, it could be argued that the lack of clarity surrounding 
the aim of the LFL 2016 might impair its application and make its objectives questionable. 
This might raise a very important question, which is: does levying tax on land tend to 
precipitate either a decrease in the market value of land or an increase in its supply? The 
following section will discuss this matter.  
 
4.3 Land taxation: its background, kinds and impacts  
 
As seen in chapter two there is a clear nexus between housing and land, which has caused 
certain commentators to assert that demand for land is a consequence of demand for 
housing.14 
This dynamic inter-relationship requires us to understand the nature of any interaction 
and its effects on housing markets, in order to better predict how variations in housing 
prices evolve over time.15 Cultivating such an understanding will assist in determining 
the potential impact on housing prices if a key factor such as tax is imposed as an attempt 
to impact upon the market price of land and its availability.  
                                            
13
 M Neutze, ‘The price of land for urban development’(1970) 46 Economic Record 313. 
14
 D Hongyan, Ma Yongkai and An Yunbi, ‘The impact of land policy on the relation between housing 
and land prices: Evidence from China’ (2011) 51The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 19. 
15
 R Bostic, S  Longhofer and C Redfearn,‘Land leverage: decomposing home price dynamics’(2007) 
35  Real Estate Economics 183.   
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In fact, there are many empirical studies conducted in many countries and regions that 
have confirmed this interaction between housing and land values.16 For instance, it has 
been recognized that high land prices lead to increases in private property prices, which 
confirms the hypothesis that high land prices in urban areas are caused by high property 
prices.17 Such a significant relationship between housing and land might be heavily 
influenced by governmental oversight and changes in policy which affect the utility and 
value of land.18 One of the most common policies used heavily by the governments to 
deal with value of land is; land taxation.
19 When did land taxation use? And what are its 
kinds and impacts on lands, the next section will shed lights on this matter.      
Generally speaking, land taxes are considered to be one of the oldest forms of taxation, 
some having indicated that they stretch back to the Roman era.20 However, it is correct to 
say that the concept of land taxation has since developed and evolved, its impact being 
initially felt in the eighteenth century and persisting ever since. Therefore such the LFL 
2016 presented by Saudi legislative authority is clearly not novel, being based as it on 
principles of economics traceable to the works of Adam Smith, most notably The Wealth 
of Nations.
21
 Smith is often credited with establishing the fundamental rules of 
economics, including taxation. These rules are considered a reference point for 
economists to rely on in their research, as will be shown below. 
With regard to land taxes, Smith established several general principles that can be 
considered fundamental in this field. For instance, in Smith’s conception of the 
landlord/tenant relationship, the landlord acts as a monopolist because he enjoys the 
benefits of ownership without the consequent burdens of maintenance, which fall on the 
                                            
16
 For example see; J Ooi and L Sze-Teck, ‘Price discovery between residential land & housing 
markets’ (2004)15 Journal of Housing Research 95 & A Alyousha and T Christopher, ‘Ricardian causal 
ordering and the relation between house and land prices: evidence from England’(1998) 5 Applied 
Economics Letters 325. 
17
 J Ooi and L Sze-Teck, ‘Price discovery between residential land & housing markets’ (2004)15 Journal 
of Housing Research 95.  
18
 E Glaeser and G Joseph, ‘The impact of zoning on housing affordability’ (nber.org, March 2002) < 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8835> accessed 10th November 2016.  
19
 There are many examples illustrated the intention of government to use land taxation for different 
purposes, for more background of those experiences see; W Oates and R Schwab, ‘The impact of urban 
land taxation: The Pittsburgh experience’ (1997) National Tax Journal 1; R Bird, ‘Land taxation and 
economic development: the model of Meiji Japan’ (1977) 13  The Journal of Development Studies 162 and  
B Needham, ‘Land taxation, development charges, and the effects on land-use’ (2000) 17 Journal of 
Property Research 241. 
20
 E Glaeser and G Joseph, ‘The impact of zoning on housing affordability’ (nber.org, March 2002) < 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8835> accessed 10th August 2016.  
21
 A Smith, The wealth of nations (Penguin books 1986) 251. 
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tenant.
22
 Smith believed, therefore, that taxes on ground-rents would not increase the rent 
for the land because only the owner would bear the burden of paying the tax.23 This 
concept was confirmed by other economists when some stated that “the effect of these 
taxes would be such as Adam Smith has described; though one must add that he 
immediately went on to register reservations on distributional grounds against pushing 
such taxes far”.24  
It seems the discussion during Smiths’s era focused on grounds as a capital asset used 
primarily to generate income, for instance by leasing land out for agricultural use. 
Landlords were therefore conceived of as monopolists by Smith and others,
25
 who 
believed that landowners secured significant capital and income benefits without 
incurring any corresponding custodial responsibilities. Smith’s contribution in shaping 
the general outlines of land taxation is plain, as he succeeded in distinguishing between 
various types of taxes on land and their different effects.26 For example, Smith states that 
“Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of houses. A tax 
upon ground-rents would not raise the rents of houses. It would fall altogether upon the 
owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent 
which can be got for the use of his ground.”
27 Smith also established what he termed the 
four “canons” of taxation, which should serve as guiding principles for economists and 
law makers:  
 ‘People should contribute taxes in proportion to their income and 
             wealth; 
 Taxes should be certain, not arbitrary; 
 Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it    
            is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it; 
                                            
22
 A Smith, The wealth of nations (Penguin books 1986) 251. 
23
A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Ward,Lock,and 
Tyler,1961)130. 
24
A Prest, The taxation of urban land (Manchester University Press 1981) 35. 
25
 For example Henry George in his famous book: Progress and Poverty focuses on this point and asserted 
that landlords are monopolists. For further discussion see: H George, Progress and Poverty (The modern 
library1880) 339. 
26
L Rose,‘The development value tax’(1973) 10 Urban Studies 271. 
27
 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Ward,Lock,and 
Tyler,1961)129. 
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 The costs of imposing and collecting taxes should be kept minimum.’28 
Land taxes have since, of course, undergone significant further development as land has 
been put to use for different purposes, either residential or commercial. Such different 
usages generally enhance the capital value of the land, which can then be used to raise 
money and grant warranties. Such diverse uses of land granted economists and policy-
makers scope to determine the proper form that taxes on such uses should take and their 
likely effects. It is therefore to be expected that forms of land tax across the world should 
vary, as they will invariably reflect differing policy goals shaped by differing political 
and economic circumstances.
29  
Some economists, for instance, have attempted to assess the feasibility of imposing taxes 
on urban land in order to reduce the margin between rural and urban land values. The 
study suggests that such forms of land tax would not achieve this goal. It was observed 
that it is very difficult to devise a tax that can directly reduce the incremental increase in 
the market value of land that had been converted from rural into urban use. The study also 
concluded that the burden of any tax imposed on developed land will ultimately be shifted 
to the final consumer.30  
Before reviewing certain examples of land taxes it is worthwhile to note that the 
philosophy underpinning land taxation revolves around the conception of landlords as 
monopolists, and treats them accordingly. This philosophy attributes incremental 
increases in the value of land to the actions of the whole community, rather than to 
individual landowners.31 The community acts through the government, on the basis that 
the community elects the government to represent them and, it follows, to provide the 
infrastructure and public services necessary to ensure that land retains its inherent value 
and to provide the right environment for growth Public services are, of course, funded by 
                                            
28
 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Ward,Lock,andTyler,1961) 
653. 
29
Some has tried to distinguish between the aim of imposing land taxes and the justification for imposing 
taxes. The former, as indicated above, is a product of different political and economic circumstances driving 
domestic economists and policymakers to adapt land taxes to achieve fixed targets. The latter, however, is 
derived from the main purpose of levying a tax, which might be one of several aims commonly held by 
economists beside the need to maintain the national fisc, such as the redistribution of wealth and income, 
control of the economy, to modify behaviour, etc, for example, levy taxes on tobacco and alcohol is kind 
of controlled social by taxes, for more information see; G Morse and D Williams, Principles of tax law 
(7thed,Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 4. 
30
 M Neutze, ‘The price of land for urban development’(1970) 46 Economic Record 313. 
31
 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Ward,Lock,andTyler,1961) 
127-129 & D Shoup, ‘The ideal source of local public revenue’ (2004) 34 Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 753. 
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the community, as taxpayers, whose contribution to government revenue is integral.
32
 On 
this basis, it is argued, a proportion of any capital or income benefits accruing to 
landowners should be passed on to the wider community, and so also to the government 
through increased revenue returns.33 
The above philosophy was tacit in Winston Churchill’s criticism of landlords who 
enjoyed increases in the market value of lands whilst contributing nothing to the broader 
community, when he stated: “Roads are made, streets are made, services are improved, 
and electric light turns night into day … and all the while the landlord sits still” he added, 
“He renders no services to the community, he contributes nothing to the general welfare, 
he contributes nothing to the process from which his own enrichment is derived.”34 
Following this philosophy, various forms of land tax were innovated in an attempt to 
divert some of these incremental increases in land value to the public purse,35without due 
consideration of the potential consequences, such as the effect on real estate prices, the 
affordability of housing and attendant welfare concerns.
36 This may be attributed to an 
over willingness to bolster the treasury at the expense of certainty within a given system 
of land taxation, as the effects of imposing land taxes in other policy areas, such as the 
need to balance supply with demand, are under-researched, as is discussed below.  
Generally speaking, there are three forms of property taxation, including land taxation, 
which are considered dominant in this field: development value tax; property transfer tax, 
and land value tax.  Sometimes some of these forms are given different names, while 
having the same meaning, an example being stamp duty, which is similar to property 
transfer tax in the UK.
37 Thus, any form of property taxation usually falls within one of 
                                            
32
 For further discussion about the role played by the community to increase the land value see: H George, 
Progress and Poverty (The modern library1880) 339. 
33
 M Neutze, ‘The price of land for urban development’(1970) 46 Economic Record 313.   
34
 J Muellbauer, ‘Land of opportunity’ Financial Times(London,25 September 2014)5. 
35
 The importance of property tax as a rich source for the government to increase their revenue can be seen 
in the state of New Jersey which its property tax provides nearly %64.8 of the total state tax collection. For 
more information about this point see; R Lindholm,‘Land taxation and economic development’ (1956) 41 
Land economics121.     
36
 See for example, W Oates, ‘The effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values: 
An empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis’ (1969) 77 Journal of political 
economy 957. 
37 Many countries impose the land transfer taxes due to their importance to public finance, such as the UK, 
which called; Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) which is due for those who desire to buy a property or land 
over a certain price in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, for more information visit; Gov,UK, ‘Stamp 
duty land tax’(gov.uk, ) <https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax/overview> accessed 19th November 
2016. Most states in the US apply taxation form closes to the land transfer tax, for more information about 
this form of taxation in these countries see; B Dachis, D Gilles and T Matthew , ‘The effects of land transfer 
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the aforementioned taxation forms even if it is given a different name. The impacts of 
such taxation on property and land are variable. However, economists have tried to shed 
light on the impact of some of these forms and to discover their effects, for example, on 
land values or on housing.    
For example, ‘Development Value Tax’ (DVT) it is generally the case that where 
permission to develop land is forthcoming, the market value of the land will subsequently 
increase.38 Governments will thus ordinarily levy tax for the granting of such permission; 
the DVT. The effect of such a tax is controversial amongst economists; some believe this 
form of taxation will serve to increase the market value of land whilst ensuring an 
appropriate redistribution of that increase,39 whereas others hold that “[such a] tax on this 
capital gain of development land has no effect whatever on its market price”.40 
The question arises here whether, if we accept the assertions of those who believe DVTs 
to facilitate increasing land values, the burden of such a tax would be incurred by 
landlords or would instead be passed on to the final consumer.
41
 
Neutze has examined the above concern when researching a proposed levy on rural lands 
as a means of addressing the disparity between urban and rural land values; he concluded 
that whilst the conversion of rural land to urban land leads to an increase in value, the 
levying of a tax to capture part of this increase, and so to maintain balance between urban 
and rural land values, would be unlikely to succeed, as the cost of any such tax would 
ultimately be borne by the final consumer.42 
This kind of land tax exists in Saudi, although with a different application because the 
Saudi government does not impose a specific rate of tax to be deducted from landlords in 
the form of cash when they develop their lands; instead the government deducts part of 
the land that will be developed, equal to 33% of its size, and allocates that part to serve 
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the public through building, for example, general partitions, schools, etc.
43
 It is worth 
mentioning that this kind of tax is imposed on massive lands over 500,000m2 in size.  
The property transfer tax, which is the second form of property taxation, has often 
occurred as a response to challenging economic circumstances, with policy-makers 
turning towards new sources of revenue and new methods of collection, as happened in 
Toronto in 2008, for example.
44
  
The last form of taxation is so-called land value taxation, which seems to be a desirable 
strategy for central cities to employ when seeking to encourage development.
45
 The 
concept of this form of taxation resides in an economic theory that shifting the tax burden 
away from improvements towards land will encourage development.
46
 This form of 
taxation is based on the belief that the effect on current landowners, who must bear 
increased holding costs, will be to encourage them to improve their properties or sell them 
to someone who will.
47
 The certain effect of this form of taxation is to increase public 
revenue, rendering it, without doubt, a preferred form of taxation and one which is 
regarded as among the most important sources of increased revenue.
48 However, the effect 
of this form on housing and land prices varies in the opinion of economists who have 
studied this matter theoretically, because it is believed that a land value tax is neutral in 
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its effect on land development decisions and therefore discourages capital intensity in 
development.
49 This notion is consistent with some empirical studies which were carried 
out in some countries to assess the effect of land value taxation on development and on 
property prices, and found that this form of taxation is a useless tool and discourages 
intensive land use.
50 In contrast, some studies suggested that land value taxes would 
increase the long-run equilibrium investment in sites that are subject to taxes by 25%.
51
 
However, one of these studies refers to a very important point, namely, that increasing 
capital investment will increase the cost of construction and operating inputs, which in 
turn will be reflected in the cost of land and housing alike. This finding was confirmed 
by another study which investigated restrictive land use regulations, including land value 
taxes on housing, and found that the land value taxes might reduce the affordability of 
single-family homes by limiting the homebuyer’s choices and probably obliging him to 
bear the increased development cost.
52
 
Surprisingly, some theoretical findings mentioned above are consistent with empirical 
studies carried out to assess the extent of the effect of land taxation on landlords’ 
behaviour in terms of developing their lands, and to assess the taxation regime’s 
effectiveness in increasing land supply. The result was negative: landlords’ behaviour 
was not changed by this form of taxation; instead they retained the lands for a long time 
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in order to increase their value. Thus the effect of the taxation regime was negative in 
relation to increased land prices.
53     
For all the above considerations and in light of findings on this form of taxation, land 
value taxation may have different effects on different classes of property and community, 
and it is possible that studies of commercial or industrial properties in those places would 
yield positive results. 
Given that the LFL 2016 employs a similar form of land value taxes to be imposed on 
land, the question arises here: what possible outcome might result from such land taxation 
in Saudi? It is evident from the above-mentioned literature and studies that have 
investigated the effect of land value taxes that the certain effect of employing such 
taxation is to increase public revenue, which was to some extent the consensus among 
economists.
54 This certain outcome, however, is contrary to the official statement issued 
by the Minister of Housing in Saudi, to the effect that the aim of enacting the LFL 2016 
was not to increase government revenue. This causes us to wonder whether or not the 
LFL 2016 underwent thorough research and study before its enactment to ensure the 
economic feasibility of levying fees, taxes, on lands, since the official statement about the 
aim of enacting it indicated that the law sought to encourage landlords to develop their 
lands, leading to the injection of more lands on the market and a consequent balance 
between supply and demand. However, achieving this aim is not certain and is subject to 
many elements and variations, as seen above. This is not to say that land value taxation 
will not lead to an increase in the supply of lands in the market; rather it may have 
different effects on different classes of property and community. The underlying question 
that needs to be answered is whether the LFL 2016 was subject to study and research 
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before enactment to ensure its economic feasibility, or whether it was a tool employed to 
achieve political success, as suggested above. The lack of indications of such study or 
research pre-enactment of the LFL 2016 impairs the hope of the law’s effectiveness.  
Some countries’ experience with the development of their respective housing markets 
suggests that levying tax on land does not necessarily lead to a corresponding increase in 
supply.
55
 This reasoning is consistent with Barker’s 2004 report concerning the 
availability of housing in the United Kingdom. The report examined to what extent 
taxation might be utilised as a mechanism to directly increase the supply of land to the 
market, as taxation is often viewed as an effective means of countering externalities, such 
as fluctuations in the availability of housing.56 The report concluded that such an approach 
would be unlikely to succeed, because the planning system has a role in influencing the 
value of lands. The report added “In the context of land, tax may also be a blunt 
instrument, because of the individual nature of each site with regard to the balance 
between the social and private costs of development.”57 The report referred to so-called 
windfall profits, otherwise known as development gains, which flow from the decision to 
develop land whilst landowners retain the increase in value and urged the government to 
adopt certain policies enabling them to share in these windfall profits, so that incremental 
increases in land value could be better disseminated among the wider community.  
Although the Saudi legislative authority has already enacted the LFL 2016 and its 
implementation has already begun, Saudi needs a report similar to Barker’s, which would 
be conducted by respected economists to determine the issue and prescribe possible 
solutions. Since the official statement on the aim of the law’s enactment is not certain 
from an economic perspective, as seen above, the effectiveness of the solution it presents 
may be impaired. In particular, some economic studies have indicated that the burden of 
any tax imposed on lands will ultimately be shifted onto the final consumer,58 which 
implies that the issue of land prices could be further aggravated for all participants in the 
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housing finance market. Nevertheless, the positive side of the LFL 2016 is, as stated in 
article (11), that all revenue collected by imposing land taxation will be allocated for 
housing projects in Saudi Arabia. Such new revenue of course will be considered a new 
resource for the government,  thus achieving two aims: addressing the negative impact of 
falling oil prices, and enabling the government to address the housing shortage by 
providing a new source of income with which to finance its housing project.         
To summarise, this section revealed the importance of land taxation as a general source 
of income to increase government revenue. However, the effects of land taxation on land 
values varies greatly, as do its effects on the supply of lands and the development of 
housing markets. It is clear that land taxation can play a crucial role in increasing the 
market value of land, as seen in the case of the DVT. However, the extent to which land 
taxation is likely to arrest rising land prices, or to reverse such a trend, may be questioned, 
due primarily to a lack of research.  
 
4.4 The wording of the LFL 2016 and the possible legal difficulties 
regarding lack of fairness and the overlap with other obligations 
stemming from Zakah 
 
It is argued that it could be considered unfair in principle to impose taxation in order to 
achieve policy aims that the tax in questions appears poorly equipped to achieve, those 
aims in this case being a desire lower the value of land and/or to increase the supply of 
land to the market. As noted above, the LFL 2016 is unlikely or it is questionable to assist 
in either respect. Moreover, the overlap between liabilities and obligations imposed under 
the LFL 2016 and those arising from Zakah, which requires landowners to pay annually 
2.5% of their land values according to the general principles of Islamic law, raises the 
spectre of double taxation, as landowners may be subject in practical terms to two separate 
property taxes on the same land. With these considerations in mind, landowners are also 
required when they develop their land to allocate approximately one third of their land’s 
size to be put towards public services59, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.  
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Accordingly, there are two concerns over the wording of the LFL 2016. The first involves 
the extent to which the wording, in the context of the Saudi legal and political 
environment, conforms to the most basic principles of tax equity and fairness. The second 
concern is related to the reasons for the possible overlap between, on the one hand, the 
liabilities and obligations stemming from the implementation of the LFL 2016, and, on 
the other hand, those stemming from Zakah. The following sections will discuss these 
concerns in detail. 
 
4.4.1 The wording of the LFL 2016 and the lack of fairness  
 
The principle of justice is very important to observe when imposing taxes, because the 
imposition of any tax is dependent upon public and individual acceptance of its 
legitimacy. To be sure, it is difficult to persuade all individuals who are liable to pay tax 
to accept the concept with equanimity, but employing and applying the principles of 
justice, fairness and equity in the levying of taxes may act to minimise any discontent. 
Justice and equity are often addressed in a single context, in which lawyers and 
economists alike discuss whether or not tax is fair. Also, we must to consider the aim of 
the LFL 2016 to achieve the equity and fairness.  
Tax equity, which in this context means, simply, fairness, encompasses both ‘horizontal’ 
and ‘vertical’ equity. Horizontal equity,60 in simple terms, calls for like treatment of 
people in equal positions,61 i.e. people whose economic circumstances are similar ought 
to incur broadly similar liabilities to tax.62This view is supported by both legal and 
economic conceptions of equity, with the ability-to-pay argument stemming primarily 
from the latter.63 
Vertical equity, following the same reasoning, seeks to ensure that the burden of tax is 
borne by individuals in proportion to their circumstances, and is a necessary corollary of 
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horizontal equity.64 Besides above theories, Adam Smith prescribed four “canons” might 
lead to the concept of justice and the need requires to involve them in taxation system in 
order to realise the justice for taxpayers, as mentioned above.
65   
The question emerges here as to whether Saudi legislator, in enacting the LFL 2016, has 
adequately realised the principle of justice. To give the LFL 2016 a fair and realistic 
appraisal, we must examine both the aims of the LFL and its principal target in the light 
of the main purposes of taxation in general, which are to increase revenues and/or to 
modify taxpayer behaviour.
66
  
The Minister of Housing has stated on several occasions that the enactment of LFL 2016 
is not aimed at increasing government revenue.67Unfortunately there is less certainty 
regarding what the LFL is aimed at achieving, there being a degree of vacillation between 
decreasing land values and increasing supply, as mentioned in the former section. As 
revenue enhancement can be excluded from our consideration, we must turn our focus to 
the aim of modifying taxpayer behaviour, in this case to incentivise the development and 
sale of land and to discourage landowners from sitting on valuable property holdings.  
Bearing this aim in mind, the LFL 2016 was designed to target only those landowners 
with extensive portfolios, whereas small scale landowners are exempt, even though both 
groups belong to the same community and are subject to the same laws. The phrase 
“extensive” is taken to represent holdings of 5,000m2 or more, and this implies that 
landholdings falling beneath this threshold will not incur any liability to tax.   
Thus, it could be argued that horizontal tax equity is not realized in the LFL, because 
landlords who retain lands for a long time in order to reap incremental increases in land 
value do not incur broadly similar liabilities to tax. This is because the law exempts those 
who own less than 5000m2 from taxation liabilities, while those own more than 5000m2 
are subject to liabilities. The distinction between landowners who live in the same 
community and who engage in the same land owning exercise is not supported by any 
economic nor legal reasons. Also, it is difficult to argue that vertical tax equity is realised 
in the LFL 2016 because individuals do not incur the same liabilities of tax in proportion 
to their circumstances. All landlords who own land of less than 5000m2, will not incur 
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liabilities that arise from the LFL 2016 even though they engage in behaviour that is 
targeted by the LFL 2016 for distinction. For example, some landowners keep their lands 
undeveloped in order to reap incremental increases in land value. 
If we accept, based on the assertions of the Ministry of Housing that the land market 
suffers from a shortage in the supply of lands due to the aforementioned behaviour of 
landlords,
68 then the rational response would be to target all landlords who sleep on their 
holdings, regardless of size. Moreover, it is unclear whether landlords are being targeted 
due to the size of their holdings or the fact they have allowed land to sit idle for prolonged 
periods of time. If the latter interpretation is chosen, then the LFL 2016 ought to apply 
equally to those landlords who sleep on their portfolios, whatever their size or value. If 
the former interpretation is chosen, it would be illogical to impose taxes on people simply 
for owning extensive lands, as to do so might undermine the Saudi economy and damage 
the reputation of the country. Such a policy rationale might also act to deter external 
investment. 
Furthermore, if the philosophy behind land taxation regards the contribution of the wider 
community as integral to the value of land, with the attendant notion that some of these 
gains ought to be recaptured from land owners in the form of tax, why did the LFL exclude 
holdings below 5,000m2 from liability to tax where the value inherent in such property is 
equally a product of social capital? 
It could be argued that the LFL 2016 has been designed to catch larger holdings because 
it is assumed that, if the LFL were to succeed in encouraging landowners to develop and 
circulate their lands, the shortfall in supply would be addressed.  This is possible, however 
if we accept that the high economic value of large landholdings provides sufficient 
justification for subjecting them to unique tax liabilities, this might encourage landowners 
to change their behaviour and look to decrease the size of their portfolios to evade the 
taxation liabilities. Here, the taxation system will not achieve the main aim which is 
modifying landowners’ behaviours representing in retaining land for long time aiming to 
increase their values and impacting on the supply of lands.   
For all the above discussion, it could be argued that the LFL 2016 does not meet the 
criteria of Horizontal equity, which may undermine its efficacy should it be implemented. 
Even if we attempt to apply the principle of Vertical equality, the LFL as it stands would 
be similarly lacking, as a large section of landowners, who own less than 5000m2, will 
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pay nothing despite the significant value of their landholdings, because such small and 
medium lands are considered a particularly valuable form of asset in the main cities of 
Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam where the price per square metre is over $400.69 
Accordingly, the attempt to realize the goals of equity and justice in the LFL, whilst at 
the same time achieving its main aim, requires that the LFL 2016 be adjusted to cover all 
lands, as there are no legal or economic reasons to support the allocation of tax on the 
proposed basis. It seems correct to say that this adjustment would go some way towards 
achieving the condition of justice in the levying of taxes, mandated by article (20) of the 
Basic Law of Governance (BLG)70 that states “Taxes and fees may be imposed only if 
needed and on a just basis. They may be imposed, revised, abolished, or exempted only 
in accordance with the Law”. 
 
4.4.2 The possible overlap between the liabilities and obligations stemming 
from the implementation of the LFL 2016 and those stemming from 
Zakah 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the LFL faced opposition from the Council of Senior 
Ulama (CSU)
71 because the latter understood from the wording and formulation of the 
law that it represents taxation, rather than a fee or Zakah.
72 This understanding required 
the CSU to study the law from the standpoint of whether or not taxation is contrary to 
Islamic law. Such an understanding of the law as taxation rather than fees, for example, 
might be attributed to the fact that the law proposed imposition of a payment on lands 
equalling 100 Saudi Riyal ($24) per square meter.
73 In addition, the law was titled as a 
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(darebah alaradi Nezam), which means land taxation law, thus arousing the CSU’s fears 
that the law represents taxation rather than fees. And that, of course, would not get their 
approval because they believe that taxation is contrary to Islamic law, as mentioned in 
Chapter Two.
74  
The legislative authority in Saudi, therefore, has attempted to redraft the law to increase 
the likelihood of the CSU accepting its provisions. For this reason, the legislative 
authority has overhauled the provisions of the LFL 2016 in two respects: the law’s name 
and the rate of payment that should be imposed on lands.   
With regard to the name of the law, the legislative authority has amended it to remove 
any reference to taxation, and to refer instead to the imposition of fees, despite there being 
a significant difference between the two concepts. Both taxes and fees are considered 
compulsory contributions. Taxpayers and beneficiaries of public services are due to pay 
specific amounts to the government, but for different purposes. Therefore, the purpose of 
making payment to the government is considered the fundamental criterion in 
distinguishing between tax and fee. When taxpayers make payment they receive nothing 
in return because taxes will be used by the government to finance public services, while 
the beneficiaries of public services pay fees in return for those services.
75
 For example, 
people are due by law to pay income tax but they receive nothing in return, but they pay 
passport fees in order to obtain a passport. Another feature that been used to differentiate 
between fees and taxes is the method of approving these contributions.
76
 
The form of amendment of the law’s name seems to be attributable partly to a perception 
that Saudi people would be more willing to accept a fee, as opposed to a tax, based on the 
commonly held belief that the latter is contrary to Islamic law whereas the former is not. 
This belief is derived from many religious opinions to the effect that the concept of 
taxation is contrary to general principles of Islamic law. In many cases Saudi religious 
scholars have issued religious opinions (fatwa) aimed explicitly at the prohibition of 
taxation in the context of Islamic law, and stating that to involve oneself in the imposition 
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or collection of a tax is similarly impermissible.
77
 For this reason a compelling argument 
could be made that the legislative authority hoped the amendment would pre-empt 
possible opposition from the CSU and public alike.
78  
It seems that changing the name of the law from land taxation to land fees has had the 
desired effect, because some CSU members have lent their support to the notion of 
imposing fees on large lands, after of course changing the name of the mechanism to a 
fee, to address the increase in land values. For example, Dr Saad Alkhathlan, a member 
of the CSU, has stated, in the wake of the intention to impose fees rather than a tax on 
lands through an amendment to the law, that such a step is consistent with the general 
teachings of Islam in view of the possible impact of rising land prices and attendant public 
unrest. He added that the outcome that would be achieved by this step would be a decrease 
in “land values”, and that the only segment that might incur some detriment from the 
imposition of land fees were those monopolists and landowners who retain their lands for 
a long time to utilise holdings and reap the benefits of the expected increase in land values. 
Given the softening of the CSU’s view following the amendment there is perhaps an 
indication by this member that altering the name of the law is likely to change the attitude 
towards the idea of taxation.  
Nevertheless, there is an important distinction to be drawn between the concept of 
taxation and that of fees, as seen throughout this chapter; also noteworthy are the changing 
public attitudes towards the idea of imposing a payment on lands. The attempts of the 
legislative authority to avoid possible opposition from the CSU did not end with the 
change in emphasis from taxation to fees. The level of the charge imposed was also 
altered from the level set out in the initial draft. This latter change may be viewed 
similarly as a means of harmonising the law with public attitudes and those of the CSU, 
so as to make the law acceptable to both. This time the legislative authority emphasised 
the level of payment proposed by the law, the aim being the islamisation of land taxation. 
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Islamisation here means greater commitment to Islamic laws and values and achieving 
compliance with the general Islamic law.
79    
As mentioned above, the law proposed imposing a $24 charge per square meter on any 
eligible lands. In order to achieve the islamisation of the payment proposed by the law, 
the legislative authority looked for an instrument that could play the same role as taxation 
and at the same time comply with Islamic law. The tool possessing such features is 
embodied in Zakah. It is evident that the legislative authority was looking for a moderate 
solution, one that would achieve the main goals of the law but, at the same time, would 
not face opposition from the CSU. The moderate solution contended for here is derived 
from Islamic law, and could occupy the same position as a tax due to the similarities 
between the two instruments, tax and Zakah, as will be seen later. Accordingly, the 
legislative authority has amended the level of land taxation from $24 per square meter to 
2.5% of the land’s value annually.  
To understand this step, and the reason the legislative authority felt it was necessary, it 
will be useful to shed some light on Zakah and its function as a general principle of 
Islamic law.  Zakah is considered the third pillar of Islam80 and all Muslims are obliged 
to pay zakah81according to the first two sources of Islam, the Quran82 and the Sunnah. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that zakah is a religious obligation imposed by God and that 
all Muslims are committed by Islam to paying it. When Muslims pay zakah they believe 
they will be deserving of God’s mercy, while those who reject paying zakah will be 
punished in the hereafter. This aspect of zakah distinguishes it from tax, which is imposed 
by human beings, as the obligation to contribute is a legal, rather than a religious, duty. 
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Unlike tax, zakah “is viewed by Muslims as a means of purification rather than 
obligation”83, besides which, it is commonly believed that paying zakah will not lead to 
a decrease in wealth. This belief is derived from Sunnah in which the Prophet 
Mohammad, Peace be upon him, stated that, “Wealth is not diminished by giving (in 
charity)”. This confirmation from the Prophet has created a new climate of obligation 
associated with benefits in life as well as in the hereafter.  
The term zakah is Arabic and means literally “growth, blessing and increase”.84 However, 
when used in Islamic law it refers to the specific share of a person’s wealth that should 
be contributed, as determined by the ‘legislator’, either God or the Prophet Mohammed,85 
Peace be upon him, to be distributed according to established deserving categories.86 
Technically, zakah has been defined as "an act of worship performed to draw closer to 
Allah by extracting an obligatory right from certain kinds of wealth and giving it to 
specified groups at a specified time, in accord with specific conditions".87 Zakah does, 
however, share some similarities with tax, in that both are compulsory payments imposed 
on wealth. These similarities may enable zakah to play the same role as tax, indicating in 
turn that, from a policy perspective, zakah could be utilised to achieve many of the same 
goals. 
Leaving to one side their obvious similarities, the difference between tax and zakah, can 
be explained in the following terms: the general principles of tax stem from human 
considerations, such as “no taxation without representation”88, whilst the general 
principles of zakah are based upon divine precepts. Furthermore, the main goal of tax, 
generally speaking, is to increase governmental revenue, whereas zakah is imposed so as 
to be spent on the eight established categories of people who need help and support from 
the community.
89
 In addition, the rate of zakah (Nisab) differs according to the asset that 
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is subject to it. The zakah on livestock, for example, differs from that on gold and so forth. 
These rates are fixed and cannot be changed, whatever the circumstances, because they 
have been determined by God and the Prophet. The rate of tax, however, is subject to 
adjustment and change depending upon the prevailing economic or political climate. For 
example, the Chancellor George Osborne surprised the housing market in his annual 
statement of 2014 by changing the stamp duty rate.
90
 
In the Saudi context, however, these differences arguably make zakah preferable to tax, 
as it is more likely to be accepted and approved by the public and the CSU alike. From 
the perspective of the government, for example, an act promulgated in 1956 expressly 
stated that Zakah shall be collected from all Saudis in keeping with the general principles 
of Islamic law. 
For all the above considerations surrounding zakah, the legislative authority believed that 
amending the payment proposed by the law from taxation to zakah might achieve the 
objective of imposing taxation on lands, due to the similarities between tax and zakah, 
while at the same time forestalling any opposition to such an amendment, since zakah is 
derived from Islamic law and is acknowledged throughout Muslim society, thus removing 
any possible religious objection to it. According to the general teachings of Islam, a 
Muslim is responsible for paying zakah al-mal or alms on money, equivalent to 2.5 
percent of its value, with lands considered one type of mal.
91
Thus, the payment proposed 
by the law was amended from a $24 charge per square meter of any eligible lands to 2.5% 
of the value of the lands.   
Accordingly, the legislative authority succeeded in enacting the LFL 2016 by amending 
its name to become a land fees law instead of a land taxation law, along with amending 
the payment proposed by the law from a $24 charge per square meter of any eligible lands 
to 2.5% of the value of the lands.   
Although the enactment of the LFL 2016 is considered a good achievement by the 
legislative authority, which met its objectives without upsetting such an important 
organisation as the CSU, there is concern that in its implementation, this law might 
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represent an overlap of liabilities and obligations flowing from the LFL 2016 and Zakah, 
respectively. This potential overlap may be attributed to a failure on the part of the 
legislative authority to determine whether the liabilities resulting from the LFL are zakah 
or fee. The name of the LFL 2016 suggests that neither the law itself nor the liabilities it 
imposes are Zakah, yet the determination of the levy imposed annually by the LFL at 
2.5% supports the assumption that the levy is zakah. This failure to determine whether 
the aforementioned liabilities are, or are not, Zakah raises the prospect that individuals 
will be required to effectively pay zakah twice, as is explored further below. 
It is perhaps necessary to begin determining the exact location of the overlap in question. 
As mentioned, all Muslims are required to pay zakah for any of their lands that are subject 
to zakah. So, if we assume that a land is eligible for both zakah and the liabilities resulting 
from the LFL 2016, then the landowner is required to pay, firstly, 2.5% of the land’s 
annual value as zakah and, secondly, a further 2.5% of this value as the fee imposed by 
the LFL. This implies that they are obliged to pay 5% of the land’s value as zakah while 
Islamic law states clearly that they are obliged to pay zakah  equals 2.5%. This assumption 
is based on the belief that the legislative authority intended, when amending the level of 
the charge set by the law, to achieve the Islamisation of the LFL, by changing the levy 
imposed by the law from $24 to 2.5% of the land value, as mentioned above. However, 
Muslims are committed to paying Zakah once, not twice, according to Islamic law and if 
landowners are forced to pay 2.5% a zakah imposed by the LFL 2016 and then pay Zakah 
imposed by Islamic law, it would seem that the legislative authority has altered the general 
teachings of Islamic law, which of course would be unacceptable and prohibited.
92  
Therefore, in the wake of enactment of the LFL 2016, the CSU’s members received many 
queries from public asking whether, if they paid the liabilities prescribed by the LFL 
2016, they would also be required to pay Zakah, because the similarities between Zakah 
and the LFL 2016 confused them, creating the impression that the two were the same.
93 
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Such queries confirmed the concern raised above regarding the possibility of overlapping 
liabilities and obligations stemming from the LFL 2016 and Zakah.     
This raises a question as to why the legislative authority did not simply designate the LFL 
as a form of land zakah. If this approach had been taken it might have served to achieve 
the desired islamisation of the law, and thus avoid criticism from the public and the CSU, 
whilst maintaining the core aim of levying a charge on land to encourage landowners to 
modify their behaviour through incentivising the sale, and hence the circulation, of 
property. The fact that the possibility of adopting this approach was never openly 
contemplated by the legislative authority as a means of avoiding any unfair overlap with 
zakah injects further ambiguity.  
It might be argued that the principal reason for this lack of due consideration may lie in 
an attempt to avoid possible evasion by zakah payers. It is clear that zakah is an Islamic 
instrument and that only Muslims are obliged to pay it, as it forms part of the general 
teachings of Islam. By contrast, non-Muslims, who by definition do not subscribe to those 
teachings, are not subject to the same obligations.94 This fact might be open to 
exploitation by those who are prepared to evade payment of zakah by any means, and 
might therefore register lands in the names of non-Muslims, whose ownership would not 
be caught by zakah.
95 This is simply one potential avenue for avoidance, and serves to 
illustrate the need for appropriately careful drafting. It follows that the measure must be 
drafted so as to minimise opportunities for avoidance, thus ensuring that there is no way 
to circumvent the payment of zakah, a possibility which could force the legislative 
authority to abandon the policy of calling the LFL a land Zakah law.   
This argument is valid to some extent. However, to avoid such potential evasion of zakah 
payment, it is suggested that the LFL take two forms: one to be imposed on Muslims and 
the other on non-Muslims. This suggestion can be employed to bridge the gap that can be 
observed in relation to implementation of the proposal to impose zakah. The suggestion 
is that the tax be imposed on lands owned by non-Muslims, whilst the law to impose 
zakah on lands owned by Muslims remains as it was when originally put forward. This 
twofold proposal should take into account the general principles of tax equity which, in 
this case, require non-Muslims to be treated as Muslims from a taxation perspective. 
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Similarly, tax equity considerations necessitate that the same rate of Zakah, which is 2.5 
per cent of the cost of the land subject to it, be adopted when levying the tax on lands 
owned by non-Muslims. This equal treatment is, as noted above, also mandated by article 
(20) of the BLG.  
Taking the above considerations into account, it is recommended that the legislative 
authority amend the LFL 2016 to become a land zakah law, to avoid the potential overlap 
that would arise as a result of individuals incurring a double liability and obligation under 
the combination of zakah and the charge imposed by the LFL – which implicitly changes 
the principles stated by Islamic law. Adherence to this recommendation would make the 
law more consistent with the legal system in Saudi Arabia, which is derived from Islamic 
law and as such looks on any charge imposed by the legislative authority as a potentially 
impermissible tax, whether or not it is clothed in the guise of a fee. In particular, the Saudi 
legal system involves some legislation dealing with Zakah, such as the Law of Zakah 
Collection 1370 (1950).      
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
It is no exaggeration to state that land prices have significantly affected the development 
of housing finance. Financers, developers and first-time buyers have all been affected, to 
their detriment, whilst the only group to have benefited are landowners, for obvious 
reasons. Despite the above concerns, the only solution advanced to address this issue was 
the enactment of the LFL 2016. There is no doubt about the importance of land taxes as 
a revenue source, but this was never the stated aim of the law according to the official 
statement from Saudi government. Nevertheless, any uncertainty with respect to the law 
aims of land taxes invites concern as to their eventual implementation and outcome, as it 
suggests a lack of any coherent vision on behalf of the legislator. 
Such concerns are somewhat legitimised by a lack of  research confirming the notion that 
land taxation might act to either decrease land values or increase land supply, as there is 
simply no empirical evidence or model-based estimate to suggest such an effect. The 
situation could in fact be worsened, as the final consumer of developed land is most likely 
to bear the burden of any tax levied on the lands. There is thus a real prospect that land 
taxes will complicate the issue, rather than contributing to its resolution. In spite of the 
above concerns, the Saudi legislature has now enacted the LFL 2106, in an attempt to 
address increasing land prices by encouraging development.  
- 127 - 
In addition to the concerns raised above regarding the extent of the liabilities imposed by 
the LFL 2016, and whether it is well-equipped to meet the objectives set by the legislative 
authority, which has been suggested to be doubtful, the LFL may also be criticised as 
being inherently unfair. The chapter demonstrated that the possibility of unfair treatment 
emerges from the provisions of the LFL 2016, due to the law’s exemption of some lands 
from its liabilities, without legal or economic justification. To address this possible legal 
defect and to realise the goals of equity and justice in the LFL 2016, the chapter requires 
that the LFL be adjusted to cover all lands. 
Also, the chapter showed that the behaviour of landowners who act according to market 
forces in retaining their lands is insufficient reason to subject those landowners to the 
possibility of unfair treatment through the possible overlap of the liabilities and 
obligations imposed by the LFL 2016 and Zakah respectively. Therefore, the chapter has 
sought to offer a moderate solution which could serve to address the lack of fairness 
inherent in the LFL by avoiding this possible overlap.  
The necessary question is whether the LFL, as enacted, will serve to address this issue 
and contribute to the development of the housing finance market, or whether it will in 
fact have the converse effect. It is of course far too early to judge the full impact of the 
LFL, however there is still a need for the government to establish an independent 
committee to prepare a report on the state of the land market and to propose appropriate 
solutions to some of the aforementioned problems. The Barker Report provides a useful 
template in this respect96 and it is now time for the Saudi government to take similar steps 
and commission a thorough review of all issues affecting the supply of land in Saudi
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 Chapter Five: Building up the housing finance market through 
developing regulatory framework for adoption of the Loan-to- value 
(LTV) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to develop a framework for regulating the housing finance market in 
general and for adoption of the Loan-to-value (LTV) in particular, through analysing 
article (12) of the Regulation of the Real Estate Finance Law (RREFL), 1 which is believed 
to be hindering the development of the housing finance market by depriving potential first 
home buyers of access to the market. Article (12) requires a down payment amounting to 
30% of the total house purchase, or in other words a loan to value (LTV), which has been 
defined as “the ratio of a possible loan amount against the value of house as collateral”,2 
of 70%. Such possible impacts of the LTV are in fact contrary to the general aim of 
enactment of the housing finance laws 2012 in Saudi, namely to facilitate access to 
housing finance.3 Therefore, the chapter argues that article (12) is in fact an example of a 
defect in the regulatory framework that should regulate the housing finance market, and 
demonstrates the need to address it. 
The chapter will ask: how should the regulatory framework pertaining to the housing 
finance market be developed so as to avoid such conflict between the general aims of the 
housing finance laws 2012 and the implementation of article (12)? And how can the 
adverse impact of article (12) regarding the LTV on the housing finance market be 
mitigated?  
To answer the above questions, it is necessary to benefit from the experience of other 
developed jurisdictions in dealing with such a tool (LTV), since Saudi lacks the degree 
of experience that would enable the country’s financial authorities to deal with a tool as 
sensitive as the LTV. In particular, the country has witnessed the markedly low 
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homeownership rate of 47%, while applying the LTV and capping it at a low rate could 
lead to the exclusion of potential first home buyers from access to the housing finance 
market. Two jurisdictions, the UK and Hong Kong, have been chosen with the aim of 
drawing on their experiences in dealing with the macro-prudential policy, including the 
LTV, taking into account the differences and similarities between them and Saudi.  
To this end, the chapter has been divided into seven sections. The first section (5.1) is the 
introduction. The second section (5.2) gives the reasons for choosing the UK and Hong 
Kong for utilisation of their experiences. Section three (5.3) will shed light on the 
development of the macro-prudential policy in general, and in particular of the LTV, 
besides presenting their advantages and disadvantages.  
The chapter then moves on to section four (5.4), to analyse article (12) of the RREFL, its 
impact on the first home buyers and the lack of regulatory framework for adoption the 
LTV. The analysis will involve three subheadings: (5.4.1) decision-making, (5.4.2) the 
integration of policies and legislations, and (5.4.3) accountability.  
Section five (5.5) discusses the macro-prudential regime in the UK. The discussion will 
be divided into the following subheadings: (5.5.1) will provide the background of the 
housing sector in the UK and the dangerous role that the housing market might play as a 
threat to the economy; (5.5.2) will shed light on the legal reform adopted in the wake of 
the global financial crisis 2007, leading to the creation of a robust macro-prudential 
regime; and in (5.5.3) the section will discuss the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), 
which is designated the competent authority to regulate and implement the macro-
prudential policy, of which the LTV is one element. The discussion will involve two 
subheadings: (5.5.3.1) will review the FPC’s powers and the way the legislator succeeded 
in minimising those powers in view of the adverse impact of the macro-prudential policy. 
Then, in (5.5.3.2), the chapter will discuss the question: How does the FPC exercise its 
powers?  
Section six (5.6) will discuss Hong Kong’s experience in mitigating the impact of LTV 
and the creative method it adopted. The discussion will involve three subheadings: (5.6.1) 
will give an overview of Hong Kong’s housing sector and its experience in dealing with 
the LTV policy; (5.6.2) will highlight the mechanism for adopting the LTV policy; and 
finally (5.6.3) will shed light on Hong Kong’s experience in addressing the adverse 
impact of the LTV policy through the Mortgage Insurance Programme (MIP). Lastly, 
section seven (5.7) will sum up the main findings of this chapter and offer 
recommendations. 
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5.2 Why the UK and Hong Kong have been chosen for utilisation of 
their experience? 
 
Generally speaking, there are three reasons for choosing the legal experience of the UK 
as a model to draw some lessons in the area of housing finance: the similar circumstances 
between the UK and Saudi Arabia in relation to the housing sector, recent financial 
reforms that have taken place in the UK, and the practice of strong cooperation between 
financial authorities, the UK Government and UK Parliament pertaining the adoption of 
macro-prudential policy in the UK. Both the Saudi and UK Governments are under 
pressure to find a solution to their housing problems, in spite of significant differences 
between them in rates of homeownership, which of course favours the UK.4 Also, in both 
jurisdictions component authorities have begun to adopt macro-prudential policies in 
spite of the adverse effects these policies seem to have on the housing finance sector, and 
this will be discussed later. The financial system in the UK has recently been subject to 
significant reforms and overhaul which make its experience of the adoption of macro-
prudential policies unique. The UK financial system reforms include granting competent 
authorities the power to take further action if needed, which includes but is not limited to 
the use of macro-prudential policies, to protect the financial system from any possible 
source of threat.5 However, the adoption and application of these policies requires finding 
a legal basis, and a way of enabling main participants in the housing market to participate. 
For all these reasons, this chapter seeks to draw from the UK’s experience in respect of 
procedures implemented before the adoption of the LTV policy; these procedures reveal 
a presence of adequate preparation and strong cooperation between financial authorities, 
the UK Government and the UK Parliament.  
With regard to Hong Kong, there are two reasons for choosing this legal model to draw 
lessons from it. The first is because financial authorities in Hong Kong have already had 
success in dealing with the adverse impacts of LTV, and have created a mechanism to 
mitigate its impact. The second reason is the long experience of Hong Kong in this field, 
dating back to the 1990s. In addition to the long experience of the application of LTV in 
                                            
4
 For further discussion about the housing crisis in the UK see: B Reid, ‘Housing crisis? What crisis?’ 
(2015) 167 Scottish Planning & Environmental Law 8 & K Barker, ‘How many houses should we plan 
for?’(2015) 13 Journal of Planning & Environment Law 10 and A Minhinick and J Boswall, ‘The 
solution to the housing crisis’ (2015) 159 Journal Article 33 
5 P Rawlings, ‘Reform of bank regulation in the United Kingdom: the opening salvo’ (2010) 25 Journal 
of International Banking Law and Regulation 522.  
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Hong Kong, there are similarities between Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong that have 
inspired the choice of the Hong Kong model.  
The first reason is related to monetary policy. The Hong Kong dollar has been tied to the 
US dollar under a currency board regime since October 1983,6 while the Saudi Riyal has 
also been tied to the US dollar through SAMA since May 1981.7It is worth mentioning 
that US monetary policy impacts on interest rates in both countries.8 The second reason 
is that both jurisdictions are distinguished by their real estate markets, which feature a 
high risk of volatility, and which represents a threat to the banking sector. It can be seen 
from this chapter that the real estate market in Hong Kong features a strong volatility risk 
which potentially threatens the banking sector, while the property market in Saudi is not 
immune to this condition, due to the geopolitical environment provided by its location. 
Saudi is situated in the heart of the Middle East which is marked by instability, due to the 
outbreak of a number of wars in the last 30 years between Israel and Arab countries, or 
between other parties, as in the Gulf War of 1991, the Iraq War of 2003 and currently the 
action of Saudi and its allies against Hothy rebels in Yemen 2015. These wars of course 
reflect negatively on the property market, subjecting it to a high risk of volatility. All 
these similarities make Hong Kong a good object to draw from its experience.    
It could be argued that the analogy with Hong Kong is not a strong one as far as Saudi 
Arabia is concerned. The latter is a large land mass with plenty of room to build on it 
whereas the former is a small island with little or no building room. This argument would 
be sound if the intention in comparing Saudi with Hong Kong involved the amount of 
land to build on, for example, or the geographic challenges facing house-building in both 
countries. However, this is not the subject matter, rather it concerns the methods used by 
the financial authorities in dealing with the macro-prudential policy so as to avoid 
possible adverse impacts on the housing finance market.   
    
 
                                            
6S Gerlach and P Wensheng, ‘Bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong’ (2005) 29 Journal of 
Banking & Finance 461 
7 M Al-Jasser and A Banafe, ‘Monetary policy instruments and procedures in Saudi Arabia’ (1999) 5 BIS 
Policy Papers 203 
8 S Gerlach and P Wensheng, ‘Bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong’ (2005) 29 Journal of 
Banking & Finance 461 
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5.3 The development of the macro-prudential policy, including LTV: 
background, advantages and disadvantages  
 
Generally speaking, when the economy is growing and there are indications of 
competitive sources seeking loans from the financial institutions, the financial market 
becomes restrictive. This is attributed to two factors: lenders become more selective in 
selecting their customers, while financial regulators adopt some aggressive monetary 
policies to limit the excessive lending. During prosperous times, interest rates and down 
payments increase, and vice versa when the economy takes a downward turn.9  
However, the above picture changed in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007 
which strongly reaffirmed the link between financial crisis and excessive credit growth 
in housing finance. The argument being that booming housing prices are caused by the 
easing of monetary policy during a downturn, together with sharp decreases in interest 
rates.10 The general monetary and macro-prudential policies adopted during the period 
2007 to 2008 were not sufficient to prevent the build-up of systemic risks which, of 
course, generated booming housing prices.11  
Therefore, in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there was a consensus that the 
current policy framework for central banks (supervisory authorities) needed further action 
to design suitable macro- prudential policy, although the history of using the macro-
prudential policy including the LTV dates back to the 1990s,12 for protecting the banking 
sector from systemic risk,13 which has been defined as “a risk of disruption to financial 
services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and has the 
potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy".14  
                                            
9
 P Garrett, ‘Land Contracts as Security Devices’ (1965) 12 Wayne L. Rev.  391 & S Ghosh, ‘Credit growth 
and macro-prudential regulation: is ownership important?’ (2015) 57 International Journal of Law & 
Management167. 
10 A Keller, ‘The possible distortional effect of the loan-to-value ratio and its use as a macro-prudential tool 
by the European systemic risk board’ (2013) 28 Journal of international banking law and regulation 266. 
11
 T Wong and H Cho-hoi, ‘Loan-To-Value Ratio As A Macro-Prudential Tool – Hong Kong 
Experiences’(researchgate.net,2010)<http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cho-
Hoi_Hui/publication/229046588_Loan-To-Value_Ratio_As_A_Macro-> accessed 12th November 2016.  
12 H Hwa Se, ‘Loan to Value as macro-prudential policy tool: Experiences and lessons of Asian Emerging 
countries’ (dsf.nl, January2103)<  http://www.dsf.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/DSF-Policy-Paper-No-
33-Loan-to-Value-as-Macro-Prudential-Policy-Tool.pdf > accessed 12th November 2016. 
13
 S Victoria, ‘The role of macroprudential policy’ (estaticos.expension, November 2009)   
<http://estaticos.expansion.com/estaticas/documentos/2009/11/doc_banco_inglaterra23112009.pdf> 
accessed 12th November 2016. 
14 J Caruana, ‘Systemic risk: how to deal with it?’ (bis.org, February 2010) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/othp08.htm> accessed 12th November 2016 
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Since then, in order to maintain financial stability, policymakers in the world have 
adopted some policies including, but not limited to, the macro-prudential policy such as: 
high down payments to improve the soundness and stability of the financial markets, 
regardless of whether the economy is growing or taking a downturn.  
Central banks (supervisory authorities), in turn, have taken on the task of designing and 
supervising the application of macro-prudential tools in order to protect the banking and 
lending sectors. Central banks in some countries, such as in Hong Kong, Norway15 and 
Sweden16 have already taken further action by adopting macro-prudential policies in 
order to prevent the build-up of booming housing prices, while other countries are 
considering taking these actions.17 All jurisdictions aim to adopt these tools in order to 
protect financial stability, and, at the same time, prevent the causes of the 2007 financial 
crisis from arising again.18 
The LTV ratio emerges as an instrument used by central banks and financial institutions 
to directly affect the amount that can be lent to individuals against an amount of collateral, 
thereby helping to control the financial instability caused by excessive lending.19 
However, the possible impacts of capping the LTV at a low ratio, namely excluding 
potential first-time home buyers from the housing finance market and reducing access to 
finance by often younger and less wealthy groups, require further and extensive 
consideration.  
                                            
15 S Victoria, ‘The role of macro-prudential policy’ (estaticos. expension, November 2009)   
http://estaticos.expansion.com/estaticas/documentos/2009/11/doc_banco_inglaterra23112009.pdf> 
accessed 12th November 2016. 
16 For example, in October 2010 the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), which was 
established in 1991 as a single integrated regulator responsible for the supervision and regulation of 
banking, securities, and insurance industries, with a statutory mandate for financial stability and consumer 
protection, introduced an LTV ratio on mortgages which applied 85% as LTV to all new mortgages or 
extensions to existing mortgages that used the home as collateral. For more information see D Salim and 
W Xiaoyong, ‘Experiences with Macro-prudential Policy— Five Case Studies’ (imf.org, June 2015) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15123.pdf> accessed 16th November 2016. 
17 M Funke and M Paetz, ‘A DSGE-based assessment of non-linear loan-to-value policies: Evidence from 
Hong Kong’ (2012) 1 & A Keller, ‘The possible distortional effect of the loan-to-value ratio and its use as 
a macro-prudential tool by the European systemic risk board’ (2013) 28 Journal of International Banking 
Law and Regulation 266.  
18 For more information about the possible role played by the macro-prudential policy in safeguarding 
financial stability, and to prevent the creation of bubbles in the housing finance market, see G Galati and 
R Moessner, ‘Macro-prudential policy–a literature review’ (2013) 27 Journal of Economic Surveys 846 & 
A Ashvin and N Malhar, ‘Safeguarding Banks and Containing Property Booms: Cross-Country Evidence 
on Macro prudential Policies and Lessons from Hong Kong SAR’ (papers.ssrn,12 December 2011) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1971435> accessed 12th November 2016. 
19 For more information about the LTV, its function and impact see; A Keller, ‘The possible distortional 
effect of the loan-to-value ratio and its use as a macro-prudential tool by the European systemic risk board’ 
(2013) 28 Journal of international banking law and regulation 266 & C Lim Cheng, ‘Macroprudential 
policy: what instruments and how to use them? Lessons from country experiences’ (papers.ssrn, October 
2011) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956385> accessed 12th November 2016.   
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Although the LTV is often viewed as a tool used to contain the housing bubbles, it is 
argued that the implementation of this tool is a barrier to the development of the housing 
finance market, when there is no alternative solution to mitigate its adverse impact. The 
reason for considering the LTV a barrier lies in its role in hindering the potential first 
homebuyers from gaining access to the housing finance market. The ease of access to the 
housing finance market helps to increase the rate of homeownership, and both elements 
– the ease of access to the market and the homeownership rate – are often used to measure 
the quality of the development of a country's housing finance market.20  
In general, the adoption and application of the macro-prudential policy, including the 
LTV, uses two approaches: mandatory and advisory. 
            –The perspective approach: under this approach central banks (supervisory authorities) 
require lenders to abide by explicit limits which are set up by them.21  
            –Guidelines approach: Some central banks (supervisory authorities) provide general 
guidelines for lenders in relation to macro-prudential tools, but do not require them to 
follow these guidelines. In these cases, supervisory authorities do not take action against 
lenders who do not follow the guidelines.22 In these jurisdictions (whether industrial or 
emerging), it has been observed that where data is not available on LTV ratios for 
different points in time, the application of the LTV policy is often not mandatory but just 
advisory.23  
The adoption and application of LTV policy differs from country to country, as a result 
of different political, economic and financial circumstances which might affect the 
possible impact on the application of the policies.  
It has been widely accepted that the possible impact of the LTV policy in excluding two  
important segments of society from the housing finance market exposes it to political  
pressure.24 Politicians are interested in supporting these segments of the electorate and  
will do whatever they can to inhibit the policy’s consequences.    
                                            
20 E Roche, ‘Loans around the world’ (1997) 14 Secondary Mortgage Markets: A Freddie Mac Quarterly 1 
& S Proxenos, ‘Homeownership rates: a global perspective’ (2002) 17 Housing finance international 3.  
21 Financial Stability Board, ‘Thematic Review on Mortgage Underwriting and Origination 
Practices’( fsb.org, 17th March 2011) < http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_110318a.pdf> accessed 
11th November 2016. 
22 Financial Stability Board, ‘Thematic Review on Mortgage Underwriting and Origination Practices’ 
(fsb.org, 17th March 2011) < http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_110318a.pdf> accessed 12th 
November 2016. 
23 C Crowe and others, ‘How to deal with real estate booms: Lessons from country experiences’ (2013) 
9 Journal of Financial Stability 300. 
24 G Galati and R Moessner, ‘What do we know about the effects of macroprudential policy?’(papers.ssrn, 
September 2014)<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2502003 > accessed 12th 
November 2016. 
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There are a number of advantages to using the LTV. For example, designing and 
employing the LTV tools might limit the exposure and vulnerability of the banking sector 
to volatiles in property prices, as has been proved in some jurisdictions.25 Also, it has 
been found that high capital and liquidity requirements established by the low rate of the 
LTV tool can play an important role in moderating excessive volatiles in the financial 
cycle.26 Also, studies have shown that there is a strong connection between LTV ratio and 
default rate, with the low LTV ratio often associated with a low rate,27 while the default 
rate increases with high LTV,28 which means that using LTV will enhance the stability of 
the financial market and reduce systemic risk and financial instability.29 In addition, 
setting a higher capital and liquidity requirement by capping LTV will grant lenders 
protection against a decline in house prices.30 In terms of the financial cycle, there is some 
evidence that the use of LTV might moderate excessive volatiles in the cycle.31 In some 
jurisdictions, Hong Kong for example, it was observed that the property price growth 
decelerated due to the use of LTV caps.32 Also, in the same jurisdiction it has been found 
that the use of LTV could slow the growth of lending in the property sector.33 Despite the 
importance of using macro-prudential tools, including the LTV, in the banking sector to 
help contain asset bubbles, it is illogical to make this goal the main aim of the banking 
sector, as the Bank of England has stated.34    
Studies confirm that there are a number of disadvantages in relation to the adoption of 
low ratio LTV (or in other words a high down payments); liquidity is significantly 
affected by down payment requirements, because it forces households to depress 
                                            
25 G Stefan and W Peng, ‘Bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong’ (2005) 29 Journal of Banking 
& Finance 461.  
26 G Galati and R Moessner, ‘Macroprudential policy – a literature review’ (2013) 27 Journal of Economic 
Surveys 846.   
27 Y Deng,‘Mortgage default and low down payment loans: the costs of public subsidy’ (1996) 26 Regional 
science and urban economics 263. 
 
29 G Galati and R Moessner, ‘Macroprudential policy – a literature review’ (2013) 27 Journal of Economic 
Surveys 846.    
30 G Engelhardt, ‘Consumption, down payments, and liquidity constraints’ (1996) 28 Journal of Money, 
credit and banking 255. 
31 C Crowe, ‘How to deal with real estate booms: lessons from country experiences’ (2013) 9 Journal of 
Financial Stability 300. 
32 A Ashvin and N Malhar, ‘Safeguarding Banks and Containing Property Booms: Cross-Country Evidence 
on Macro prudential Policies and Lessons from Hong Kong SAR’ (papers.ssrn,12 December 2011) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1971435> accessed 10th November 2016. 
33 A Ashvin and N Malhar, ‘Safeguarding Banks and Containing Property Booms: Cross-Country Evidence 
on Macro prudential Policies and Lessons from Hong Kong SAR’ (papers.ssrn,12 December 2011) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1971435> accessed 10th November 2016. 
34 S Victoria, ‘The role of macroprudential policy’ (estaticos. expension, November 2009)   
http://estaticos.expansion.com/estaticas/documentos/2009/11/doc_banco_inglaterra23112009.pdf> 
accessed 12th November 2016.  
- 136 - 
consumption in order to accumulate high down payments.35 In addition, adopting a low 
ratio LTV might lead to the exclusion of some segments of the market, such as first-time 
home buyers and low-income earners, due to their inability to fulfil the high capital 
requirement.36 The potential exclusion of these segments from the financial market and 
hence from the property market will in turn lead to a decrease in the homeownership rate. 
Thus, for example, some studies attribute Germany’s low homeownership rate to the low 
LTV and high down payment there.37Unless potential home buyers receive some help 
from their families or friends to accumulate the required high down payment, they have 
no chance of gaining access to the financial market.38  
Bearing in mind these considerations, did the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 
which was authorised to draft the Regulation of the Real Estate Finance Law (RREFL) 
including article 12, take into account the possible adverse impact of capping the LTV at 
70% on the first home buyer and medium segment? Initiatives by government and 
legislative authorities include a number of measures that aim to facilitate access to the 
financial system, so as to increase home ownership rates, but the wording of article 12 
seems to work against the aims of those initiatives. There is a need for an analytical 
examination to help us understand the circumstances surrounding the drafting of article 
12, and this will achieve two goals: to improve the effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework governing macro-prudential policy, and to mitigate the possible impact of 
article 12 on the housing finance market.   
 
                                            
35 G Engelhardt, ‘Consumption, down payments, and liquidity constraints’ (1996) 28 Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 255 
36 D Igan and K Heedon, ‘Do loan-to-value and debt-to-income limits work? Evidence from 
Korea’(papers.ssrn,March2011)<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974849>accessed 
10th November 2016.   
37 M Voigtländer, ‘Why is the German homeownership rate so low?’ (2009) 24 Housing Studies 355. 
38 F Ortalo-Magne and S Rady, ‘Housing market dynamics: On the contribution of income shocks and credit 
constraints’ (2006) 73 The Review of Economic Studies 459. It is noteworthy that the high down payment, 
which of course resulted from capping the LTV at a low percentage, is the main liquidity constraint for the 
first home buyer in the USA, despite the down payment there being between 5-20% of the purchase price 
of the home, for further discussion about this tool and its impact in the US see: T Jappelli and P Marco, 
‘Consumption and capital market imperfections: An international comparison’(1989) The American 
Economic Review 1088 & T Jappelli and P Marco, ‘Saving, growth, and liquidity constraints’ (1994) The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 83. 
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5.4 Article (12), its impact and the need to reform the regulatory 
framework for adoption of the LTV to develop the housing 
finance market 
 
Based on the above studies, there is no doubt that the possible impacts of applying the 
LTV at 70% are significant and that first home buyers are likely to be excluded from 
access to the housing finance market as a result. In this respect, Saudi is not exceptional. 
The possible impact of the LTV could be worse if we take into account the political and 
economic circumstances of the last two years (2015-2016), which make it more difficult 
for Saudi first home buyers to accumulate a down payment amounting to 30% of the price 
of a house. 
In the wake of falling oil prices in mid-2014, along with engagement in the Yemen war, 
both of which factors have overtaxed the general budget and caused an acute deficit, the 
government has adopted many austerity policies to decrease its spending, including but 
not limited to job cuts and reduced salaries.
39 In addition, enacted the Land Fees Law 
2016 has increased the government’s appetite to impose more taxes and fees, in order to 
ameliorate the budgetary shortfall caused by the above-described circumstances. For 
example, electric and water tariffs were increased by the company owned by the 
government to double their previous levels,40 and taxes on rubbish removal were 
imposed.41 Naturally, Saudi families’ budgets will be impacted by these extra expenses, 
making it even more difficult to accumulate the 30% down payment required to buy a 
house.  
If we assume that Saudi authorities aimed to maintain and safeguard the financial system 
through imposition of the LTV, article (12), the question might emerge here as to why 
they have not reviewed the literature on LTV, so as to become aware of its adverse 
impacts on the housing finance market. Also, Saudi is a member of many international 
organisations which are interested in the macro-prudential policy, and is supposed to 
                                            
39 S Kerr, ‘S Spickernell, ‘Saudi Arabia begins quest for austerity as its economy sinks in plunging oil 
prices’ (CITY A.M, 25 August 2015) < http://www.cityam.com/223040/saudi-arabia-seeks-austerity- 
advice-amid-plunging-oil-prices> accessed 12th January 2016 & S Kerr, ‘Saudi Arabia cuts public  sector 
bonuses in oil slump fallout’ The Financial Times(London, 27th September 2016) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/765898e0-8482-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5> accessed 12th November  2016. 
40 According to the Council of Ministers' resolution dated 28th December 2015.   
41 According to the Council of Ministers' resolution dated 16th August 2016. 
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receive from those organisations several publications and reports about the macro-
prudential policy, including LTV, indicate to their negative impacts on the housing 
finance market. This leaves Saudi authorities with no excuse to ignore the adverse impact 
of the LTV on the housing finance market.  
Saudi Arabia was one among many jurisdictions to have taken extra care with the LTV 
policy in order to prevent any potential systemic risks in their banking sector that might 
be created by lending in general, and housing finance lending in particular. Although the 
LTV policy  received more attention in the wake of the 2007 global financial crisis, the 
adoption of the LTV by the Saudi supervisory authorities was delayed until 2012 to be 
included within the provisions of the Housing finance laws 2012, of which the RREFL is 
one law.  
The mechanism of the drafting article 12, together with the possible adverse impact of 
the LTV on first-time home buyers and low to medium segments alike, raises concerns 
about the regulatory framework operating in the housing finance market in general and in 
relation to the adoption of the LTV in particular. This is due to a mismatch between the 
main aims of the Housing Finance Laws 2012 and their implementation in connection 
with the LTV. Therefore, it is worth considering that problems exist within the regulatory 
framework within which article 12 was drafted, and to discover these defects it is 
necessary to analyse both the regulatory framework and the conditions in which it 
operates. The aim of this analysis is to find the most appropriate regulatory framework 
for boosting the housing finance market’s capacity to meet the demands of all community 
segments, while maintaining financial stability. 
To perform the above analysis, it is necessary to discuss the regulatory framework for 
adoption of the macro-prudential policy, including the LTV, in three aspects: decision-
making, the integration of policies and legislations, and accountability. 
 
5.4.1 Decision-making 
5.4.2 The integration of policies and legislation 
 
There is an urgent need to integrate the aims of the policies and legislation which pertains 
to housing finance, to make the possible outcomes of application of the legislation and 
policies consistent with their aim. Thus preventing the kind of conflicts, as seen in article 
12 and the main aim of the enactment of the housing finance laws 2012. 
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There is no doubt that any action has side effects, but the issue here arises when these 
side effects overwhelm the planned aims of the legislation or policies. Then the strategy 
of implementing these legisaltions and policies becomes problematic. 
Maintaining the financial system through the LTV policy is necessary, but it would be 
irrational to make this the main aim of the banking sector, let alone the housing finance 
sector, because this measure will prevent the sector from flourishing, growing, and of 
course developing.42 Although it can be argued that the benefits of the LTV policy tend 
to be sizeable when financial or housing shocks hit the economy,43 it would be illogical 
to make it the main aim of the financial system, so as to prevent a crisis occurring 
This is not to say that we need not take account of the LTV tool to protect the financial 
system from such crises; rather, we should not exaggerate this factor when applying this 
tool. It is clear that SAMA, with its new department, works apart from other governmental 
agencies and legislative authority, which explains the contradiction between the general 
aims of enacting the housing finance laws 2012, which the RREFL is one of them, and 
the provision of article (12) of the RREFL. Therefore, it could be argued that a 
comprehensive decision to develop the housing finance market cannot be expected as 
long as SAMA works apart from other governmental agencies and legislative authority.  
The lack of integration of policies and legislations, pertaining the housing finance, results 
from lack of cooperation between government agencies and the legislative authority. For 
instance, after enacting article 12 pertaining the LTV, the Ministry of Housing sensed the 
possible downsides of capping LTV and called a meeting between the minister of housing 
and the governor of SAMA in Saudi to discuss this issue and to find a solution that might 
mitigate the possible impact of LTV on housing finance market. However, the results of 
the meeting were not announced to the public or to the newspapers.44 Concern over the 
impact of this measure caused the Ministry of Housing to announce again, according to 
local newspapers, its intention to cooperate with other governmental agencies to create 
                                            
42 Bank of England stated in its report about the macro-prudential policy that despite the importance of 
using this policy in the banking sector to help contain asset bubbles, it is illogical to make this goal the 
main aim of the banking sector. For more information about this report see;  P Tucker, S Hall and A Pattani, 
‘Macroprudential policy at the Bank of England’(papers.ssrn, June 2013) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2327434> accessed 12th November2016.  
43 P Angelini, S Neri and F Panetta ‘Monetary and macro-prudential polices’ (papers.ssrn, March 2011) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832349> accessed 10th November 2016 
44 The above meeting between the Housing of Minister and the Governor is announced by SAMA’s 
website, for more information see: SAMA, ‘The governor meets the Minister of Housing’ (sama.gov.sa, 5 
Sugust 2015) <http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar-sa/News/Pages/News08052015.aspx> accessed 11th November 
2016. 
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means of helping prospective first homebuyers to provide the down payment of 30% 
prescribed by article (12) of the RREFL, with no details.45  
To achieve a good outcome from the application of the LTV and other government 
policies pertaining to housing finance, it is necessary to unify the Saudi Government’s 
plans, policies and legislation as part of its decision-making mechanism, so as to avoid 
potential conflicts. This mechanism will guarantee the integration of government policies 
with legislative enactments and decrease possible conflict between them where the 
housing finance market is concerned. This aim can be achieved through including a 
member representing the so-called Economics and Development Affairs Council (EDAC) 
in the composition of the suggested committee, which was mentioned in the previous 
section, in order to convey the orientation of the EDAC towards any issue related to the 
housing finance market. In fact, the EDAC was established46 to examine, review and 
make decisions on all matters associated with economic development, and to participate 
in drafting bills dealing with economic issues, including housing finance.47 Therefore, 
this step would enable the proposed committee to consider and take into account other 
legislations and government policies relating to the housing finance market before 
making any decisions; and of course it would enhance integration of legislation and 
government policy in this field.    
It might be argued that the financial stability committee needs to do its work without the 
political pressure that could be exercised by the EDAC. In order to achieve these goals, 
the proposed committee needs independence, and there needs to be an integration of 
government policies with legislative enactments when making decisions pertaining to the 
housing finance market, i.e.  a member representing the EDAC should be non-voting.48  
                                            
45 A Albargawi, ‘Sources; saving program to confront the difficulties of making down payment’ Sabaq 
(Riyadh, 13th August 2015) 
<https://mobile.sabq.org/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B
4%D9%81-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%82-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%85%
D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8
%A7%D8%AF%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%83%D9%86%D9%8
A-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7>  accessed   10th November 2016.           
46 EDAC was established by the Royal Order no(A/69) dated 29th January 2015. 
47 EDAC’s missions and functions were approved by the Council of Ministers in 20th February 2015.  
48
 The above composition of the suggested committee goes beyond the classic image, which would only 
emphasise financial services, to focus, instead, on both social and economic representation. In fact, such 
diversity in the membership of committee of this sort has been adopted by some jurisdictions such as the 
United States, where, for example, “the President shall have due regard to a fair representation of the 
financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and the geographical divisions of the country” 
before appointing seven governors of the Federal Reserve System. Also, it was seen in the UK that the FPC 
is constituted of different members representing the Bank of England, the Financial Conduct Authority, 
four external members appointed by the Chancellor and non-voting representation of the Treasury. For 
more information about the composition of financial committee in the US and the UK see; A Arora, Banking 
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Although the proposed financial stability committee should enjoy independence when 
making a decision on financial matters, that does not exempt it from accountability, which 
will be discussed below.   
 
5.4.3 Accountability   
 
Generally speaking, the central banks’ authority to use the macro-prudential policy, 
including the LTV, needs to be balanced with clear accountability arrangements.49 
Therefore, it could be argued that SAMA’s silence in response to criticisms of the LTV 
ratio can be attributed to its lack of accountability in that SAMA, according to its enacting 
law,50 is not accountable to the public for justification of its actions. 
Usually, accountability refers to two options: a hearing in Parliament, or political 
accountability to the Minister of Finance and thence from the minister to Parliament.51 
The concept of accountability, in fact, is inherent in the concept of a democratic society 
that requires independence to be coupled with accountability.52 Bearing these 
considerations in mind, accountability could take a different form, namely that of 
transparency or information disclosure, although the latter is one aspect of the former.  
Neither the concept of accountability, entailing a hearing in Parliament, nor that of 
transparency, exists in the mechanism for formulating article (12) and applying LTV. It 
is believed that if the principles of accountability had been included in SAMA’s law, the 
latter would have responded to criticisms of capping LTV at 70%, or at least would have 
given an explanation or justification for its action. The absence of published reports or 
research revealing the purpose of capping the LTV ratio at 70% instead of 80%, for 
example, supports the belief that SAMA’s action on LTV lacks accountability. That gives 
                                            
Law (Pearson Education limited 2014)141 &   Bank of England, ‘Financial Policy 
Committee’(bankofengland.co.uk, 
2012)<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/pages/fpc/default.aspx> accessed 10th 
November 2016.   
49 D Schoenmaker and W Peter, ‘Macroprudential policy: The need for a coherent policy framework’(2011) 
13 Duisenberg School of Finance Policy Paper 1. 
50 The Royal decree no (3) was issued in 15-12-1957 to enact the Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency, which include 14 articles represent the constitution of the SAMA to control the currency in the 
country alongside other financial functions and tasks.  
51 J Haan, F Amtenbrink and S Eijffinger, ‘Accountability of central banks: aspects and 
quantification’(1999) 209 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 169. 
52 V Perro and S Ruoff, ‘Improving accountability in banking’ (1996) Com. Lending Rev 44 & D Jakob, F 
Amtenbrink and S Eijffinger,‘Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification’(1999) 52 Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 169 & E Suzuki and S Nanwani, ‘Responsibility of international 
organizations: the accountability mechanisms of multilateral development banks’ (2005) 27 Mich. J. Int'l 
L 177.    
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SAMA unlimited authority to regulate and supervise the financial sector without 
justifying its actions or at least clarifying the aim and purpose of those actions.   
In these circumstances, how are we supposed to develop the housing finance market while 
the sector lacks this necessary feature, accountability? In particular, there is nothing to 
hinder SAMA from adopting a policy, whether a monetary policy or a macro-prudential 
policy, aimed at maintaining the financial system regardless of the adverse impact on the 
housing finance market, for example. This is not to assert a need to restrict SAMA’s 
powers; rather the idea is to combine independence with accountability to serve the public 
interest.  
For all the above reasons, and in order to enhance the concept of accountability by placing 
all decisions regarding macro-prudential policy in general and those related to the housing 
finance market in particular under public monitoring, the suggested financial stability 
committee, which was mentioned in section (5.4.1) should be subjected to an 
accountability requirement by the CEDA. To promote the principle of accountability it is 
suggested that the committee be required to respond publicly to any recommendations 
made to it by the CEDA, explaining either the ways in which it is acting in accordance 
with them or its reasons for not doing so.  
It might be asked why the committee is not subject to an accountability requirement by 
the Saudi Parliament rather than by CEDA. In fact, there is no Parliament in Saudi, despite 
the so-called Shura council playing some parliamentary roles. However, the power and 
strength enjoyed by CEDA are much greater than the Shura Council’s, and its direct 
linkage to the King might provide a motive for the committee to do its utmost to take into 
account possible adverse impacts on the housing finance market and other sectors.  
To summarise this section, it has shown that there were many defects inherent in the 
regulatory framework used in drafting article (12) in relation to the LTV. These defects 
ranged from the lack of experience of the new department that was authorised to draft 
article (12), SAMA’s inability to justify its action in setting the proportion of LTV, the 
mismatch between the main aims of enacting the housing finance laws 2012 and their 
implementation as regards the LTV, to the lack of accountability, and finally to the 
absence of initiatives for resolving the adverse impact of the application of the LTV. 
Therefore, the committee suggested above is urgently needed to improve and develop the 
regulatory framework shaping both macro-prudential policy and the housing finance 
market.  
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The following section will show how the competent authorities in the UK avoided the 
issues related to the procedures leading to LTV adoption, by enhancing the principles of 
accountability and transparency as well as by establishing an independent committee to 
deal with the macro-prudential policy while taking care over its possible impacts on the 
housing finance sector. The section will then be followed by section six, which will 
examine the way the financial authorities in Hong Kong created a means of resolving the 
adverse impact of the LTV.  
 
5.5 Housing markets and financial stability: the evolving role of the 
macro-prudential regime in the UK 
 
5.5.1 Background  
 
During the period from the 1950s until the early 2000s, the homeownership rate in the 
UK reached a peak in 2003, at 70.9 per cent of households in the UK.53 The main factor 
to play a significant role in increasing the homeownership rate was the Thatcher 
government’s policies during the 1970s, when it adopted many initiatives to assist tenants 
to achieve homeownership.54 For instance, the Housing Act 1980 was subjected to 
amendments including the Right to Buy provisions, which ended the ability of local 
authorities to block sales to tenants. Right to Buy gives eligible council tenants the right 
to buy their property from their council at a generous discount ranging from 33% to 70% 
of the property’s value.55 Consequently, the number of homeowners increased from 11.9 
million to 15 million between 1981 and 1989.56 
Although the above statutory amendment and government policy had the notable 
advantage of increasing the homeownership rate, their side-effects were not realised 
during that period. The result of those policies and the statutory amendments was a 
reduction in the local contribution to house building, so that the number of social houses 
                                            
53 G Meen, ‘Homeownership for Future Generations in the UK’(2012) Urban Studies 1.  
54 P Collier and R Luther, ‘The use of tax regulations as covert political policy variables: A  
case study of tax expenditures during the Thatcher years’(2003)19 Financial Accountability and 
Management 159. 
55 M Loison-Leruste and D Quilgars, ‘Increasing access to housing: Implementing the right to housing in 
England and France’ (2009) European Journal of Homelessness 75 & P Collier and R Luther, ‘The use of 
tax regulations as covert political policy variables: A case study of tax expenditures during the Thatcher 
years’(2003)19  Financial Accountability and Management 159. 
56 J Brown, H Song and  A McGillivray, ‘Forecasting UK house prices: A time varying coefficient 
approach’(1997) 14 Economic Modelling 529. 
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built in the UK declined from around 42,700 houses per year during 1994-95 to around 
21,000 in 2002-03, according to Barker’s report.57 In addition, some studies suggested 
that local authority house-building, that is, of social houses, fell dramatically to the lowest 
levels achieved in the post-World War II era.58 
Many initiatives have been put forward to offset the huge gap in housing funding that 
resulted from the policy of ceasing to build social housing. For instance, the new housing 
projects were funded by private debt, which became the main means of funding such 
projects from 1989 on.59 Therefore, private renting has increased since 1989 when it 
reached its lowest point while the significant growth in this sector has been facilitated by 
the development of the Buy-to-let mortgage market.60 
Also, another side-effect of the government’s policies and statues amendments during the 
1980s is the increased house prices. The wave of increased house prices following the 
decline in construction of social houses was accepted. The decline in construction of 
housing was one reason for the increase in house prices, alongside, as mentioned by the 
Barker report of 2004, the increase in the UK population, the growth in demand for 
housing over time, driven primarily by demographic trends and rising incomes, the weak 
response of housing supply to demand changes, etc.61 Of course, the increase in house 
prices was a barrier hindering access to the housing finance market; in turn the 
homeownership rate declined to reach, for example, less than 67% in 2010.62 In particular, 
younger people were noted as the main group affected by the decline in the 
homeownership rate.63  
                                            
57 Kate Barker is a British economist was empowered by the British Government to conduct a review of 
issues underlying the lack of supply and responsiveness of housing in the UK, she finished the report in 
2004. For more information about the Barker’s report visit; K Barker, ‘Review of housing supply: 
delivering stability: securing our future housing needs’ (ayrshire-jsu.gov.uk,December2003)< 
http://www.ayrshire-jsu.gov.uk/download/review%20of%20housing%20supply%20-%20interim.pdf>  
accessed 10th November 2016. 
58 P Collier and R Luther, ‘The use of tax regulations as covert political policy variables: A case study of 
tax expenditures during the Thatcher years’(2003)19  Financial Accountability and Management 159. 
59 C Whitehead and W Peter, ‘Causes and consequences? Exploring the shape and direction of the housing 
system in the UK post the financial crisis’ (2011) 26 Housing Studies 1157. 
60 Buy-to-let refers usually to buy property aiming to let it and it is  a very long term investment, Buy-to-
let constitutes a very important segment of the housing market in the UK, for more information about this 
market see; N Sprigings, ‘Buy-to-let and the wider and the wider and the wider housing market’ (2008) 2 
People, Place & Policy Online 76. 
61 K Barker, ‘Review of housing supply: delivering stability: securing our future housing 
needs’(ayrshirejsu.gov.uk,December2003)<http://www.ayrshirejsu.gov.uk/download/review%20of%20ho
using%20supply%20-%20interim.pdf>  accessed 10th November 2016. 
62 C Whitechead and W Peter, ‘Causes and consequences? Exploring the shape and direction of the housing 
system in the UK post the financial crisis’(2011) 26 Housing Studies 1157.  
63 C Whitehead, ‘International Trends in Owner-Occupation: In the Light of the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 25 
Housing Finance International 6. 
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In the wake of The Barker Report, the UK Government adopted initiatives to address the 
lack of supply of housing in the UK. For instance, in 2013 the Conservative Party, who 
is still currently in power, launched initiatives to solve the housing shortage, such as the 
‘Help to Buy’ scheme,64 and in 2015 it allocated of £3.5 billion to deliver thousands of 
new affordable homes across the country, a project designed to last for three years.65 
However, although, the UK Government initiated some change in the wake of The Barker 
Report of 2004, house prices were pushed up dramatically, as a consequence of the 2007 
global financial crisis. 
The forecast indicated that the increase would continue in the coming years. In London, 
for example, house prices are predicted to rise more than 30% over the next five years, 
according to some studies.66 However, the forecast has changed slightly since Brexit, as 
a new forecast suggests that house prices will fall by 1% in 2017, rising again by 2% in 
2018.67   
Although the above initiatives, whether governmental or private, have aimed to address 
the lack of housing supply and to cater for the huge demand for housing finance, they 
include some systemic risks that might pose a threat to the financial system in the UK. 
Therefore, the governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, said that “problems with 
housing are the biggest risk to the UK economy”.68 Such a pronouncement gives an 
indication of the dangerous role that the housing market might play as a threat to the 
economy, and particularly to the financial system in the UK. Hence further actions were 
expected to follow to protect the system from such a threat. This protection is represented 
in the macro-prudential policy, including the LTV, which the supervisory authorities  
resorted to in order to protect the UK economy.  
                                            
64 ‘Help to buy’ was designed for those aged 16 or over who have a valid UK National Insurance number 
and are UK resident and do not own another property anywhere else in the world to be a first-time buyer. 
It works if a person saves enough money, then the government boosts their savings by 25%. So, for every 
£200 they save, they receive a government bonus of £50. The maximum government bonus you can 
receive is £3,000. For more information see: HM Government, ‘Help to buy’ (helptobuy.gov.uk, August 
2013) <https://www.helptobuy.gov.uk/> accessed 10th November 2016  
65 For more information about above programme visit this website: GOV, ‘£3.5 billion deal to build 
homes and drive local growth’ (gov.uk, 27 June 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/35-billion-
deal-to-build-homes-and-drive-local-growth>accessed 12th November 2016. 
66 A White, ‘Is another house price bubble around the street corner for London?’ The Telegraph (London, 
2th April 2015) 5. 
67 I Fraser, T Wallace and R Bury, ‘House prices forecast to fall after Brexit’ The Telegraph (London, 22ed 
August 2016) 5< http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/08/21/house-prices-forecast-to-fall-after-
brexit1/> accessed 23th November 2016. 
68 R Moore, ‘Britain’s housing is a human disaster. Here are 10 ways to solve it’ The Guardian (London, 
14 March 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/14/britain-housing-crisis-10-ways-solve-
rowan-moore-general-election>  accessed 10th November 2016. 
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5.5.2 Building a robust macro-prudential regime  
 
Generally speaking, there are four dimensions that distinguish the mechanism of adopting 
the macro-prudential policy, including LTV, within the UK jurisdiction from its 
counterpart in Saudi: establishing the legal basis to rely on when adopting these tools, 
observing the principles of accountability and transparency, identifying the sources of 
threat to financial stability and resilience, and finally consulting a range of participants in 
the housing market before making the decision about the macro-prudential policy.  
The above dimensions can be revealed by examining the competent authority (which is 
the Financial Policy Committee (FPC)) mandated to regulate the macro-prudential policy, 
its functions, the powers granted to it for the exercise of its functions in this context, and 
the way the FPC rounds work. The aim of this examination is to enable Saudi Arabia to 
learn lessons to improve its regulatory framework pertaining macro-prudential policy. 
The following section will examine and discuss the FPC in detail. 
 
5.5.3The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) 
 
The FPC was established in the wake of the evolution of the financial system through 
enactment of the Financial Services Act (FSA) 2012. This Act restructured the previous 
Tripartite System, which had been responsible for financial stability since 1997 and 
comprised HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority.69 
Alternatively, the Act created new authorities to exercise the supervisory responsibilities:  
the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which together might be considered a different 
                                            
69  In fact, the Conservative Party took the first step in venturing to criticise the Tripartite system and to 
sway voters to attack it through its White Paper of July 2009, nearly two years after the financial crisis of 
2007. Commentators, therefore, have largely criticised the Tripartite system because it failed to anticipate 
the financial crisis and the roles of the three bodies were not clear enough to identify who was in charge. 
As a result, the White Paper proposed putting the central bank at the heart of the financial system and 
abolishing the Tripartite system in order to give the Bank of England responsibility for macro-prudential 
regulation and maintaining financial stability. These criticisms and proposals resulted in enactment of a 
new act that restructured and recast the financial system in the UK which contained three bodies with 
different functions and responsibilities. For more information see; A Arora, Banking Law (Pearson 
Education limited 2014)123 & B Geva, ‘Systemic risk financial stability: the evolving role of the central 
bank’ (2013) Journal of international banking law and regulation 1 & E Ferran, ‘The break-up of the 
financial services authority’ (2011) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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tripartite structure.70 The FPC has the responsibility for supervising and taking necessary 
action to maintain financial stability in the UK.71 
The FPC is considered an independent committee at the Bank of England72and contains 
thirteen members73 from varied sources such as the Bank of England, private sector and 
the Treasury, thus enhancing the diversity of this committee’s membership, a feature 
which of course will enrich any decision it makes.  
The committee has two objectives and remits, primary and secondary. The former 
includes identifying and monitoring the systemic risks that threaten financial stability and 
taking any action to remove or at least reduce those risks,74 while the latter involves 
supporting the government’s economic policy.75  
To understand the FPC’s functions, remits, and how it exercises its function in adopting 
the macro-prudential policy, it might be useful to shed light on its powers and on how 
FPC rounds work. 
 
5.5.3.1 FPC’s powers 
 
Generally speaking, UK regulators were being cautious when they limited the FPC’s 
remit to exercise its functions. The aim was to prevent the FPC carrying on in a way that 
would be likely, in the regulators’ opinion, to have significantly adverse effects on the 
                                            
70 P Lowey and A Reisberg, Pettet’s company law: company law & corporate Finance (4th Edition, Pearson 
2012) 395. 
71 There are several definitions of financial stability, such as: “the primary target in preventing financial 
crisis and reducing the severe risks of financial problems which do occur from time to time”; however, 
determining the exact meaning of the financial system is not the aim of this thesis, being beyond its scope, 
for more information about the nature of financial stability see; R Cranston, Principles of Banking Law ( 2ed 
edition,  Oxford University Press2002) 118; B Geva, ‘Systemic risk financial stability: the evolving role of 
the central bank’ (2013) Journal of international banking law and regulation 1& G Schinasi, ‘Responsibility 
of central banks for stability in financial markets’ (papers.ssrn.com, June 2003)< 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879197> accessed 10th November 2016. 
72 A Arora, Banking Law (Pearson Education limited 2014)141 & Shearman & Sterling, ‘United 
Kingdom: financial regulation – new financial regulators’ (2013) 28 Journal of International Banking Law 
and Regulation77. 
73 The thirteen members are: the Governor, four Deputy Governors, the Chief Executive of the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA), the Bank’s Executive Director for Financial Stability Strategy and Risk, five 
external members appointed by the Chancellor, and a non-voting representative of the Treasury, for further 
information see: L Cox and others, ‘United Kingdom regulatory reform: emergence of the twin peaks’ 
(2012) 95 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1. 
74 A Arora, Banking Law (Pearson Education limited 2014)141 & A Haynes, ‘Financial services: all change 
or new cosmetics?’ (2014) 35 Company lawyer 129. 
75 s.2A of the Bank of England Act1998 was amended by Financial Services Act2012, scueldule1 which 
provide that the FPC is to contribute to that objective primarily by identifying, monitoring and taking action 
to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK 
financial system. 
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financial sector’s capacity to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium 
and long-term. 
 In that case the Financial Services Act 2012 would neither authorise nor require the FPC 
to carry out its function.76 This limitation on the FPC can be attributed to the desire of the 
regulator to enhance the principle of accountability of the committee, which would thus 
take extra care when exercising its function.  
It was observed that there has been a gradation and slowness in adopting the macro-
prudential policy in the UK; that might be attributed also to two main factors. The first is 
that, despite the FPC having responsibility for supervising and taking necessary action to 
maintain financial stability in the UK, it was not authorised to exercise its function if it 
believed that would have an adverse impact on the growth of the UK economy in the 
medium and long term.77 The second factor is the FPC’s statutory obligation to follow 
specific statutory principles and procedures, as set out by the FSA 2012 and other 
legislations, before adopting the macro-prudential policy. This requirement enabled the 
regulators to ensure that FPC’s policies and actions would not negatively impact on the 
UK economy. 
To fully understand the gradation and slowness in the adoption of the macro-prudential 
policy, it is necessary to look at the powers, including those related to the macro-
prudential policy, granted to the FPC to protect the financial system and to meet its 
responsibilities. In fact, the FPC is endowed with two types of powers to enable it to take 
necessary action to protect financial stability.  
 
i. Powers of Recommendation 
 
This provision grants the FPC the necessary power to ask both the PRA and FCA to take 
action to mitigate the risks emerging from the finance market.78 It is a broad power which 
                                            
76 Bank of England, ‘Financial Policy Committee statement on housing market powers of 
direction’(bankofengland.co.uk,September2014)<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Doc
uments/fpc/statement021014.pdf>accessed 10th November 2016. 
77 A Arora, Banking Law (Pearson Education limited 2014)142 & L Cox and others, ‘United Kingdom 
regulatory reform: emergence of the twin peaks’ (2012) 95 Compliance Officer Bulletin. It is worth noting 
that the UK regulator was extremely cautious about adopting the macro-prudential policy, due to the 
sensitive impact of such a policy on housing market participants, in addition to which housing is considered 
a priority matter for the government and any policy that might have an adverse effect on housing would 
require extra scrutiny of either its legal, economic or social aspects.Therefore, when Parliament discussed 
the proposal, including the grant of powers to the FPC, MPs raised concerns about the adverse impact of 
such tools on the housing sector and whether or not the government had prepared for such impacts. For 
more information see: HC Deb  23 March 2015, vol 121Column number: 4-12.   
78 A Arora, Banking Law (Pearson Education limited,2014)142-143. 
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can cover wide aspects of “the activities of the regulators but it cannot relate to a specific 
individual’s regulated entity”.79 Also, there is the so-called “comply or explain” principle 
whereby the FPC can make a recommendation and both authorities are required to act on 
it as soon as reasonably practical.80 On this basis the regulators have two options, either 
comply with the recommendation or explain why they are not doing so.81 
 
ii. Powers of Direction 
 
This provision is very distinctive and grants the FPC the power needed to direct the PRA 
and the FCA to apply specific macro-prudential tools, on two conditions: the power shall 
be prescribed by the HM Treasury, and must be approved by Parliament.82  
 
5.5.3.2 How does the FPC exercise its powers?  
 
The use of the above powers requires the FPC to go through many steps when applying 
the macro-prudential policy; however, all steps use the gradation mechanism and so do 
not surprise either the market or individuals. The steps are as follows:  
 
1-Increasing awareness:  
 
Some measures have been taken to aid public understanding of the macro-prudential 
tools, their functions and their impacts on the financial system and the economy in 
general. Such measure began before the establishment of the FPC, due to the Bank of 
England under the Banking Act 2009 was required to publish financial stability reports.83 
For instance, in November 2009 the Bank of England,84 published a discussion paper 
                                            
79 P Tucker, S Hall and A Pattani, ‘Macroprudential policy at the Bank of England’(papers.ssrn, June 2013) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2327434> accessed 10th November 2016. 
80 J Perry and others, ‘The new UK regulatory landscape’ (2011) 84 The new UK regulatory landscape1. 
81 For more information about Powers of recommendations and its functions see: A Arora, Banking Law 
(Pearson Education limited 2014)141-143 & E Murphy and S Senior, ‘Changes to the Bank of England’ 
(papers.ssrn.com, 14 March 2013) < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243562> 
accessed 10th November 2016.  
82 Shearman & Sterling LLP, ‘United Kingdom: financial regulation – New financial regulators’ (2013) 28 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation77. 
83
 B Geva, ‘Systamic risk and financial stability: the evolving role of the central bank’ (2013) 28 Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 403. 
84
 A Daripa and S Wright, ‘Labour’s record on financial Regulation’ (2013) 29 Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 71. 
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which drew a big picture of the role of macro-prudential policy, its impacts, why it is 
important, and how it works.85 The gradation in deploying the macro-prudential tools, as 
will be seen below, gives borrowers and lenders in the housing finance market some scope 
to anticipate the supervisory authorities’ future conduct, in order to help them make a 
good decision before concluding a housing mortgage contract.  
 
2-Determining the source of threats and using powers of recommendation:  
 
The FPC is required by s.9W of the Bank of England Act 1998,86 as part of its 
accountability, to prepare and publish a financial stability report twice per calendar year. 
In its reports of September 2013 and June 2014, the FPC determined the source of threat 
when discussed the possibility of the housing market and mortgage debt posing direct 
threats to the financial stability of the UK.87 These reports constituted the first step taken 
to warn of the risks that might be posed by the housing market, due to the increase housing 
prices, and the need to take extra action, represented by the macro-prudential policy, to 
mitigate these risks.  
In the same reports, the FPC mentioned that the potential risks might be amplified by a 
cycle of rising housing prices and overextension of credit.88 To address this potential risk, 
the FPC set up criteria on which to choose an appropriate instrument enabling the FPC to 
exercise its powers of Recommendation89 for mitigating risks that emerge from the 
housing market. Then, the Governor of the Bank of England, the FPC’s member, 
                                            
85 G Baber, ‘Peer review of financial stability: how does the United Kingdom fare?’(2014) 35 company 
lawyer77.  
86
 B Geva, ‘Systamic risk and financial stability: the evolving role of the central bank’ (2013) 28 Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 403. 
87 To see the full papers see, Bank of England, ‘Financial Policy Committee statement from its policy 
meeting, 18 September 2013’ (bankofengland.co.uk, 25th September 2013) 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/014.aspx> accessed 13th November 
2016 & Bank of England, ‘Record of the financial policy committee meetings 17 and 25 June 
2014’(bankofengland.co.uk,1st July 
2014)<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/records/fpc/pdf/2014/record1407.pdf> 
accessed 12th November 2016. 
88 Bank of England, ‘Financial Policy Committee statement on housing market powers of Direction from 
its policy meeting, 26 September 2014’ (bankofengland.co.uk, 2ed October 
2016)<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/statement021014.pdf> accessed 
12th November 2016. 
89 In June 2014 the FPC exercised its current powers of Recommendation to limit the share of lending at 
very high loan-to-income ratios to the PRA and FCA. For more information see: Bank of England, 
‘Financial Policy Committee statement on housing market powers of Direction from its policy meeting, 26 
September 2014’ (bankofengland.co.uk, 2ed October 
2016)<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/statement021014.pdf> accessed 
12th November 2016. 
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announced in June 2014 that the Bank would not impose draconian measures to cool the 
housing market unless house prices rose by more than 20% over the next three years.90  
Moreover, in order to prepare for further risks, in case the current powers did not mitigate 
the existing ones, the FPC took further steps, such as the following. 
 
3-Consulting all interested parties about the FPC’s housing market tools: 
 
This further step was taken during 2014, when the FPC decided to launch a separate 
consultation on the FPC’s housing market tools. The consultation targeted a wide range 
of housing market participants, including banks, non-bank mortgage providers, 
homebuilders, and industry bodies. Such a step by the FPC gives us an indication of the 
importance of involving housing market participants in the mechanism for decision-
making on macro-prudential policy, due to their experience in this field which rests on a 
reliable basis of information gained through operating and dealing in this area.91 In 
January 2015 HM Treasury issued a report on the details of the outcome of the FPC’s 
housing market tools consultation.92 This step will be followed by another one using the 
second kind of power, namely the Power of Direction, to mitigate the threat of systemic 
risks to the financial system.  
 
4-Setting up statutory basis for the Powers of Direction:  
 
Such a power rests on two conditions: it must be prescribed by HM Treasury and it must 
be approved by Parliament. The first condition was met by the announcement of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, expressing his intention to give the FPC “new powers over 
mortgage, including over the size of mortgage loan as a share of family incomes or the 
value of the house”,93 which was followed by consultation with the FPC in accordance 
                                            
90 J Treanor and L Elliott, ‘Bank will not act on house prices yet, says Carney’ The Guardian (London, 26 
June 2014)< http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/26/bank-of-england-limit-large-loans-
housebuyers-mortgage-lenders> accessed 15th November 2016. 
91 HM Treasury, ‘Detail of outcome for FPC’s housing market tools consultation’(gov.uk, 
January2015)<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/400448/PU
1748_Consultation_Housing_Response.pdf> accessed 12th October 2016.  
92 HM Treasury, ‘Detail of outcome for FPC’s housing market tools consultation’(gov.uk, 
January2015)<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/400448/PU
1748_Consultation_Housing_Response.pdf> accessed 12th October 2016. 
93 Gov.uk, ‘Mansion House 2014: Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’ (gov.uk,12th June 
2014)<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/mansion-house-2014-speech-by-the-chancellor-of-the-
exchequer> accessed 12th November 2016. 
- 152 - 
with section 9L (2) of the Bank of England Act 1998.94 After these procedures a draft 
order was laid down, based on section 9N of the same act.95 The second condition was 
also met by Parliamentary approval in March 2015.96 After setting up a statutory basis for 
the Powers of Direction, the FPC adopted the Powers of Direction and this did two things: 
to restrict bank and building societies’ ability to lend out more than 15% of their 
mortgages portfolios  to customers; and to prohibit lending customers more than four and 
a half times their income. However, such “measures are not nearly as draconian as they 
might have been had the FPC applied absolute loan to value or loan to income caps at an 
individual mortgage level”,97 as stated by the head of residential research at Savills UK.98   
In view of the above steps, it could be argued that such lengthy procedures indicate 
beyond doubt the UK regulators’ concern to establish a statutory basis for every new 
action or power in order to give it the needed legitimacy. Also, such procedures have 
many advantages, such as the gradation in adoption the macro-prudential policy, and 
involvement of the private sector in the decision-making procedures followed in this 
matter, along with giving the market enough scope to brace itself for the expected tougher 
action. 
It is evident, when comparing the Saudi regulators with their counterparts in the UK in 
regard to their way of adopting and applying the macro-prudential policy including the 
LTV that the latter were very careful from the start when they sought to provide a statutory 
basis before taking an action that might have an adverse impact on the UK economy. The 
main impetus and explanation for this care can be attributed to the existing principle of 
accountability, as seen above, due to the fact that the FPC is accountable to both the 
Chancellor and Parliament. This principle, of course, has pushed the FPC to take many 
steps to enable them to be sure of their concerns before raising them officially. Also, it is 
clear from that the UK regulators tried to consult the main participants in the housing 
sector and to involve them in decision-making on the macro-prudential policy, while the 
Saudi regulators did not do so. These efforts by the UK regulators were aimed at 
                                            
94 The Bank of England Act 1998.  
95 Order 2015/909. 
96HC Deb 23ed March 2015,vol 594, col 3. 
97 P Tucker, S Hall and A Pattani, ‘Macroprudential policy at the Bank of 
England’(papers.ssrn,June2013)<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2327434> accessed 
12th November 2016. 
98  Savills is a global real estate services provider listed on the London Stock Exchange. They have more 
than 700 offices and associates throughout the world, for more information about it visit their website: 
Savills, ‘About Savills’(savills.co.uk) <http://www.savills.co.uk/about-savills/> accessed 12th November 
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discovering the main participants’ opinions of the potential actions that might be taken 
by the FPC to protect the financial system.  
In the Saudi context, we have not seen such a statutory basis established by SAMA and 
its new department; rather, SAMA has unlimited authority to do whatever it wants, on the 
excuse of protecting the country’s financial system. There is no doubt about the good 
faith of the Saudi regulators in terms of protecting the Saudi economy and maintaining 
the financial system free from any risk that might pose a threat to the economy; however, 
good faith is not enough to build a good and well-structured housing finance market. 
In fact, the absence of the principle of accountability might constitute a barrier hindering 
the development of the housing finance market in Saudi, as seen, for example, when 
SAMA capped the LTV at a low ratio and thus prevented many first homebuyers from 
getting housing finance, without undertaking some process to assess the risks emerging 
in the housing sector. In contrast to the FPC’s experience in dealing with the macro-
prudential policy, SAMA failed at the beginning to increase awareness of the effect of 
the macro-prudential policy, besides which it did not release any studies revealing its 
attitude towards this policy. Also, SAMA did not consult the main participants in the 
housing sector to enable them to contribute to decision-making on this policy, which 
would have enriched the decision that was eventually made. All these steps were taken 
by the FPC, enriching the implementation of this policy and giving the market and its 
participants enough scope to prepare for the application of the policy later on. 
The supervisory authorities in the UK deserve praise for adopting statutory procedures 
surrounding the macro-prudential policy, as well as for ensuring that the FPC has the tools 
at its disposal to deal with systemic risks emerging from the housing market, should they 
arise in the future. This implies that the supervisory authorities are willing to take any 
step that might seem important later on to mitigate the adverse impact of LTV 
implementation, as will be seen from Hong Kong’s experience. 
 
5.6 Hong Kong’s experience in mitigating the impact of LTV and the 
creative method  
 
5.6.1 Overview  
 
Hong Kong’s long experience with LTV rules is partly the outgrowth of its success in 
achieving the main goal of applying macro-prudential policy, which is to maintain 
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financial stability and in the meantime to guard the banking system against overexposure 
to the property market.99 The policy environment of Hong Kong’s financial system and 
its unique mortgage market are the main determinants of the way LTV works. The 
mortgage market in Hong Kong is considered one of the most developed markets in 
Asia.100 That status is attributed to its mortgage loans, which constitute approximately 
25-30% of bank loans, and to governmental policies introduced to maintain stability in 
the housing market.101 
According to some studies, residential mortgages form a high proportion of the banking 
sector’s lending to borrowers. For example, since 1991 residential mortgages have 
accounted for at least 20 percent, reaching a peak of 37% in September 2002.102 On the 
other hand, property prices have witnessed a strong cyclical pattern in the last 30 years, 
which endanger financial stability, especially when the banking system is exposed to the 
property market.103 Nevertheless, Hong Kong’s experience in the housing market and its 
mitigation of systemic risks stemming from unstable property prices have provided strong 
evidence for the ability of Hong Kong to deal with these risks through LTV policy, taking 
into account that the financial authorities have further measures available to reduce the 
adverse impacts of the LTV policy, as will be shown later.  
 
5.6.2 The mechanism for adopting the LTV policy 
 
The mechanism for adopting the LTV policy was distinctive due to the gradual process 
of imposing this tool. It began with setting up guidelines for LTV and went on to adopt 
LTV as a long-term policy for the country. Finally, it shifted the policy from guidelines 
to compulsion, which means that all authorised financial firms are required to comply 
with the policy.  
The gradual movement from the guidelines level to the imposition level gives us an 
indication that this policy enjoys the flexibility to give the financial authorities enough 
                                            
99 D He, ‘Hong Kong’s approach to financial stability’ (2013) 9 International Journal of Central Banking 
299. 
100 K Chau, B MacGregor and G Schwann, ‘Price discovery in the Hong Kong real estate market’ (2001) 
18 Journal of Property Research 187. 
101 H Zhu, ‘The structure of housing finance markets and house prices in Asia’ (2006) BIS Quarterly Review 
(papers.ssrn,December2006)                     <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1632353> 
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102 H Se, ‘loan-to-Value as Macroprudential policy tool: experiences and lessons of Asian emerging 
countries’(2013) DsF policy paper 33. 
103 G Stefan and W Peng, ‘Bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong’ (2005) 29 Journal of Banking 
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scope to tighten and loosen the LTV policy in line with economic fundamentals. 
Meanwhile, it shows that the financial authorities in Hong Kong did not surprise the 
market with unpredictable measures in relation to such a policy; rather, they introduced 
and gave indications of what prudential measures would be adopted by the government 
in future.  
The most interesting feature of Hong Kong’s experience in respect of the LTV policy was 
that it was set as an instrument to curb hot periods in the property market and to fight 
incredible rises in housing costs,104 alongside maintaining financial stability.105 The factor 
that distinguishes Hong Kong’s experience from others is that the formulation of the LTV 
has taken two forms from 1997 up to the present. The supervisory authorities adopted two 
kinds of LTV, one to be imposed on so-called luxury properties, and the other to be 
imposed on normal properties. The definition of luxury properties was limited to 
properties coasting HK$12 million or more, but this definition is subject to review from 
time to time, due to the changes in the cost of properties.106  
There is a sense that Hong Kong’s experience with preventive LTV policies could 
succeed in containing some of the risk of boom-bust cycles.107 The questionable aspect 
of Hong Kong’s experience which needs some light shed on it is: how did Hong Kong 
manage to mitigate the drawbacks of the LTV policy, such as liquidity constraint and 
exclusion of prospective first homebuyers from access to the financial market, without 
undermining the effectiveness of the LTV ratio as a policy tool? This point will be 
explained in detail in the following section. 
 
5.6.3 Addressing the adverse impact of the LTV policy through the  
Mortgage Insurance Programme (MIP) 
 
                                            
104 C Crowe, ‘How to deal with real estate booms: lessons from country experiences’(2013) 9 Journal of 
Financial Stability 300. 
105 Also, other jurisdictions, such as China and India, Korea and Singapore have adopted the LTV policy 
for the same purposes, namely, to combat an overheating housing market and to protect financial banking. 
See: Financial Stability Board, ‘Thematic Review on Mortgage Underwriting and Origination 
Practices’( fsb.org, 17th March 2011) <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_110318a.pdf> accessed 
15th November 2016. 
106 R Craig and C Hua, ‘Determinants of Property Prices in Hong Kong SAR: Implications for Policy’ 
(imf.org, November 2011) <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11277.pdf> accessed 12th 
November 2016. 
107 M Funke and M Paetz, ‘A DSGE-based assessment of nonlinear loan-to-value policies: Evidence from 
Hong Kong’ (2012) 20. 
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The Mortgage Insurance Programme (MIP) was created by the supervisory authorities in 
Hong Kong to resolve and mitigate the liquidity constraint resulting from the LTV policy 
and to increase the rate of homeownership in the country, as the authorities stated.108 The 
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC)109 launched in 1999 a national programme 
(MIP) aiming to widen home ownership through facilitating access to the financial market 
to obtain mortgage loans. It was obvious that the LTV policy hindered many prospective 
homebuyers from getting housing finance loans, due to liquidity constraints resulting 
from the policy. Together with restricting credit growth, it was synchronised with sharply 
increasing house prices which made it more difficult for people to get mortgage loans. 
MIP programme, however, enables prospective homebuyers to gain loans at an LTV ratio 
of up to 90%, on condition of meeting many criteria set up by the HKMC and subject to 
adjustment and change from time to time.110 The mechanism of MIP programme requires 
first that all authorised banks have to comply with the LTV policy issued by the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). 
Under this mechanism, banks can afford to offer housing finance above the LTV imposed 
by the HKMA without incurring any systemic risks, due to protection by MIP. For 
example, if the banks have to comply with the current LTV policy for Hong Kong on 
properties valued at HK$7 million, the prospective homebuyer is required to make a down 
payment of 40% due to the LTV is 60%. However, with MIP he or she will be able to 
provide just 20% as down payment because the bank will provide 80% of the housing 
finance, 20% of the 80% being protected against borrower default through MIP managed 
by the HKMC. 
                                            
108 For example, Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited, which is owned by Hong Kong government 
For further information see: The Hong Kong Mortgage corporation Limited, ‘Mortgage insurance 
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Under MIP, the HKMC is the insurer while the bank is considered the insured party, with 
the housing finance borrower paying the insurance instalments.111 Therefore, in the case 
of default, the banks which provided the housing finance will be compensated, not the 
borrower. Also, it must be noted here that “the banks have the full discretion to decide 
whether and to what extent the insurance premium will be passed on to the borrower.”112 
This mechanism achieves three goals in one action: helping the prospective homebuyer 
with the down payment, protecting the bank against default by the borrower, and finally 
helping the government with its plan to widen the rate of homeownership.     
In order to disperse the credit exposure resulting from MIP, the latter is reinsured by 
private mortgage insurance companies, thus mitigating the risks that might result from 
the MIP mechanism.113 
It might be argued that such a mechanism mitigates the effectiveness of LTV and results 
in unpredictable systemic risks, due to overextended credit growth, that are assumed to 
be consequences of this mechanism. In actual fact, economic researches and studies 
carried out on this mechanism, to assess its impact on the mortgage default ratio and 
whether or not it would dampen the effectiveness of the LTV policy, have found no 
correlation between MIP and mortgage default, citing the insignificant effect of MIP on 
mortgage default behaviour in Hong Kong during the period between the middle of 1998 
and the end of 2007.114 Nevertheless, another study confirmed that HKMC should 
maintain its prudent criteria in considering MIP applications, because these criteria, along 
with the guidelines issued by KHMA to the banking industry to rein in residential 
mortgage default, will enhance the healthy development of the mortgage market.115 
The concern surrounding the role of MIP in reducing the effectiveness of the LTV policy 
was officially dissipated when HKMC confirmed, empirically, that “MIP’s portfolio 
enjoys a lower delinquency ratio than Hong Kong’s banking sector, indication that, thanks 
to prudent underwriting criteria, the MIP has not undermined the LTV policy but has 
                                            
111 The Hong Kong institute of banks, Banking Lending, (John Wiley and Sons 2012)13.  
112 The Hong Kong institute of banks, Banking Lending, (John Wiley and Sons 2012)13. 
113 L Chiquier, O Hassler and M Lea, ‘Mortgage securities in emerging markets’ 
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actually improved the stability of Hong Kong’s banking system”.116 The same study, 
however, has taken its view further, stating that the mechanism of MIP, rather than 
reducing the effectiveness of the LTV policy, as was believed, is actually enhancing the 
net benefits of the LTV policy and improving the stability of financial banking.117 
Moreover, other research economics showed that Hong Kong’s experience confirmed the 
effectiveness of MIP in mitigating the adverse impact of the LTV policy.118  
From 1999 to 2007 the loan amount approved under MIP increased from 3.23 per cent in 
1999 to 13.23 in 2007, which reflects the huge demand for this mechanism. Particularly 
from people who could not afford a high down payment and whom this mechanism 
offered an alternative solution by reducing the amount of down payment without 
incurring additional risk for the bank.119 Also, the increase in the ratio of MIP usage can 
be attributed to the low rate of rejection of applications for MIP.120     
It is clear that the success of the MIP mechanism can be attributed both to the innovation 
itself which provides additional flexibility for lenders and borrowers, and to prudent 
underwriting criteria which determine the dimensions of mortgage loans and property 
values. The former has been periodically changed and adjusted many times to reflect 
changes in the property market,121 to enable the HKMA to assess the systemic risks that 
might threaten banking stability. This indicates that the HKMA has access to the real 
estate market and property values, which helps them to make good decisions about either 
the LTV ratio or the eligibility criteria for MIP, because good decisions rely on accurate 
information.   
As mentioned earlier, despite there being no statistical evidence of the relationship 
between the mortgage default rate and the MIP mechanism, many studies have asserted 
the importance of maintaining the HKMC’s prudent criteria in guidelines to the banking 
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industry because of the role that they play in reducing the rate of mortgage default.122 
This might explain the integrity of the success of the MIP mechanism: it can be attributed 
to good co-operation between the HKMA, which issues the LTV policy guidelines, and 
the HKMC, which designs the eligibility criteria, together achieving an optimal result in 
practice. However, it is questionable whether good co-operation between two entities can 
be easily achieved, or whether a specific environment needs to exist in order to gain that 
result.  
In fact, the good co-operation between HKMA and HKMC may be explained by their 
both falling under the regime of the government in Hong Kong. Despite the HKMC being 
considered a corporation, it is wholly owned by the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region Government through the Exchange Fund.123 This governmental structure might 
explain the strong correlation between HKMA and HKMC in relation to the issuance of 
prudential regulations which achieve the main goals of both the LTV policy and the MIP 
mechanism, without incurring further risks that threaten banking stability.  
  
5.7 Conclusion  
 
The chapter has sought to develop the regulatory framework for regulating the housing 
finance market in general, and for adoption of the LTV in particular. Also, the chapter 
has sought to draw from the experience of two developed jurisdictions, the UK and Hong 
Kong in dealing with the macro-prudential policy, of which the LTV in one element.   
The analytical study of the formulation and application of article (12) of the RREFL 
confirms that there are three consequences: the mismatch between the main aims of 
enacting the housing finance laws 2012 and their implementation in connection with the 
LTV, the lack of cooperation between the competent Saudi authorities in the housing 
finance market; and the absence of an alternative solution with which to address the 
possible adverse impacts of the LTV. These consequences in turn suggest the existence 
of a defect in the regulatory framework for the regulating the housing finance market. 
This defect was confirmed when the chapter shed light on the process of adopting the 
macro-prudential policy, including the LTV, in the UK and Hong Kong.  
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For all above considerations, five lessons can be learned from the analytical study and the 
experiences of the UK and Hong Kong:  
1-There is no doubt that capping the LTV at 70% is a really massive challenge for first 
homebuyers in Saudi Arabia, a country that suffers from a low rate of homeownership 
with no alternative rational solution proposed by either official authorities or the private 
sector to facilitate for people the access to the financial market without incurring 
additional obligations. In fact, the situation in Saudi became more difficult with the sharp 
fall in oil prices, the budget’s main resource, an event which will definitely impact on 
individuals’ incomes since the government’s launch, at the beginning of 2015, of austerity 
measures including some job cuts, abolition of bonuses and reduction in salaries:124 
measures that made it more difficult for individuals to save a 30% deposit. It could be 
argued that the austerity policy might cause house prices to fall, making homes more 
affordable. This argument might be true to some extent, but it is difficult to compare the 
impact of the austerity policy on Saudi family incomes with the effect on house prices, 
because the latter is potential while the former is certain. The situation of Saudi families 
became much worse, unfortunately, when as recently as October 2016 the Saudi 
government adopted additional harsh austerity policies, including but not limited to a 
reduction in salaries, in some cases by more than 50%, which of course will reflect 
negatively on the Saudi family’s ability to save 30% as a deposit on the purchase of a 
house. 
2- The UK’s experience in respect of the legal procedures and gathering of information 
before making a decision about the LTV shows a clear divergence between Saudi and the 
UK. However, certain common threads exist between the UK and Hong Kong which 
sharply distinguish them from Saudi, such as the good cooperation between the competent 
authorities in housing finance market.  
Both countries; the UK and Hong Kong, clearly demonstrate good cooperation between 
the financial authorities, that are in charge of adopting such a policy, and the government, 
whether the cooperation is shown by the government’s willingness to participate in 
decision-making while enabling the financial authorities to apply the policy in question, 
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including the mechanisms that they created to help people with housing finance, as seen 
in the UK, or by joint effort to resolve the adverse impact of the LTV, as seen in Hong 
Kong. Such cooperation does not exist in Saudi, where SAMA seems to work apart from 
other government agencies, regardless of the cost impact of its decisions. This issue can 
be addressed by the suggested committee.125  
3- There remains the really vexed issue of how to develop the housing finance market 
while SAMA enjoys total independence and immunity for all its decisions, for example 
regarding the macro-prudential policy. Therefore, good cooperation between the 
government and SAMA with regard to the housing sector is required to achieve 
favourable results for all parties. It is recognised as obvious that, even if SAMA is 
independent as a matter of law, it is necessary to couple that independence with 
accountability. To do that, it was suggested that an independent committee, emulating the 
FPC’s composition, be established to exercise the function of applying the macro-
prudential policy, and that the committee be made accountable to the Economics and 
Development Affairs Council (EDAC).  
4- The nature of macro-prudential policy, and in particular the LTV tool, subjects such 
tools to change and adjustment based on political and economic circumstances which 
require the financial authority to review the LTV ratio and adjust it regularly. By contrast, 
legislation by nature is designed to be as permanent as possible because frequent 
amendments and changes to the legal role would mitigate the nature on legislation. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that the provision of article (12) be removed, while all the 
provisions of RREFL for regulating the provisions associated with real estate finance, 
including its participants and activities, etc., be retained. With regard to the macro-
prudential policy including the LTV ratio, it is suggested that guidelines be enacted as 
issued by the proposed committee, which will be able, according to statutory powers to 
be granted to it, to review and adjust the LTV ratio when it is deemed necessary.    
5- Regarding the adverse impact low ratio of the LTV, it could be resolved by emulating 
Hong Kong’s experiences in mitigating the LTV’s adverse impact and applying the MIP 
mechanism in Saudi, as long as both jurisdictions enjoy a number of common features in 
terms of monetary policies and the real estate market, as mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter. These similar circumstances in the two jurisdictions might pave the way for 
an attempt to transfer the MIP from Hong Kong to Saudi. As was seen above, the provider 
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 See section 5.4.1. 
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of this programme is a company wholly owned by the government, while being based on 
the criteria eligibility issued by HKMC, and that arrangement could be applied in Saudi 
as long as there are no potential legal obstacles to such an attempt.
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Chapter Six: The development of housing finance and securitisation; is 
there a need to reform the housing finance laws?   
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to determine whether or not Saudi needs to launch a securitisation 
market, which has been broadly defined as “the transformation of an illiquid asset … into 
tradable securities with a secondary market”,1 in order to develop the housing finance 
market in the light of current economic and political circumstances. The chapter will then 
ask what legal changes are needed to launch a securitisation market in the country. This 
question can be explored through determination of three legal defects which require 
further examination and discussion: the failure of article (17) of the Real Estate Finance 
Law 2012 to establish a legal basis for securitisation, inasmuch as an entity that should 
perform the function of securitisation is prevented from carrying out an important process 
within it, namely issuing bonds; uncertainty surrounding specification within the Saudi 
legal system of property rights in the event of a borrower’s default; and finally the failure 
of the housing finance laws 2012 to identify transparency as an important criterion in 
securitisation. Then the chapter will offer legal recommendations for addressing the 
named defects.  
To do this the chapter is divided into the following sections: (6.1) is the introduction to 
the chapter; section two (6.2) will discuss the nature of securitisation, its function and 
advantages; section three (6.3) analyses the securitisation’s role and causes in the global 
financial crisis 2007-2008 and why securitisation acquired a bad name as a result of the 
crisis; section four (6.4) will examine the importance of establishing a securitisation 
market in Saudi; section five (6.5) will examine the failure of article (17) of the Real 
Estate Finance Law 2012 to establish a legal basis for securitisation, since within it an 
entity that should perform the function of securitisation is prevented from carrying out an 
important process within securitisation, namely issuing bonds. However, to do this the 
section needs to examine the main participants in the securitisation process, their roles, 
and then the reasons why article (17) is considered a barrier to the exercise of 
securitisation in Saudi. Section six (6.6) will discuss the Saudi legal system and the 
                                            
1 Integrated Financial Engineering, Mortgage securitization: lessons for emerging markets (PD&R 
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uncertainty surrounding specification of property rights in the event of the borrower’s 
default in the securitisation process. Section seven (6.7) will attempt to answer the 
question: why did the housing finance laws 2012 fail to deal with the issue of transparency 
in securitisation and what should they do to remedy that failure? And finally, section eight 
(6.8) presents the conclusion of this chapter 
 
6.2 The nature of securitisation, its function and advantages  
 
Since the well-developed primary residential housing finance market increases 
homeownership and in turn contributes to both economic and political stability, the 
securitisation market plays a crucial role in helping the primary market to achieve those 
goals. The securitisation market serves the primary market in its function by separating 
the housing finance investment and origination functions.2 Such a separation will achieve 
aims such as increasing the number of investors, providing liquidity, etc.3  
Although security and return on the funds to be invested are very important components 
for the investors, the need for liquidity in the investors’ portfolio is also pressing. The 
main features of the housing finance market do not provide the feature of liquidity for 
investors.4 This contrasts with the provisions available for competing investments such 
as corporate securities, related either to equity or debt, which are supported and enhanced 
by a well-developed securitisation market. Also, purchasers of securities in securitisation 
market know that their investment can be instantaneously converted into money when 
they wish, taking into account the possibility of loss or gain according to the situation of 
the market.5 This feature of corporate securities makes such markets attractive for 
investors, whether small, medium or even large, who are looking for security and liquidity 
alike.  
Given to the lack of liquidity in the housing finance market, which makes investors avoid 
such investment, it was suggested that the housing finance market be developed and its 
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position improved through creation of an effective securitisation market which would 
enhance the ability of the market to cater to the desire of investors to gain liquidity at any 
time. Such development and improvement depend on finding a way to enables converting 
housing finance (mortgage) into units that can be traded to satisfy the investors’ wish for 
both liquidity and security.6  
It might be noted from the above explanation that the essence of securitisation is mainly 
premised on conversion of home mortgage into liquidity. The mechanism of conversion 
occurs in the secondary mortgage market, which is defined
7 as the ‘ability of mortgage 
investors, in an organised fashion either to dispose of mortgage in their portfolios through 
sale or to convert such mortgages into securities acceptable to other segments of the 
investing public, directly or indirectly’,
8  in many stages and involves many participants, 
as will be shown later, in contrast to the primary mortgage market whose transactions 
take place between borrowers and lenders.9  
The creation of a securitisation has a significant impact on housing finance transactions 
through the advantages provided to the main participants in the securitisation: lenders, 
borrowers, investors and even the government.10 For example, the securitisation market 
grants banks an advantage that does not exist in the primary housing finance market, 
where lenders have the ability to originate loans but then sell them to more appropriate 
long-term investors.11 The former advantage entails another, which is the lenders’ ability 
to remove loans from their balance sheet12 to lower the capital requirement introduced by 
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the Basel Committee and to expand room for more loan activities and lending.13 In 
addition, securitisation provides liquidity for lenders, which makes the mortgages much 
less risky since the liquidity lowers the risk surrounding the potential for borrower’s 
default.14 Issuing new loans due to the liquidity resulting from a securitisation is likely to 
increase income from loan origination fees through making new loans.15 With respect to 
the risk, the securitisation provides another advantage for the lenders as originators, by 
reducing the lenders’ risk in holding the loans, even long after they were originated.16 
The securitisation also extends its advantages to borrowers, since the lower risk resulting 
from the flow of liquidity into the primary market, which would otherwise be excluded 
from that market, means that lenders can charge a lower margin on loans that they issue. 
This is certain to reflect positively on borrowers and in turn increase the affordability of 
homeownership due to the reduction in the cost of borrowing.17 Moreover, the funds 
resulting from securitisation are likely to enhance and at the same time facilitate access 
to the housing finance market due to the amount of liquidity that would cater to some 
extent to the huge demand for housing finance loans.18 
The most surprising finding in terms of the benefits provided by securitisation market is, 
as mentioned by some studies, its contribution to society at large, in that by increasing 
access to capital it increases opportunities for homeownership, which in turn tends to 
enhance political stability.19 Separation of the mortgage origination and investment 
functions may allow for greater stability in the banking system due to the opportunity 
provided by securitisation for the originators of a mortgage to dispose of it and gain 
liquidity instead, reducing the risk associated with potential borrower default.20 
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6.3 Analysing Securitisation’s role in the causes of the global financial 
crisis 2007-2008 
 
Securitisation sometime involves a very risky institution called sub-prime lending, or 
sometimes sub-prime mortgages, which came into existence in the early 1980s in the US. 
This risky institution, sub-prime lending, serves borrowers who would not meet the 
criteria for getting housing finance, or in other words who have poor credit histories; by 
enabling borrowers to get the housing finance they require but that they would not obtain 
under normal lending conditions.21 Usually, borrowers with poor credit histories are able 
to get housing finance loans through the mechanism of sub-prime lending at a higher 
interest rate, to offset the lenders’ exposure to the risk of borrower default.22    
From the mid-1990s, sub-prime lending flourished and became an important fiscal 
innovation, enabling the US government to expand the homeownership rate while 
providing an alternative financial solution for lenders seeking to expand their 
operations.23 To understand the expansion in sub-prime lending in the US it might be 
useful to glance at its growth during the 1990s and up to 2006. For instance, in 1997, it 
was expected that approximately 5% of all mortgages originated were sub-prime, a 
percentage that increased to 20% in 2005. Also, the total dollar amount of the sub-prime 
mortgage loans originated in 2001 was $57 billion, increasing in 2006 to $375 billion,
24 
while estimates suggest that the value of sub-prime lending was over $600 billion in 
2006.25   
The most significant government contributed to the success of this fiscal innovation, the 
most noticeable element playing a crucial role in this field is the pair of government-
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sponsored housing enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are the giants of the 
home mortgage industry and were the first and are still by far the biggest purchasers of 
mortgages on the securitisation market in the US.
26 Established by Congress in 1938 and 
1970 respectively to develop the housing finance market, their mission was to increase 
opportunities for homeownership by means of enhanced market liquidity.
27 They operate 
in two distinct lines of business, mortgage-backed securitisation, which will be defined 
later, and retained mortgage portfolios. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase and 
transform sets of whole mortgage loans into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) which 
are then sold to capital market investors (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac investors-held 
MBS).
28 At the same time Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantee these MBS against the 
risk of default, in return for which they obtain an annual guarantee fee. In 2007 both 
entities owned or guaranteed about 40% of outstanding home mortgage debt in the United 
States.
29
 
The above figures and information give us an indication of the role played by 
securitisation, especially sub-prime lending, in increasing access to the housing finance 
system to obtain housing finance, which in turn promoted homeownership. However, the 
increase in house prices as a consequence of the excessive lending caused by the 
expansion of originated sub-prime mortgages helped to build up the bubble in the housing 
market. Rising house prices, in turn, enhanced the appetite of lenders to lend to more 
people with poor credit histories in the expectation that if those borrowers defaulted, the 
lenders could offset their losses by selling houses without incurring any actual loss.30 
However, this expectation was not accurate because huge numbers of sub-prime 
borrowers failed to fulfil their financial obligations, the reason for which will be explained 
later. Consequently, investors resorted to selling houses to satisfy the debt, but the issue 
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here was that the housing bubble burst when house prices were exposed to collapse, so 
that lenders faced the loss of their credit and loans.31 
A number of researches and reports pointed to the role played by securitisation in the run-
up to the global financial crisis 2007.32 It  could be argued that securitisation acquired a 
bad name as a result of the financial crisis in 2007/2008, due to three main factors: weak 
underwriting standards in the securitisation of sub-prime mortgages; the technical 
sophistication and complexity of securitisation, which led to misunderstanding of the risk 
inherent in this fiscal innovation; and finally, the complaint that Credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) are financially incentivised to give a particular securities issue a good ranking 
because they are paid by the issuer of the securities. 
The first reason, the deterioration in underwriting standards, was observed following the 
adoption of several processes related to monetary policies in order to withstand the 2001 
recession caused by the destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York on September 
11, 2001.33 For example, in the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Centre, stock 
market turmoil around the whole world motivated the US Federal Reserve and its 
counterparts to inject billions of American dollars into the banking system to facilitate 
lending and reassure the markets.34 At the same time the US Federal Reserve reduced 
interest rates in order to enhance economic growth. With ample liquidity and low interest 
rates reaching 1% in 2003, the environment was conducive to increased operations and 
expanded activities by lenders. These circumstances, helped potential borrowers with 
poor credit histories to finally have a chance to obtain a mortgage through sub-prime 
securitisation techniques. These encouraging conditions for lending and borrowing led 
both lenders and borrowers to take riskier decisions, helped by the deterioration in 
underwriting standards for sub-prime mortgages. While the borrowers gained credit at 
high interest rates to offset their poor credit histories, it was recorded that mortgage 
brokers, who originated sub-prime mortgages, provided mortgage loans by the sub-prime 
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mortgage mechanism without requiring adequate documentation of the income and assets 
available to service the mortgages.35 
In fact, the above practice of mortgage brokers represents a form of the weakened 
underwriting standards which might be considered among the many factors contributing 
to the global financial crisis 2007 during the run-up to it. The only explanation for 
mortgage brokers incurring the underlying risks involved in these actions is the belief that 
those risks could be disposed of by selling those sub-prime mortgages to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac which were pushed, at that time, by Congress and the Bush Administration 
to accumulate sub-prime mortgages and so increase the homeownership rate.
36
In turn, 
when the giant intermediaries Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought these subprime 
mortgages, they securitised them and sold some in the securitisation market while holding 
others in their own portfolios.37  
Although the above practice weakened underwriting standards by granting potential 
borrowers the chance to obtain a mortgage despite poor credit histories, it also exposed 
them to another issue which is a predatory lending. Predatory lending can be described as 
providing a loan to a borrower with no capacity to repay it,
38 a course of action that has 
played a significant role in generating the global crisis 2007. 
The predatory lending represents in the imposition of high fees on sub-prime mortgages 
which sometimes in conjunction with repeated refinancing of a loan within a short period 
of time have led to increased risk of foreclosure.
39
 The prime borrowers, sometimes, may 
not have had the capacity to assess clearly the risk involved in the sub-prime mortgage 
which exposes them to predatory lending. That risk resides in the fact that interest rates 
in some kinds of sub-prime mortgages can increase substantially after an initial period of 
between one month and two years from the start of the agreement, without the borrowers 
recognising the threat. This substantial increase in interest rates, of course, affects sub-
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prime borrowers’ creditworthiness as the monthly instalments will increase, leaving them 
unable to fulfil these new financial obligations.40  
The legislators, however, have recognised this issue and attempted to curb predatory 
lending through the federal Home Ownership and Equity protection Act (HOEA) which 
classified the mortgage loan with high interest rates and fees as potentially a form of 
predatory lending. Although the HOEA has incorporated consumer protection provisions, 
including but not limited to disclosure requirements of the mortgage contracts, the sub-
prime mortgage borrowers are still exposed to predatory lending.
41  
The second source of securitisation’s bad name is its complexity and sophistication. The 
rationale for weakened underwriting standards, despite the risks involved, was that this 
kind of investment was attractive for lenders due to the high yield it offered, while the 
underlying risks were transferred to investors who were also looking for high yields. 
Unfortunately, investors based their decision to buy such securitisations on the triple-A 
ratings which were granted by the Credit rating Agencies CRAs. The CRAs’ primary 
function is to assess the creditworthiness of a company and its debt obligations through 
issuing credit ratings in order to help investors judge the credit risks before investing in 
the markets,
42 at face value of these securitisations regardless of the risks they entailed.  
The financial crisis 2007 has confirmed that investors failed to appreciate risks and acted 
irrationally when they invested in securitisations which met their criteria for investment 
and their appetite for ever-higher yields.43 The crisis also confirmed that investors over-
relied on credit rating agencies which provided triple-A ratings for all securitisation 
products even those belonging to sub-prime borrowers.44 The irrationality of investors’ 
actions was criticised by the G20s’ declaration at the Summit of the financial markets and 
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the world economy: ‘during a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and 
prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yield without an 
adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence ... weak 
underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and 
opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create 
vulnerabilities in the system’.45 
The third reason why securitisation has a bad name lies in the CRAs’ role in the economic 
meltdown of 2007. Although there are nearly 150 local and international credit rating 
agencies worldwide, the largest CRAs, which are dominant in this industry, are Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch.
46
 These giant agencies’ wide experience and 
professionalism qualified them as the most powerful players in many business 
transactions, leading to complaints about the CRAs’ unlimited power in the markets.
47
 
For instance, the New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman described in 1996 the 
power enjoyed by one of the three giant agencies in these words: “There are two 
superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United States and there’s 
Moody’s bond rating service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and 
Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear 
sometimes who’s more powerful.”
48 This remark might epitomise the major complaints 
about the superpower status enjoyed by the CRAs, and it became clear at the time that 
there were grave fears about the effectiveness of the principle of accountability in relation 
to these entities which seemed set to dominate the financial world.   
The business of CRAs is “the issuance of credit ratings for the purposes of evaluating the 
credit risk of issuers of debt and debt-like securities”.
49
 In other words, the CRAs’ primary 
function is to assess the creditworthiness of a company and its debt obligations through 
issuing credit ratings in order to help investors judge the credit risks before investing in 
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the markets.
50
 Therefore, it could be argued that CRAs play a very important role in both 
financial and capital markets. Nevertheless, it might be argued that their role in financial 
markets is controversial and has raised some concerns regarding their complex 
relationship with the main players in the markets, namely issuers of corporate securities, 
investors, and banks. Therefore, the CRAs have been subjected to the criticisms before 
and after the financial crisis 2007, as will be shown below. 
Prior to the economic meltdown in 2007, the CRAs were attacked in general criticisms 
incorporating the following points. First, imperfect competition has resulted from the size 
of the largest CRAs (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) which enjoy the largest 
share, 95%, of the market, while other credit rating agencies share the rest.
51 The second 
criticism is the slow reaction of the CRAs in adjusting their ratings to changes in corporate 
creditworthiness. For instance, the giant energy corporation Enron’s creditworthiness was 
confirmed by the CRAs on November 2001; then on December 2001 Enron was failed 
for bankruptcy.
52
 Finally, it was argued that the mechanism of CRAs’ function made it 
liable to the charge of lack of independence, due to their practice of selling ratings to 
firms that hire them to rate their creditworthiness.
53
 This conflict of interest presents a big 
challenge, making CRAs vulnerable to criticism, as will be shown later.   
After the global financial crisis 2007, however, the CRAs have faced censure based on 
the prevailing belief that they played a significant role in generating the crisis. In general, 
the criticisms can be placed in two categories: 
1. Conflict of interest: it is evident from the nature of the CRAs’ business that the 
mechanism of their function reveals a lack of independence and potential conflict of 
interest because they are paid by their clients to provide ratings of issuers of securities. 
This complex relationship between CRAs and their clients raises concerns that CRAs 
might be encouraged to issue a high rating in order to avoid displeasing the clients, 
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who pay for this rating. In fact, this concern was noted prior to the global financial 
crisis 2007. In response to this criticism CRAs have defended themselves by saying 
that they pay more attention to their business, which depends on their reputation, 
while the amount they receive from a particular issuer is small in comparison to 
overall income.
54
 
A clear example emerged from the global financial crisis 2007, showing the extent to 
which the complex relationship between CRAs and their clients might influence their 
professionalism and at the same time strengthen the concern over potential conflict of 
interest. The US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) civil fraud case 
against Goldman Sachs produced a record of emails exchanged over 16 months which 
revealed that Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s were pressurised into giving Abacus 
2007
55
 a much better rating than the CRAs knew they deserved.
56 The CRAs rated the 
securities that were issued by Goldman AAA and then sold to investors who were 
misled by this rating before the disaster occurred and the incorrect rating was 
discovered. 
2. Slow interaction to downgrade the securities: it was observed prior and post the 
global financial crisis 2007 that CRAs failed to recognise the decline of the issuers’ 
creditworthiness before the market did. The CRAs usually downgraded the issuers’ 
ratings after the markets recognised that their creditworthiness had deteriorated.
57
 For 
example, in fall and winter 2006-2007 a wave of early payment defaults on mortgage 
based securities (MBS) which were rated by CRAs spread throughout the US markets, 
but the CRAs did not begin large-scale revision of the creditworthiness of those 
securities, and downgrading of the rating where necessary, until the summer of 2007, 
after the global financial crisis had occurred.
58
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For all the above considerations, securitisation acquired a bad name in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis 2007 due to the role it played in the run-up to the crisis, which 
required regulators to regulate some aspects of securitisation that posed a threat to the 
financial system. Therefore, the Saudi legislator needs to take great care when considering 
launching such a market in the country. This raises the question: why does Saudi really 
need to launch a securitisation market despite its risks and complexity? 
 
6.4 The importance of establishing a securitisation market in Saudi  
 
The development of the housing finance market requires an increase in the number of 
investors and of course in the amount of capital in the market that is available to cater for 
the demand for housing finance operations. These features, if realised in the development 
of the housing finance market, will increase competition which in turn will lead to more 
choices and lower costs for borrowers. Homeownership will become cheaper and more 
affordable so that the rate of homeownership will increase.  
The remarkable increase in housing demand following the positive state of the Saudi 
economy, as well as the booming numbers of people both locally and nationally, make 
Saudi an attractive housing market for national and foreign real estate developers, 
investors, financial institutions and multinational construction companies. Also, the 
enactment of the housing finance laws 2012 has opened the door for banks and financial 
institutions to increase their operations in housing finance to cater for the huge popular 
demand in this area. 
However, the circumstances have changed and placed some obstructions against that 
door. The fall in oil prices, which are considered the main source of the government’s 
budget, alongside engagement in the Yemen war,
59 have imposed fundamentally high 
costs, having a significant impact on the governmental budget, and thus, of course, on the 
Saudi economy. Therefore, the Saudi government is currently forced to borrow from 
national and international lenders in order to meet its fiscal obligations.60 It must be noted 
here that the increase in government borrowing is likely to increase the ratio between 
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government debt and the gross domestic product (GDP), which in turn will expose the 
government’s rating to the risk of downgrade by credit rating agencies.61  
Due to all the above geopolitical and economic circumstances, the securitisation market 
emerges as a good solution for developing the housing finance market so as to cater to 
the desires of both the Saudi government and the financial market. There are three main 
reasons for this.     
The first reason supporting the idea of establishing a securitisation market in Saudi is the 
Saudi government’s intention to become a regulator of the housing finance market, rather 
than a financer, to avoid incurring any fiscal obligation. The above geopolitical and 
economic circumstances have forced the government to adopt austerity policies to deal 
with the potential deficit in its budget and to carry out its plans and policies internationally 
and nationally. The austerity policies include, for example, ceasing to offer interest-free 
housing loans to those who have been waiting for more than 15 years to gain such loans 
from Real Estate Development Fund (REDF). The government’s reason for this step lies 
in its intention to transform REDF from an entity providing interest-free loans to a 
company owned by the government which provides housing finance loans with interest.62 
It could be argued that the government might be committing a sin when the REDF 
provides housing finance loans with interest. However, this argument is not quite correct, 
since the government is likely to avoid committing Riba, which is considered a sin and 
forbidden under the general teachings of Islamic law, by applying some of the Islamic 
finance transactions that offer borrowers the desired finance but avoid Riba such as: 
Ijarah muntahia be tamlieak.
63
       
These austerity policies and others – especially Saudi Vision 2030, which  explicitly 
signals the government’s intention to pave the way for the private sector to perform many 
functions formerly the preserve of government – might be considered a gesture indicating 
that the government aims to be a regulator rather than a financer and thus to avoid 
incurring any fiscal obligation. In light of these circumstances, securitisation emerges as 
a good solution of a tool serving the private sector by catering to its need for liquidity and 
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to some extent offering cheap housing finance loans for borrowers, while enabling the 
government to avoid further fiscal obligation.    
The Saudi Government’s intention to become a regulator rather than a financer of the 
housing finance market, was explicitly signalled by the Saudi Vision 2030; this indicated 
the Saudi Government’s desire to copy the American model of  housing finance (in that  
the US government became a regulator rather than a financer). In particular, the legislative 
authority in Saudi explicitly stated when drafting the housing finance laws 2012 that the 
laws were inspired by US’s experience in  dealing with the housing finance market and 
especially with the securitisation market. 
The example of the US in the housing field and outsourcing of securitisation revealed that 
the government’s role became that of regulator rather than financer, which of course 
prevents it from assuming the burden of additional fiscal obligations. There, the 
government’s policy was to create a legal and regulatory environment that enabled the 
private sector to flourish while its own role in providing housing for people remained 
really modest.64 The US government’s intervention in housing was minimal where it was 
believed that the best way to increase homeownership was through paving the way for 
the private sector to contribute in this field while retaining the government’s role to 
legislate and control the sector.  
Such a successful experience in the housing finance sector, which did not incur fiscal 
liabilities for the US government, supports the idea of introducing securitisation in Saudi, 
particularly in present circumstances, when the government faces fiscal difficulties due 
to the collapse of oil prices. The latter problem has expanded to create another issue 
hindering housing finance activities, and of course revives consideration of the launch of 
securitisation: namely, liquidity constraint,
65 as will be explained below. 
The second reason supporting the idea of establishing securitisation in Saudi is the lack 
sources of liquidity due to current economic circumstances which increase the cost of 
borrowing and place much pressure on liquidity. The oil price collapse has led to a drop 
in the government’s revenue which reduced its deposits in national banks, tightening 
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liquidity and forcing lenders to raise borrowing costs.66 A study on the impact of the 
decline in oil prices on the Saudi economy, published by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), showed that “a 1 percent decline in oil prices leads to a 0.3-0.4 percent decline in 
credit growth, a 0.1-0.2 percent decline in deposit growth, and higher nonperforming 
loans”.67 Historically, it has been observed in terms of the relationship between deposits 
and oil prices that lower oil prices reduce income and deposit flows, whether from the 
government, business or individuals. Therefore, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) has taken further steps to ease the rules on bank lending, in order to stimulate 
growth in liquidity, by permitting banks to lend the equivalent of 90% of their deposits, 
up from the former policy which gave permission to lend just 85%: thus easing liquidity 
constraints, as mentioned.68 However, the sustained low level of oil prices seems to have 
had a huge negative impact, even beyond what was expected, as seen by the Fitch rating 
service agency having recently downgraded 7 Saudi banks, “because of a weakening 
operating environment, resulting in lower loan growth, impacting earnings and 
profitability and asset quality, ultimately leading to a reduction in capital ratios”.69  
An increase in oil prices is not the only way to resolve liquidity constraint, despite being 
considered a significant remedy for the Saudi economy, because such a solution is subject 
to complicated political and economic circumstances which make it difficult to rely on it. 
This requires us to think outside the box to create a mechanism that will raise finance 
without resorting to deposits that suffer from scarce liquidity. Saudi’s history in particular 
shows us that the government has adopted some financial means of addressing the 
liquidity shortage; for example, late in 2002 the Saudi Telecom Company was 30% 
privatised, creating a huge government fund.70 
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The liquidity shortages represents a big challenge for the lenders to expand their 
operations in lending, therefore, in some economic circumstances, lenders, including 
banks and financial institutions, face issues surrounding deposits, because depositors may 
prefer to place their money in mutual funds and other investments that pay higher interest 
rather than keep it in local banks and financial institutions that pay less interest. This 
practice by depositors can expose lenders, whether local banks or financial institutions, 
to liquidity shortages which of course will minimise their capacity to lend.71 Such practice 
from depositors and other economic circumstance that cause to the liquidity shortage 
might limit the capacity of lenders to expand their operations in lending. In the light of 
these considerations, the securitisation could emerge to address these liquidity shortages.  
For example, in the late 1960s, the huge demand for mortgages in the US, combined with 
limited liquidity, encouraged banks and financial institutions to develop securitisation to 
provide cheaper funding and enable them to raise finance faster without the need to rely 
on deposits.72  
The third and last reason supporting the idea of establishing a securitisation market in 
Saudi is the high cost of borrowing in Saudi.73 The high cost of borrowing might be 
attributed to the systemic risks regarding the borrowers which might lead to an increase 
in the rate of default. However, this argument might be acceptable if the banks had no 
assurances when they concluded housing finance agreements, but the current operation 
reveals that Saudi banks, required by SAMA, look for all these assurances, including but 
not limited to: a high down payment equal to 30%, verification of the customers’ credit 
histories, and the requirement for a full valuation of a property. These assurances are 
enough theoretically to reduce the systemic risks and of course to grant the required credit 
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at low cost; however, the borrowing cost is still high and is likely to prevent those wishing 
to own a home from gaining access to the housing finance market.  
It could be argued, therefore, that the explanation for the high cost of borrowing can be 
found in Saudi monetary policy and its effects on the cost of borrowing, as will be 
discussed below.  
Generally speaking, Saudi monetary policy is for openness of the economy and the 
country has a pegged exchange rate system whereby the Riyal, which is the currency of 
Saudi, is effectively pegged to the US dollar.74 This means that Saudi Arabia’s financial 
market is highly integrated with the US market and that therefore SAMA, as the country’s 
central bank, follows the US Federal Reserve’s interest-rate moves whether they increase 
or decrease.75 Such a policy influences the so-called Saudi Interbank Offered Rate 
(SIBOR), which represents the interest rates at which banks offer to lend unsecured funds 
to other banks in Saudi.
76 This in turn increases the cost of borrowing between banks and 
of course is reflected in the cost of providing loans to both businesses and individuals. 
Therefore, when SAMA announced in December 2015 that it was raising the interest rates 
for the first time since 2009,77 matching the US Federal Reverse’s move,78 the result was 
an increase in the SIBOR. In other words the borrowing cost between local banks 
operating in Saudi will be increased, which of course reflects on the borrowing cost, 
which is supposed to increase as a consequence of increasing SIBOR.79 A study published 
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by SAMA revealed that the rise in the SIBOR would, theoretically, have negative impacts 
on consumption and investment which should decline due to the high cost of finance.80  
The mechanism of borrowing additional funds to increase mortgage lending activities 
might explain the role played by SIBOR in increasing the cost of borrowing in Saudi. 
Usually, most mortgage lending institutions, including banks, borrow capital in the short-
term credit markets to increase mortgage lending through the SIBOR mechanism; 
however, they hold such loans in their portfolios as long-term investments.  
The issue with the former action is that it encourages higher interest rates in a short-term 
credit market, and this exposes lenders to the risk that any return might be less than the 
cost of their capital. To address this issue the securitisation market can help reduce the 
cost of borrowing by offering lenders alternative sources of liquidity without the need to 
borrow through SIBOR. 
The US experience in the secondary mortgage market in general and in securitisation in 
particular has played a significant role in reducing the cost of borrowing, by offering 
mortgage lenders an alternative mechanism for creating funds without resorting to 
borrowing at high interest rates.
81
  
For all the above reasons, it could be said that the launching securitisation in the light of 
above circumstances might help the improvement of the housing finance activities to 
address the liquidity shortage and lower the capital adequacy requirements. However, 
from legal perspective, the housing finance laws of 2012, which pave the way to 
establishing securitisation, are supposed to begin with fundamental legal issues about 
securitisation. In particular, much ink has been spilt over the causes and shortcomings 
surrounding the financial crisis 2007, attracting attention from scholars and policy makers 
alike and leading us to wonder whether the Saudi legislator has resolved such issues 
through the provisions of the housing finance laws 2012.82 The question emerges here as 
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to whether or not the legislative and government initiatives to launch a securitisation 
market are enough to design a well-developed market, avoiding the main causes of the 
run-up to the global financial crisis 2007.    
Around four years have passed since the enactment of the Real Estate Finance Law 2012 
(REFL),83 which included provisions that pave the way for the establishment of a 
securitisation market, followed by the announcement to make a partnership between the 
Public Investment Fund (PIF) in Saudi and the Boston Consulting Group to help design 
a government-owned entity similar to America’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with the 
purpose of developing a securitisation market for home loans.84 However, this chapter 
argued that such legislation and government initiatives are not sufficient to launch and 
develop a well-structured market due to three issues that remain unaddressed: the failure 
of Article (17) of the Real Estate Finance Law 2012 to establish a legal basis for 
securitisation, specification of property rights in the event of borrower default, and finally 
the lack of legislation addressing transparency in securitisation. The aim of discussing 
these issues is to develop a healthy environment for housing finance, which would 
provide low cost borrowing while protecting the rights of all parties and mitigating the 
risks of securitisation, as well as learning from others' experience and avoiding their 
mistakes.  
 
6.5 The failure of Article (17) of the Real Estate Finance Law 2012 to 
establish a legal basis for securitisation 
 
Before shedding light on article (17) of the Real Estate Finance Law, it is necessary to 
understand the process of securitisation and the main participants in the process. 
Securitisation plays a significant role in the secondary mortgage market, attracting much 
attention and observation from economists and legislator alike, as it is considered an 
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engine which starts off the secondary mortgage market. Securitisation entails “the process 
of repacking larger sized and illiquid instruments into smaller and more liquid instruments 
that can be traded”.85 In fact, the mechanism of securitisation involves many stages and 
participants, as will be examined below.    
The operation goes through five stages, beginning with the primary mortgage market and 
ending with the secondary market, while participation in this operation involves some or 
all of the following parties: borrowers, primary lenders,86 mortgage-backed security 
(MBS) issuers (originators),87 servicers,88 guarantor,89 and investors.90  
To simplify the mechanism of securitisation one might say that it combines individuals’ 
loans into a pool and then uses them as collateral for bonds. To explain it in greater detail: 
in the first stage, the primary lenders originate housing finance loans to fund their 
customers. The main challenge for the lenders at this stage is how to market their loans 
in the secondary mortgage market when they intend to sell the loans, in view of the fact 
that not every loan would be purchased in the secondary market and the lenders would 
thus be exposed to the risk of ‘Pipeline’ – which refers to the notion that not all loans will 
come to fruition.91 A prolonged period of time required to sell the loans will cost lenders, 
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as these loans will remain in their portfolios and expose them to many risks, such as 
borrower default and change in interest rates, which will negatively affect the value of 
the loans.  Another issue requiring some attention is that the lender has to consider 
whether it wishes to provide ‘servicing’,92 which is considered a highly profitable source 
of revenue especially for the largest lenders who have the ability, skills and capacity to 
perform such a function. However, small lenders who lack the abilities to perform these 
services have the right to sell the rights of doing services to other entities who can do so.93 
The former stage means the end of the role of primary participants in the securitisation 
process except for the function of loan servicing if applicable, which would be 
implemented by the primary lenders as mentioned above. The loans issued by lenders will 
be bought by MBS issuers who will combine them and then collect a pool of 
homogeneous mortgages and finally sell them to investors in the secondary mortgage 
market, who will be entitled to receive proportional shares of all cash flows the mortgages 
generate.94  
In order to protect the investors’ rights to receive the cash flow that they are owed under 
the MBS issuers, there is an entity called the guarantor, whose function is to guarantee 
the rights resulting from securitisation, particularly when the MBS issuers become unable 
to meet their obligations.95 However, the MBS issuers have to take extra care at the 
earlier stage regarding the structure of the MBSs that will be issued, since there are many 
ways to structure such loans,96 involving the amount of credit risk that investors will have 
to bear and so on.97  
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The above-described operation of securitisation reveals that the main participants in such 
a mechanism are: borrowers, primary lenders, MBS issuers (originators), investors and 
guarantor, despite there being other participants whose role is not crucial in designing 
securitisation, such as mortgage brokers and legal advisors.98 Within the Saudi market, 
most securitisation participants are found, such as borrowers, primary lenders, and 
investors, while the MBS issuers and guarantor, whose roles in the securitisation market 
are significant, will be established sooner as stated by the government.  
However, it might be useful to mention the recommendation by the US Department of 
Housing and Urban Development that emerging markets should take account of the fact 
that the MBS-issuing entities were supposed to be owned by the government.99 The 
purpose of this recommendation is to enhance confidence in such an emerging market, 
and so to boost capital by attracting investors nationally and internationally.  
It seems that the Saudi regulator has taken into account the above recommendation when 
starting to establish the MBS issuer. Article (17) of the Real Estate Finance Law has 
paved the way for licensing of a company to carry out real estate refinance activities. 
Accordingly, the Saudi government has noted the defect stemming from the absence of 
MBS issuers from the Saudi market and launched talks with the Boston Consulting Group 
to create an entity which will take the form of a company with the possibility of being 
transformed into a joint-stock company, owned by the government. This company would 
resemble Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac100 in the US, and would be granted the function 
of refinancing mortgages. So, these talks will result in the establishment of an entity 
exercising the functions of the MBS issuer.     
With regard to a guarantor and whether or not it exists in the Saudi market, in fact, there 
is no need to establish a specific entity to perform the role of guarantor in securitisation, 
because that role can be played by the entity exercising real estate refinancing activities, 
as the latter is supposed to be designed on the model of the American Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, whose role, based on the US securitisation market, is to act as a guarantor 
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alongside their main function as MBS issuers.
101
 Accordingly, there is no need to establish 
a specific entity to act as guarantor.  
Although article (17) has cleared the way to establishment of a securitisation market in 
Saudi, it contains a legal defect that hinders the creation of a well-structured market.  
Article (17) stated that “SAMA shall license one or more companies to engage in real 
estate refinance activity in accordance with the Law, this Regulation, the Finance 
Companies Control Law and its Implementing Regulation, provided that: a- The license 
be restricted to real estate refinance activities. b- The capital of the real estate refinance 
company be not less than five billion riyals”. According to this article, the potential entity 
will be allowed to exercise real estate refinance activities which consist of buying 
mortgages from the lenders and holding them in its portfolio. This function is deemed the 
first part of the MBS issuers’ function, but the second part – pooling and combining loans 
and then issuing bonds backed by a pool of homogeneous mortgages – is not allowed.   
In other words, the MBS issuers have two functions: the first is to purchase loans 
originating from primary lenders, while the second function is to aggregate the loans into 
pools, secure them, and then sell them into the secondary market. A company could be 
licensed under article 17 to carry out the functions of MBS issuers. However, according 
to the terms of article 17 the company would be allowed to exercise the role of loan 
purchase, but not allowed to aggregate loans in to pools before selling them on the 
secondary market. Therefore, article 17 presents a legal obstacle and there is a need to 
amend this article to enable the potential company to conduct the two roles in full.  
However, it could argued that there is no need for the second role to be sanctioned by 
article 17, as long the role that facilitates the combined purchase and pooling of loans for 
sale on the secondary mortgage market is  mentioned in the Memorandum and Articles 
of Association of a company, then the latter could exercise this function legally. This 
argument might be accepted if the Saudi legislators had not already confirmed restrictions 
as stated in article 17, which imply that any agreement that goes against the law is classed 
as illegal. However, there is no indication of the purpose of these restrictions or whether 
they are temporary or permanent. 
The last point takes us to another argument: might the regulator have intended to restrict 
the function of the company to solely refinancing real estate activities, without pooling 
loans and reselling them to the secondary market? This argument might succeed if the 
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function of securitisation were just to refinance real estate loans, whereas its actual 
function, as mentioned above, is to convert illiquid assets into tradable assets through the 
securitisation mechanism. Therefore, there is a need to reform article (17) so as to grant 
the real estate refinance companies another function with respect to pooling loans and 
reselling them to the secondary mortgage market.   
To summarise this section, the government has taken further steps to establish an entity 
owned by the government similar to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US, to develop 
a securitisation market for housing finance loans. However, the wording of article (17) 
raises concern about the possibility of establishing a well-developed securitisation market 
while the MBS issuers are not allowed to exercise one of its main functions Saudi.  
 
6.6 The Saudi legal system and the uncertainty surrounding 
specification of property rights in the event of the borrower’s 
default in the securitisation process 
 
The assignment of receivables,102 which is considered the central structure of 
securitisation, might lead to an overlap of liabilities, obligations and rights resulting from 
the securitisation unless a legal structure is created to maintain such rights and 
obligations.103 As seen above, the originator of mortgage loans (lender) sells them to the 
MBS issuer that purchases them for sometimes a discounted sum, while the MBS issuer’s 
function is to raise funds through issuing bonds.104 The complementary functions, such 
as servicing, are probably carried out by the lender, who will attempt to maintain the 
relationship with the borrower. The transforming of receivables and the rights derived 
therefrom aim to make sure that the lender is not in a position to reach them, particularly 
in the case of insolvency.105  
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The Saudi legislator has treated the above issue with extra care in article 21 of the 
Regulation of the Real Estate Finance Law when stating that the mortgage assets and the 
rights derived from them may be assigned to the Real Estate Refinance Company (RERC) 
in refinancing transactions, without the prior consent of the borrower so that all rights 
assigned to the third party in the secondary market are protected in case of the lender’s 
insolvency.106 Such wording means that a transfer by assignment would establish a new 
relationship between borrower and assignee, who is in this case MBS issuer, which is the 
RERC under Saudi jurisdiction.  
In actual fact, the Saudi legislator deserves praise when it succeeds in avoiding the legal 
uncertainty that might arise concerning the rights of the buyer, the MBS issuer, in the 
case of insolvency of the lender,107 due to the statement of article (21) that the transfer 
shall not be revoked or otherwise rescinded in the event of the bankruptcy of the 
transferring real estate finance entity. In addition, the former article asserted that the 
transferred rights shall not be deemed part of the transferor's assets, provided the MBS 
issue has paid the agreed amount in full to a transferring real estate finance entity. 
However, potential concern might arise from another feature of the Saudi legal system 
and threaten the right of the buyer (the MBS issuer) when the borrower defaults, as will 
be explained below. 
Logically, should the borrower default, the MBS issuer, who bought the receivables, can 
sell the pledged property, which was financed as a collateral, to pay off the debt. However, 
there is doubt about the application of this process under Saudi jurisdiction; at least the 
application might face legal challenges that mitigate the structure of securitisation, and in 
turn might alienate investors and lenders alike from participating in such a market because 
of the ownership of the financed property being retained by the lender not the borrower.   
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As mentioned in Chapter Three,108 the banks operating in Saudi resort to Islamic finance 
transactions as a consequence of the decision of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) 
which denies them their greatest security, namely mortgage. The rationale for preventing 
banks from recording mortgages in their interest was that all loans provided by these 
banks are usurious, and are thus not Sharia-compliant, according to the SJC. In nearly all 
forms of Islamic finance transactions, the lender is at some stage the owner of the financed 
goods and of course, as a result, deems the bank the owner of the financed asset for a 
considerable period of time until the debt owed is fully paid. Accordingly, it is assumed 
under Saudi jurisdiction that the main participants in securitisation are: the originator of 
the loan, who will retain the ownership of the financed property as security for the loan, 
as explained in detail in Chapter three; the borrower, who gained the loan from the 
originator and will be considered the renter of the financed property until the debt owed 
is fully paid, when ownership will be transferred to him; and the MBS issuer, which under 
Saudi jurisdiction is the RERC.  
To enable the MBS issuer, in the case of borrower default, to gain the right to sell the 
financed property to satisfy the debt, there are two possible scenarios:      
1- Given that the ownership of the financed property is under the authority of the 
lender(the loan originator), the MBS issuer may take legal action against the 
lender for recovery of any loss, under a claim based on the ownership of the 
financed property being deemed collateral to secure the loan in the case of 
borrower default. From this perspective, the MBS issuer is well advised to gain a 
copy of the loan agreement between the borrower and lender to support such a 
claim. However, the lender might argue that he abided by all liabilities and rights 
resulting from the assignment of receivables, which represent instalment loans 
that borrowers are repaying over time, including but not limited to the shifting of 
the debts from his balance sheet109 to the MBS issuer. In addition to this, he 
assigned to the MBS issuer the right to receive all or a proportionate share of 
payment when made by the borrower through him.  
Also, the lender might offer the defence that the default arose from the borrower 
and that he is only an intermediary between the borrower and the MBS issuer. On 
this basis the MBS issuer needs to raise a claim against the borrower, rather than 
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the lender, who has already fulfilled all liabilities resulting from the transaction. 
In fact, the lender’s defence might be endorsed by the new and direct contractual 
relationship established by the securitisation between the borrower and the MBS 
issuer, as assignee, which requires the MBS issuer to raise the claim against the 
borrower rather than the lender.
110 In these circumstances, the MBS issuer might 
be forced to resort to the second scenario.  
2- The MBS issuer might raise a claim against the borrower who defaults on paying 
the debt owed. From a legal perspective, the claim is absolutely correct, because 
the transaction of securitisation has established a new relationship between the 
MBS issuer and the borrower, which gives the former the right to raise such a 
claim against the latter, requiring the transfer of all liabilities, loan assets and 
rights through securitisation from the originator to the MBS issuer. Following 
assurance of the legality of the claim, however, the main goal which to satisfy the 
due debt might not be achieved because the borrower is likely to argue that the 
ownership of the financed property is not registered in his name, and that therefore 
the MBS issuer needs to raise a claim against the lender who retains the ownership 
of the financed property to satisfy the due debt.  
The potential outcome of the above scenarios carries more risks for the buyers (MBS 
issuer) and exposes them to legal uncertainty in case of the borrower’s default; in 
particular, both scenarios are likely to occur due to all parties having a legal basis to 
support their arguments. Consequently, there is a need for a solution to protect the 
interests of the buyers (MBS issuer) and at the same time to maintain the structure of 
securitisation because there is uncertainty surrounding specification of property rights in 
the event of the borrower’s default in the securitisation process. 
Generally speaking, the existence of a few problematic issues and legal defects in the 
Saudi jurisdiction may cause loss of confidence in such a market, which in turn may spoil 
this fiscal innovation’s reputation for trustworthiness, even before it is used. As Professor 
Tamar Franklin said: “Regulation provides the industry with the stamp of ‘good 
housekeeping’ that guards investors' interests”,111 and would of course reduce the very 
high costs of unpredictable outcomes due to the existing legal uncertainty in the 
jurisdiction. Thus, lawmakers have to carefully consider this issue and strike a balance 
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between importing fiscal innovations to be applied in Saudi, and accommodating national 
legal issues, such as the SJC’s decision, in order to create a hybrid form that will convince 
the investors, in particular those who will participate in the securitisation market as MBSs, 
that their rights will be protected in all situations including that of borrower default.  
To fill the above gap and address the issue, the primary task of the legislator is to put the 
RERC (MBS issuer) in a position to gain access to the financed property in the event of 
borrower default, without exposing him to conflict with the lender (the housing finance 
loans originator) who holds ownership. The solution lies in creating bankruptcy 
remoteness between the lender and the RERC, which retains ownership of the financed 
property. 112  
The equitable remedy provided by such a solution is embodied in the proposal discussed 
and examined in Chapter Three,
113
 and recommended as a means of resolving the issues 
arising from the SJC’s decision. Such an equitable remedy guarantees that the borrower’s 
default would not impact on the RERC’s interest in selling the financed property to satisfy 
the debt.  
As mentioned there, in order to develop the housing finance market and enhance 
confidence, the government is advised to establish, under article (155) of the companies 
law, a special purpose vehicle SPV owned by the government, to hold the collateral, that 
is, the property being financed, and keep it at the same distance from lender and borrower. 
This new collateral structure will dissipate the concerns arising from the above two 
scenarios because the receivables and liabilities, which are at the centre of the 
securitisation mechanism, being transferred to the MBS issuer while ownership remains 
under the authority of the borrower. This collateral structure in fact enables the MBS 
issuer to raise a claim against the borrower, who retains ownership of the property being 
financed, without potential conflict with the lender, as will be seen below.  
The mechanism of the housing finance transaction with this company owned by the 
government will enable the borrower to retain ownership of the property being financed 
in order to grant him proper protection in this bargain, while the lender's rights and 
interests in the property being financed will be secured through mortgaging the property 
in favour of the proposed SPV. In this case, the MBS issuer will have the right to raise a 
claim against a borrower if he fails to pay the instalments required by the housing finance 
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agreement, because he retains ownership of the property being financed alongside all 
rights arose from the housing finance transaction between the borrower and lender have 
been assigned to the MBS issuer (article 21).  
In these circumstances, it seems there is no potential way for the borrower to defends 
himself against such a claim by alleging that the ownership is not under his authority. In 
the light of the above-mentioned new mechanism for housing finance transactions, the 
ownership will remain under the authority of the borrower. In addition, the new 
mechanism will prevent conflict between the MBS issuer and the lender because under 
this mechanism the ownership is no longer under lenders’ authority, and there is no need 
for MBS issuer to make a claim against him.      
To summarise this section, the MBS issuer might be exposed to the risk of loss of its 
interests in the case of borrower default, due to the ownership of the financed property 
being retained by the lender. Therefore, establishing a bankruptcy remoteness entity 
would maintain the rights of all parties to the securitisation and address the above concern. 
     
6.7 Why did the housing finance laws 2012 fail to deal with 
transparency in securitisation? 
 
The Saudi legislator has paid good attention to the promotion of transparency in the 
primary mortgage market, since the market would fail without it. For instance, SAMA 
was obliged to “publish data related to the real estate finance market and to determine 
principles for disclosure of finance costs and method of calculation to enable consumers 
to compare prices”.114 In addition, the Saudi legislator attempted to standardise, whenever 
possible, and to get as much information as possible to the market, because it was believed 
that would help to establish the culture of transparency, which of course will ultimately 
lead to the success of the market.115  
For instance, the lender is obliged to include specific information and data in the contract 
that would be concluded with borrowers.116 The former step is considered standard in the 
real estate finance contract to be concluded between lender and borrower, and is deemed 
a sophisticated step on the part of the legislator in this field. Nevertheless, it could be 
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argued that the provisions of the housing finance laws 2012, which were supposed to 
regulate securitisation, did not give securitisation the same level of care as the primary 
housing finance market is given in to the matter of transparency. This which of course 
might have a negative impact on the potential securitisation market when it is established 
in Saudi. As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, the members of both the 
government and the AlShura Council,117 which are both considered the legislative 
authority in Saudi, announced, in the wake of enactment of the housing finance laws 2012, 
that the laws had taken account of the causes contributing to the global financial crisis 
2007-2008, in order to prevent such a crisis occurring in Saudi.118 However, the absence 
of provisions in the housing finance laws 2012 to regulate transparency in securitisation 
might impair the former claim, inasmuch as the lack of transparency in the securitisation 
market was deemed a factor, among others, that contributed to the global financial crisis 
2007. This leads us to wonder whether further legal reform is needed to legislate the 
aspect of transparency for the purpose of averting the circumstances that contributed to 
the global financial crisis 2007. To answer this question it might be useful to shed light 
on the role played by lack of transparency in generating the global financial crisis and the 
initiatives were adopted to develop this principle prior to and post the crisis.  
Usually, the originator of the loan (lender) is required to promote a more comprehensive 
understanding of the risks involved in securitisation, by providing both the MBS issuers 
and investors with the information needed to enable them to carry out their due diligence 
on the properties, rather than relying blindly on the judgement of CRAs, for example.
119 
The means to this end lies in transparency, defined by the Bank of International 
Settlements as “sufficient information on the underlying assets, the structure of the 
transaction and the parties involved in the transaction, thereby promoting a more 
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comprehensive and thorough understanding of the risks involved”,120 which would enable 
the investor to assess the risks involved in securitisation.     
The global financial crisis 2007 confirmed investors’ over-reliance on credit rating 
agencies (CRAs), which are paid by the loans originator, 121 due to the investors not being 
in a position to assess the value of the securities because of the lack of transparency. Two 
explanations are available: either the insufficiency of the information prevented the 
investors from properly assessing the risks involved in securities, or the complexity and 
overload of the information hindered the investors from assessing the securities and 
forced them to rely on the CRAs.122  
Post the financial global crisis 2007, it was adopted the principle of disclosing all relevant 
information in order to address information asymmetry.123 The aim of this mechanism is 
to put the investors in a position to fully assess the risks of securitisation. Therefore, this 
issue was naturally not discussed post the global financial crisis 2007, because “most of 
the risks giving rise to the collapse of the market for securities backed by subprime 
mortgages were disclosed”.124  
However, it was questionable whether the full disclosure put the investors in a position 
to perform their role with due diligence and to assess the risks in the securities, or whether 
it failed to achieve its aim, thus forcing investors to rely on CRAs to help them in valuing 
the securities and assessing the systemic risks. In fact, the full disclosure backfired in 
terms of its main goal by leading to information overload, with investors unable to 
understand the risks involved in the securities due to the huge amount of information, by 
contrast with the limited skills of the investors.125 
The concept of full disclosure is based on the idea that investors and other securities 
market participants are perfectly rational, and that, in addition, more disclosure is always 
better than less.126 However, Herbert Simon has a different viewpoint, which is that 
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people are boundedly rational because they have limited cognitive abilities with which to 
process information.127 Therefore, when faced with complicated and sophisticated tasks, 
such as securitisation, people tend to economise on cognitive effort through either 
heuristics or "short cuts".
128
 Based on Simon’s insight, in cases involving vast quantities 
of information, people tend to adopt a decision strategy requiring less cognitive effort.129 
In fact, Simon’s insight might explain the desire of investors to rely on the CRAs in the 
securitisation process due to information overload forcing them to adopt a strategy 
requiring less cognitive effort.    
The full disclosure, in fact, might be considered incomplete and sometimes 
counterproductive, as it is meaningless to disclose information that is not used. Such a 
principle requires analysis of the disclosed information to approach a degree of certainty 
about the investment, whereas investors do not have the ability to perform this function. 
Even if they managed to do it they might not be able to realise the legal consequences of 
the securities products.
130  
Investors usually seek CRAs’ experience in valuing the securities due to their inability to 
assess the risks involved in the securities products. Although the CRAs employed 
numbers of qualified experts in securitisation, they failed in this function and played a 
crucial role in generating the crisis through badly underestimating the risks in the new 
securities products and giving these products the highest grade “without adequately 
examining the assumptions underlying such ratings and without considering whether 
changed circumstances surrounding the issuance of novel securities should have caused 
the revision of such assumptions”.131 Therefore, over-reliance on the CRAs caused the 
investors not to scrutinise the risk involved in the securities products they were 
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purchasing, and thus exposed them to credit risks.132 This failure requires us to seek the 
reasons beyond it and ask whether information overload played a role in it.   
The complexity and overload of information undermine the disclosure paradigm of 
securitisation which requires parties to disclose all relevant information. The complexity 
is derived from the nature of securitisation, as seen above, which makes investors unable 
to determine the risks.133Therefore, the full disclosure did not resolve that complexity, 
confirming the need to establish a new concept with which to address such complexity 
and give investors a degree of certainty when they invest in securities. This viewpoint is 
supported by the testimony of one of the most famous CRAs, Moody’s, that announced 
in 2008 that the complexity of the market makes CRAs unable to determine where the 
risk lies.134 Professor Schwarcz believes that the complexity of transactions even affects 
institutional investors, who are expected to have the abilities needed to assess the 
suitability of securities products; therefore, the complexity of the transaction rendered the 
full information insufficient for the market and the participants alike. 135  
The complexity of information remains the main challenge facing securitisation in 
developed markets such as the US and Europe. Nevertheless, many initiatives have been 
taken to mitigate complexity, with the aim of enhancing confidence and, at the same time, 
simplifying securitisation to enable securities market participants to determine the risks. 
It is noteworthy that the purpose of these initiatives was not to serve as a substitute for 
investors’ due diligence but instead to help the investors and the securities market 
participants to assess the systemic risks. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), for example, and the International Organisation of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO), both of which organisations include Saudi Arabia as a member, have attempted 
to identify the meaning of simple, transparent and comparable securitisations, to 
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contribute to a more accurate assessment of the systemic risks in securitisation.136 They 
have also set up criteria for these principles, which are non-exhaustive and non-binding, 
to help investors with their due diligence on securitisation so as to determine the risks and 
value the investment.137    
Also, the European Central Bank (ECB) has developed eligibility criteria, with two goals: 
to determine the asset that will be permitted as collateral, and to enhance standardisation 
and transparency in the securitisation market in order to enhance investors’ confidence.138 
The demand to structure the disclosed information has stimulated the ECB to develop 
templates, which are designed to ensure compliance with data protection and 
confidentiality regulations, while requiring specific information to be standardised and 
disclosed.139 The ECB’s initiative is intended to improve transparency, clarify the 
information for investors and other securities market participants, and keep CRAs up-to-
date with information related to their credit and cash flow models.140 Such initiatives 
indeed minimise complexity by ensuring that only relevant information is disclosed, 
avoiding the information overload that produced the complexity.  
When an attempt is made to apply the above principles of transparency in the Saudi 
jurisdiction, it is observed that the Saudi legislator remains outside the latest 
developments in this field, despite the enactment of the housing finance laws 2012 in the 
wake of the global financial crisis 2007. This is not meant to undermine the initiatives 
adopted by the Saudi legislator in the housing finance market, but to shed light on areas 
that need to be developed.  
Accordingly, the Saudi legislator, firstly, needs to avoid relying solely on full disclosure 
as the main means of enhancing transparency, inasmuch as the application of this idea 
has not achieved its goals in cases where the investors and other securities market 
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participants, as seen above, were unable to assess the systemic risks in securitisation. This 
is not an argument for ignoring full disclosure, but rather for following the latest 
development on enhancing transparency in securitisation. 
Therefore, the Saudi legislator, secondly, is advised to boost the transparency 
environment before establishing the securitisation market, by adopting the latest 
developments in the field. Such a task will be easier than anticipated, due to Saudi 
Arabia’s membership of many financial organisations and institutions such as IOSCO and 
the Board of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions. These 
organisations have already developed a number of mechanisms and methods for 
enhancing transparency, which Saudi can utilise and employ in its system. 
 
6.8 Conclusion  
 
The chapter has drawn attention to the process of securitisation by pointing to its nature, 
function, advantages and main participants. It has observed the impact of securitisation 
in increasing homeownership through offering borrowers low-cost loans while lenders, 
such as banks, benefit from a reduced risk of weighted credit exposures, as securitisation 
offers them the flexibility to remove from the balance sheet the securitised assets, loans 
and receivables owed to the originator. This in turn enhances the banks’ efficiency, 
enabling them to increase their activities in housing finance lending; in other words, 
removal of securitised assets from balance sheets will improve the trade books ratio.141  
The underlying question remains whether such an innovation under Saudi jurisdiction can 
deliver economic and social outcomes. If on the one hand securitisation would be a means 
of addressing the results of the oil price collapse, such as liquidity shortages and the new 
government's austerity policies, on the other hand the difficulties presented by the Saudi 
legal system, which have been highlighted by this chapter, raise the possibility of 
securitisation producing unexpected results or at least not leading to the desired results. 
Although Saudi has recently created the legal framework needed, the housing finance 
laws 2012, to make securitisation possible, its development could be hindered by a 
number of regulatory constraints inherent in the Saudi legal system. 
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The establishment, for instance, of an entity to perform the function of securitisation is 
not enough as long as that entity is prevented from carrying out an important process 
within securitisation, namely issuing bonds. This consideration suggests that it would be 
unwise to adopt the concept of securitisation but divest it of its main function.  
The right of the MBS issuer to sell the pledged property to satisfy the debt in case of 
borrower default is not clear under Saudi jurisdiction. There is a need to address this issue 
to enhance confidence in securitisation, particularly as such a market is considered 
emergent in the Saudi context, and needs to be made more attractive to participants in 
order to acquire additional funds and investors. Therefore, it is suggested that a 
bankruptcy remoteness entity be established to maintain the rights of all parties to 
securitisation and to enhance confidence in the market while stimulating investors to 
participate in it.    
Saudi’s membership of a number of international financial organisations, such as the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organisation of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO), which are interested in securitisation, could facilitate 
identification of the level of transparency of disclosure in securitisation, since the 
obligation of the securitisation market to disclose all information does not promote 
understanding of the risks that securitisation involves, as seen throughout this chapter. It 
is clear that international organisations’ recommendations offer a general framework for 
legislators, based on the principle that determining and standardising the information to 
be disclosed might promote understanding of the risks posed by securitisation, while still 
avoiding information overload that does not achieve the main goal of disclosure. 
Therefore, the Saudi legislator is advised to amend the provisions of the Real Estate 
Finance Law regarding transparency to bring them into line with the latest developments 
in this field.  
For all these considerations, and to build a well-structured securitisation market from a 
legal perspective, the following legal changes are needed: 
1- Amending para a. of article (17) of the Real Estate Finance Law to grant the 
licensed company the function of pooling and selling loans to complete the 
process of securitisation.  
2- Establishing a special purpose vehicle (SPV) owned by the government to hold 
the collateral, that is, the property being financed, and keep it at the same distance 
from lender and borrower, as explained in detail above.  
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3- Adding a new article to the Real Estate Finance Law to oblige the main 
participants in securitisation to identify the information that will be disclosed in 
securitisation in order to promote the level of transparency and to facilitate 
understanding of the risks that securitisation involves.   
In summary, it is believed that the establishment of a well-structured securitisation market 
could not occur in current circumstances, but would require a certain degree of legal 
guidance in order to maximise the market’s efficacy. Hence, the Saudi legislator is 
strongly advised to take into account the above recommendations to achieve the highest 
level of desired results of applying securitisation in the Saudi jurisdiction, while 
preventing a repetition of the global financial crisis 2007 in Saudi.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
This thesis has sought to explore ways in which Saudi Arabian laws for housing finance 
might be improved, so as to encourage the development of the housing finance market. 
However, the task was not easy because the development of housing finance in Saudi 
Arabia is a moving target that, in recent times, has been influenced by significant 
economic and political upheaval, such as the collapse of oil prices and the Saudi Vision 
2030. These circumstances have made the task of development and improvement very 
difficult. This situation has, in turn, created a new challenge in relation to the development 
of housing finance, in the form of a general liquidity shortage, which has changed the 
Saudi government’s priorities, particularly in relation to the housing finance market. 
However, the thesis accommodates such influences, and takes into account possible 
economic, political and legal circumstances that might impact on suggestions made for 
the development of the housing finance market.
1
 
The research aimed to achieve the following objectives: to suggest a mechanism to 
enhances the efficiency of the main participants in the housing finance market, namely, 
the lender and borrower, and to provide them with adequate protection; to make 
suggestions to facilitate access to the housing finance market and to build up a strong 
regulatory framework for regulating that market; and, finally, to address potential legal 
barriers to the provision of cheap liquidity in the market. The research confirmed that, in 
dspite of the enactment of the Housing Finance Laws (2012) which were enacted with the 
similar above objectives, four issues still present significant obstacles to the development 
of the housing finance market, and some are the result of the provisions of the Housing 
Finance Laws (2012).    
It was necessary at the beginning of the research process to determine what barriers 
hindered the achievement of the above objectives, in order to clear the way for the thesis 
to examine and analyse these barriers and to propose solutions. To do this, Chapter Two 
of the thesis reviewed the interventions made by the government and legislative 
authorities in the development of the housing finance market during the last thirty years 
to address two housing shortage phases, the first between the 1970s and the mid-1980s, 
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and the second beginning in the late 1990s and which persists to this day. The thesis 
confirmed that interventions and initiatives undertaken by both the Saudi Government 
and legislative authorities succeeded in addressing the first housing shortage only. The 
thesis asserted that despite significant measures and initiatives taken during the last ten 
years, including the enactment of the Housing Finance Laws (2012), which aimed to build 
up a well developed housing finance market, these measures were unable to address the 
second housing crisis, and the public were let down by modest outcomes.2  
The thesis identified four factors that work as barriers to achieving the desired objectives, 
and these barriers could be the subject of legal reforms. The first barrier is the lack of 
protection granted to participants in the housing finance market as a result of the Supreme 
Judicial Council’s (SJC) decision to deprive lenders and borrowers of a mortgage 
mechanism to secure their interests in financed property. Furthermore, an increase in land 
prices has led to negative effects in the housing finance market, mainly due to the rise in 
the cost of borrowing. This hinders first-time buyer access to housing finance. The only 
solution advanced by the Saudi Government and legislative authorities to address this 
issue was the enactment of the Land Fees Law (LFL) (2016). Therefore, it was necessary 
to analyse this law and its provisions to see whether or not the law tends to precipitate 
either a decrease in the market value of land, or an increase in its supply. The third factor 
is the high value down payment required under Article 12 of the Regulation Real Estate 
Finance Law (RREFL), which restricts first-time homebuyers’ access to the housing 
finance market. Fourthly, and finally, the thesis examined the legal changes needed to 
enable the establishment of a securitisation market for the purpose of providing cheap 
liquidity in the housing finance market, and to address liquidity constraints in Saudi 
Arabia that have been caused by the oil price collapse.  
Bearing these considerations in mind, the thesis then explored the improvement of the 
legal infrastructure. It suggested measures which might enhance the effectiveness of the 
housing finance market, so as to provide an efficient, healthy and practical commercial 
environment for housing finance market participants, and to facilitate access to the market 
for potential first-time homebuyers by lowering lending costs and providing the desired 
level of protection. 
There has long been a need for Saudi Arabia to develop and improve its housing finance 
market, not only to meet current domestic demand and to rectify the second era of acute 
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housing shortage, but also to strengthen the housing finance market to a point where it 
can cater for the demand for housing finance in any circumstances. This is especially so 
in light of the absence of successful government initiatives designed to address the 
housing crisis, a factor which confirms the view that no lasting solution can be found 
without the support and engagement of the private sector.
3
 Therefore, the importance of 
this thesis derives from the belief that it is consistent with the Saudi Vision 2030, which 
explicitly conveys the Saudi Government’s intention to pave the way for the private sector 
to flourish within the housing sector.
4
 An analysis and assessment of the improvement of 
legal infrastructure, as provided in this thesis, is vital for the future development of the 
housing finance sector in Saudi Arabia, and this thesis has sought to help the Saudi 
Government in its task of creating an attractive environment for private sector investment, 
to assist in the government’s role to facilitate access to the housing finance market for 
potential first-time purchasers, and to maintain the financial system in the country.   
The thesis benefits from the use of a combination of theoretical, doctrinal and contextual 
approaches to enrich its content and to establish a strong foundation on which to propose 
possible avenues for reform, to achieve the above described objectives. Although the 
thesis focused on the situation within Saudi Arabia, in that cases and data examined rules 
and legislations pertaining to the housing finance market and financial system of KSA, 
some lessons were learned from three other jurisdictions: namely, the UK, Hong Kong 
and the US, and these issues were dealt with in Chapters Four, Five and Six respectively.  
Finally, as mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, the barriers selected for consideration 
are not the only challenges that exist to the development of the housing finance market in 
Saudi Arabia. 5 Other legal challenges are apparent in every aspect of this field. However, 
the constraints of a doctoral research project forced the researcher to limit the scope of 
the thesis to those barriers that were considered to be major hindrances to the development 
of the housing finance market, and these barriers were chosen due to their importance. 
7.2 Research Findings 
As noted above, Chapter Two reviewed the initiatives undertaken by the Saudi 
Government and legislative authorities to develop the housing finance market and to 
address the housing shortage of the last thirty years. Chapter Two then identified four 
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barriers to the development of the housing finance market which remain unaddressed, 
despite government and legislative initiatives initiated in response to the housing crisis.
6
 
These barriers, in fact, constitute the substance of the research questions, and, 
accordingly, were dealt with in its chapters. 
 
7.2.1 The Findings of Chapter Three 
 
Chapter Three analysed the impact of the decision of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) 
on the development of the housing finance market. This decision deprives lenders and 
borrowers of the mortgage mechanism by which to secure their interests in financed 
property. The chapter also asked whether or not the provisions of the Housing Finance 
Laws (2012) overturned that decision. Finally, the chapter aimed to put forward an 
alternative solution to bridge the gap produced by the SJC’s decision.  
Although there have been many attempts to overturn the SJC’s decision during the last 
thirty years, the analytical study conducted as part of this thesis confirmed that the 
decision remains immune to amendment and overturning by the Saudi regulators and the 
legislations, including the Housing Finance Laws (2012), as long as the initiative to 
amend or overturn does not emerge from the Supreme Court. Chapter Three asked 
whether Islamic finance transactions (IFTs) could be used as a solution, and if so, are 
banks correct in asking to use such transactions to secure their interests in properties being 
financed, even though borrowers lack the same degree of protection, and the risks 
surrounding these transactions appear to have undermined such protection as is afforded 
to lenders, particularly when compared to that offered by a mortgage.7 The analytical 
study carried out in Chapter Three found that IFTs may be suitable in some instances, 
primarily with regard to religious matters, but in terms of acting as substantial protection, 
like that provided by a mortgage, these transactions are susceptible to failure.  
The analytical study illustrated three risks involved in using IFTs which might impair the 
protection provided to the borrower and the lender. These are: the risk of re-
characterisation of these transactions, due to the fluctuation between sale and lease 
contracts; the lack of protection granted to the borrower; and, finally, the absence, in these 
transactions, of priorities given to the lender in case of borrower insolvency. Borrowers 
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in particular are not given the same protection afforded to lenders by IFTs, and may find 
themselves, in some circumstances, losing what is likely to be their most valuable asset. 
The risk of the re-characterisation of such transactions may expose lenders to the risk of 
a lease contract being re-characterised as a sale agreement, and this outcome would, of 
course, be highly detrimental to lenders who are anxious to see their interests protected.   
Chapter Three sought to develop a collateral security structure to plug the gap left by the 
decision of the SJC, and at the same time address the risks involved with IFTs.8 The 
solution lies in the concept of the Adel: a trusted and honourable person selected by both 
the lender and borrower to hold the collateral. This concept is derived from Islamic law, 
and is similar to that of the trustee in the western sense, and the main function of the Adel 
is to hold the collateral. The chapter developed the concept of the Adel and proposed the 
establishment of an entity similar to the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), owned by the 
government, which would be trusted by both borrowers and lenders in the housing finance 
market. The SPV would be a third party in all housing finance contracts. The borrower 
would retain ownership of the property to be financed to grant him adequate protection 
in this bargain, while the financed property would be mortgaged in favour of the SPV to 
secure the lenders’ rights.  
The adoption of the above collateral security structure may enhance confidence in the 
housing finance market on both sides, and this will benefit both lenders and borrowers 
alike, as well as encouraging the market to adopt fresh financial innovations to make it 
easier to obtain housing finance, such as securitisation. The collateral security structure 
is also somewhat novel, and this might open the gate for Islamic countries that are 
presented with a similar dilemma to adopt such measures, in order to avoid committing 
sin, riba, and to provide the housing finance agreement with the desired level of 
protection.     
 
7.2.2 The Findings of Chapter Four 
 
Although the rise in land prices has significantly affected the ability of first-time buyers, 
financiers and developers to obtain housing finance, the only solution advanced to address 
this issue has been enactment of the Land Fees Law (LFL) (2016). Chapter Four sought 
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to determine whether the LFL, which imposes a levy constituting 2.5% of land values 
annually, tends to precipitate either a decrease in the market value of land or an increase 
in its supply. In addition, the chapter attempted to shed light on two legal concerns: the 
lack of fairness resulting from the wording of the LFL, along with a possible overlap of 
liabilities and obligations stemming from the LFL and zakah.  
It was evident that the political will had a significant effect when the law-making process 
was accelerated to enact the Land Fees Law 2016.
9
Although the enactment of the LFL 
was considered a significant achievement by the legislative authority, due to its success 
in taxing individuals based on a demand from the individuals themselves,
10
 the LFL 
cannot be considered the best solution to resolve the increase in land prices problem, 
because of the questionable effect the LFL has on land values, especially relating to the 
application of land taxation.
11
 In addition, the lack of clarity surrounding the aim of the 
LFL might impair its application and make its objectives questionable, in so much as that 
aim has been inconsistently presented (varying between decreasing the market value of 
land and increasing its market supply). The chapter indicated that the relevant economic 
research failed to confirm that land taxation would definitely lead to either a decrease in 
the market value or an increase in the market supply of land.12 Therefore it could be 
argued that there is a disparity between the aims of the LFL, and this might reflect 
negatively on the results of its application in the future. 
Taking into account all the above considerations, to achieve the aim of developing the 
housing finance market there is a need to establish an independent committee of respected 
economists in order to study land value in Saudi Arabia. Their job would be to determine 
the main elements that affect land value, and then to prepare a report similar to Barker’s 
report of 2004.
13 This recommendation, if followed, should make it possible to determine 
what elements can contribute to an increase in land value, and to propose measures to 
counteract this trend.  
The chapter then moved on to examine two legal concerns that emerge from the wording 
of the LFL: the lack of fairness, and the possible overlap of liabilities and obligations 
resulting from both the LFL 2016 and zakah. With regard to the first concern, it was 
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confirmed that exempting lands of less than 5000m2 from the LFL’s liabilities is unfair, 
due to the absence of legal or economic justification for this exemption. In practice, 
according to the LFL, landowners who own larger pieces of land can avoid liabilities by 
disposing of lands so that they only own land less than 5000m2, leaving the final consumer 
to bear the land taxation.14 Thus, by implication, this actually worsens the situation.
15
 We 
can assume that the law aims to increase land supply by encouraging landlords to develop 
their land and then sell it on the market. But this, of course, will lead to an increase in 
land supply. Chapter Four raises concerns that the exemption of land under 5000m2 might 
encourage landowners to change their behaviour and decrease the size of their land 
portfolio in order to evade taxation liabilities. Such a development would represent a 
failure to achieve the goals of the law. 
Accordingly, the chapter concludes that the law’s enactment discloses an eagerness to 
appease citizens who demand the levying of taxes on extensive landholdings, and, 
therefore, it fails to impose the levy on the basis of justice and equity. Instead it adopts a 
short-term approach to what may be a long-term problem. Thus, there is a need to realize 
the goals of equity and justice in the LFL by amending its provisions to cover all land, as 
there is no legal or economic reason to support the allocation of tax on the basis proposed 
by the LFL. 
The second concern raised in Chapter Four concerns the possible overlap of liabilities and 
obligations stemming from LFL and zakah, the latter being an Islamic instrument similar 
to tax. When the legislative authority redrafted the LFL 2016, it amended the level of the 
charge set by the law from $24 to 2.5% of the land value annually, and changed the name 
of the law from the land taxation law to the land fees law. Both changes were made in 
order to achieve the Islamisation of the LFL and to avoid opposition from the Council of 
Senior Ulama (CSU), which is an official institution in charge of issuing religious 
opinions in Saudi Arabia (they believe that taxation is contrary to Islamic law). Chapter 
Four explored the idea that Islamisation can be achieved by simulating the level of zakah, 
and imposing a 2.5% levy of land value annually, thus bringing the law much closer to 
zakah and meeting the standards of the CSU.16 
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The argument asserted that the payment imposed by the law is regarded as zakah despite 
the LFL being called the land fees law. The concern arising from the above mentioned 
change is that the wording of the LFL has confused Muslim landowners in Saudi Arabia, 
and they do not understand whether or not, if they paid 2.5% as the liability imposed by 
the new law, they are still required by Islamic law to pay 2.5% of the land value as zakah. 
This confusion has arisen due to the similarities between the liabilities and obligations 
resulting from the LFL and zakah. To avoid such confusion it is necessary to make the 
wording of the provisions of the LFL 2016 solid, accurate and coherent. Therefore, the 
chapter recommends that the LFL be amended in two ways. Firstly, the name of the LFL 
should be changed from the ‘land fees law’ to a ‘land zakah’ in order to avoid the 
impression of a potential overlap between the two instruments, and possible resulting dual 
liabilities and obligations incurred by individuals. A second recommendation aims to 
avoid possible evasion of LFL by landlords: once the name of the law is changed to ‘land 
zakah’ the registration of land in the name of non-Muslims can take place, because this 
kind of ownership would not be caught by zakah, because of the non-Muslims’ exemption 
from the obligations set by zakah. For this purpose, it was recommended that the LFL be 
amended to include a provision imposing fees equal to 2.5% of the land value annually 
on land owned by non-Muslims.   
 
7.2.3 The Findings of Chapter Five  
 
Chapter Five confirmed that the development of the housing finance market has been 
hindered by article (12) of the Regulation Real Estate Finance Law (RREFL) which 
capped the Loan to Value (LTV) at the low ratio of 70% (this stipulates a high down-
payment requirement equal to 30% of the total house purchase). The chapter sought to 
achieve two aims: the first was to develop the regulatory framework for the management 
of the housing finance market in general, and for the adoption of a macro-prudential 
policy, of which LTV is one element, in order to avoid a conflict between the general 
aims of the Housing Finance Laws (2012), of which the RREFL is one law, as is and the 
application of article (12). The second aim was to determine how to mitigate the adverse 
impact on the housing finance market of applying LTV. 
To achieve these aims, the chapter explored the practices of two developed countries (the 
UK and Hong Kong) when adopting and applying a macro-prudential policy, including  
LTV, in order to gauge the extent to which Saudi Arabia can draw on their experiences. 
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It was evident that capping the LTV at the low ratio of 70%, as imposed by article (12), 
may be suitable for certain policy areas (primarily banking and financial matters which 
require protection from excessive lending), but in the context of housing finance, its 
application is liable to conflict with the main aims of the Housing Finance Laws (2012), 
namely to facilitate housing finance access, as announced by both the Saudi Government 
and the Shura Council.17 This conflict between the application of article 12 and the main 
aims of the Housing Finance Laws (2012) was the main research finding of Chapter Four. 
It was discovered that there is a disparity between the aims of the laws and the results of 
applying those laws.  
The enactment and application of article (12) of the RREFL demonstrates the vexed issue 
of a lack of cooperation between government agencies, including the financial authorities 
and the legislative authority, which of course represents a significant barrier to the 
development of the housing finance market. The chapter analysed the formulation and 
application of article (12) of the RREFL and confirmed that the article has three 
consequences: a mismatch between the main aims of enacting the Housing Finance Laws 
(2012) and their implementation in connection with the LTV; a lack of cooperation 
between Saudi financial authorities in the housing finance market; and the absence of an 
alternative solution to address the possible adverse impact of the LTV. These 
consequences suggest the existence of a defect in the regulatory framework for regulating 
the housing finance market in general, and in the adoption of a macro-prudential policy 
in particular.  
The chapter then outlined the critical analysis undertaken to determine the defects in the 
regulatory framework in relation to three aspects: decision making, the integration of 
policies and legislations, and accountability. The critical analysis observed that the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), which was authorised to draft the RREFL, works 
apart from other government agencies and the legislative authority. In addition, the 
analysis confirmed SAMA’s inability to justify its drafting in relation to the 70% LTV 
cap, along with its failure to publish studies and research on the LTV to increase public’s 
awareness about its function and adverse impact. Finally, it was found that SAMA enjoys 
unlimited authority to regulate and supervise the housing finance market, mainly due to 
the absence of the principle of accountability, and this might explain why SAMA did not 
respond to criticisms about its decision to cap the LTV at the low ratio of 70%. In contrast, 
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the experience of the UK and Hong Kong demonstrates that Saudi regulators have not 
adopted the proper legal format for applying the LTV policy, and this is quite apart from 
the negative impact that capping the LTV at 70% has on first-time homebuyers.  
The UK’s experience, in respect of using legal procedures and gathering information 
before making a decision about adopting a macro-prudential policy, clearly demonstrates 
good cooperation between their financial authorities, and the government. This good 
cooperation is shown by the UK Government’s willingness to participate in decision 
making while enabling the financial authorities to apply the policy in question, including 
mechanisms that have been created to help people with housing finance. The principle of 
accountability is relied on in the UK jurisdiction, and both UK Parliament and the UK 
Government have refrained from granting unlimited authority in this field to the 
competent authority in charge of dealing with macro-prudential policy, namely the 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC). This is to avoid any possible adverse impact on UK 
economic growth, which, of course, requires limits to be placed on the FPC’s authority.   
       
In light of the UK’s experience, and to avoid a conflict between the aims of legislative 
and government policies regarding the housing finance market in Saudi Arabia, it is 
suggested that an independent committee be established which emulates the composition 
of the (FPC), in order to exercise the function of drafting and applying the macro-
prudential policy. However, there is an urgent need to ensure that the proposed committee 
be accountable to the Economic and Development Affairs Council (EDAC) in order to 
promote a culture of transparency and to enhance confidence in the housing finance 
market. In the adoption of critical financial system reform, the suggested committee will 
be required to allow cooperation between all financial authorities and the Saudi 
Government in the area of housing finance, as seen in the UK.  
Also, it is suggested that the provision of article (12) be removed, while all the provisions 
of RREFL for regulating the provisions associated with real estate finance, including its 
participants and activities, etc., be retained. With regard to the macro-prudential policy, 
including the LTV ratio, it is suggested that guidelines be enacted by the proposed 
committee.  
With regard to the adverse impact of the LTV, especially on first-time homebuyers, the 
experience of Hong Kong was explored. The analysis revealed that Saudi authorities have 
failed to create or use a mechanism to mitigate the detrimental effect of LTV’s on housing 
finance activities. Hong Kong’s experience provides a very good example of how 
- 211 - 
effective cooperation between financial and governing authorities can work in relation to 
the housing finance market. In addition, the financial authorities in Hong Kong were 
successful in mitigating the adverse impact of applying an LTV, while still protecting 
financial stability. In the light of the similarities between Hong Kong and Saudi, the Saudi 
financial authorities are advised to copy Hong Kong’s model for  dealing with an LTV 
through the application of a Mortgage Insurance Programme (MIP), which serves to 
increase home ownership rates, to mitigate the detrimental effect of the LTV, and, finally, 
to maintain the financial system .18 
 
7.2.4 The Findings of Chapter Six  
 
Why does Saudi need to launch a securitisation market in the context of the development 
of the housing finance market? If, indeed, this need exists, will there be a consequent need 
to reform the Housing Finance Laws (2012) so as to build up a well-developed 
securitisation market? These questions were central to the discussion undertaken in 
Chapter Six.   
It is clear that the Saudi housing market lacks certain financial innovations, such as the 
mechanism of securitisation, and it depends largely on conventional fiscal tools, despite 
the known advantages provided by securitisation in both the housing and banking sectors. 
Chapter Six examined the need to establish a securitisation market in Saudi Arabia in 
light of current circumstances such as the collapse of oil prices, which has resulted in a 
liquidity crisis (a negative financial situation characterised by a lack of cash flow) and, in 
turn, this has had a negative effect on the housing finance market. It was held that, besides 
the aim of addressing the liquidity crisis, the establishment of a securitisation market is 
needed to contribute to the development of the housing finance market through reducing 
the cost of borrowing, providing cheap liquidity, and reducing the risk to lenders of 
holding housing finance loans for a significant length of time.  
The chapter also found that the Housing Finance Laws (2012) have paved the way for the 
establishment of a securitisation market in Saudi, via a number of rules and principles. 
However, the examination and analysis conducted in Chapter Six revealed that, in the 
current circumstances, it would be unwise to establish securitisation market due to the 
legal changes that are needed.  
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At the beginning of the development process it is crucial for legislators to widen their 
understanding of securitisation in order to introduce a proper legal system that is derived 
from the experience of other jurisdictions, but adapted to suit to the interests of the Saudi 
nation and be compliant with the domestic legal system. The provisions of the Housing 
Finance Laws (2012), however, do not represent such a system, because they fail to 
address a number of issues. This is in spite of assurances made by Saudi legislators that 
the laws offer protection for all participants and take account of the factors that 
contributed to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.19 An examination of the former 
claim found that if we wish to introduce securitisation in Saudi Arabia, to develop the 
housing finance market within a framework that is coherent, rational and workable, then 
a new raft of legal reforms and governmental initiatives are required.20 It is difficult to 
argue that Saudi legislators succeeded in introducing comprehensive legal form when 
they provided neither the desired protection for the participants using securitisation, nor 
avoided the factors which precipitated the financial crisis of 2007, as they claimed to have 
done.  
The securitisation market, by its nature, is not like other markets; it requires a high degree 
of confidence, protection for market participants, a high level of transparency, and a full 
understanding of its intricacies in order to deliver optimal economic and social outcomes. 
These characteristics cannot be provided by the Housing Finance Laws (2012), due to the 
three legal changes that are needed, as shown by the examination conducted in Chapter 
Six.  It was found that the main player in securitisation, the mortgage backed security 
(MBS) issuer, is prevented, by article 17 of the Real Estate Finance Law (one of the 
Housing Finance Laws (2012)) from exercising the key function of pooling and grouping 
loans, and then selling them in the secondary mortgage market. Therefore, it is unlikely 
to attract the participation of national financial institutions, including banks, in the 
market, let alone international institutions, when they are excluded from the main 
advantage offered by securitisation. Thus it is questionable why Saudi legislators adopted 
such a restriction without a clear reason, whereas other markets, whether developed or 
emerging have declined to do so.
21 This action gives the impression of a failure to 
understand the securitisation process, which is reflected in the drafting of article 17. The 
                                            
19Chapter Six, Sections: 3, 4. 
20Chapter Six, Section 7. 
21
 Integrated Financial Engineering, Mortgage securitization: lessons for emerging markets (PD&R 2007) 
39.. 
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Saudi legislative authority is advised, therefore, that any potential entity established under 
article (17) (to act as MBS issuer) should be granted the functions of pooling and selling 
loans to complete the process of securitisation.
22  
The Housing Finance Laws (2012) lack another critical characteristic, namely the 
protection of the rights of the MBS issuer in the event of the borrower’s default in the 
securitisation process. It was shown that the Real Estate Refinance Company (RERC), 
(which will act as the MBS issuer based on article 21 of the REFL), would lose its rights 
in cases of borrower default, due to the ownership of the financed property being retained 
by the lender.
23
 The legislator should consider a solution that does not conflict with 
Islamic law, yet can achieve the desired level of protection for all parties. One solution is 
to create bankruptcy remoteness between the lender and the RERC (MBS issuer). This 
guarantees that any borrower default would not impact the RERC’s interest in selling the 
financed property to satisfy the debt without exposing the RERC to conflict with the 
lender. Although creating such an entity would be a new development under Saudi 
jurisdiction, it would serve the purpose of enabling the securitisation process to achieve 
its main goals. There is no indication of any potential barriers to this solution, either from 
a legal perspective or from the perspective of Islamic law, and this reinforces the 
possibility of its adoption by the Saudi legislators.      
Finally, although it is clear from the evidence provided that a lack of transparency played 
a crucial role in generating the global financial crisis of 2007, this matter was not given 
enough attention in the drafting of the Housing Finance Laws (2012), and in particular 
the REFL.
24 However, this lack of transparency cannot be addressed through insisting on 
the disclosure of all relevant information in the securitisation market. This is mainly 
because of the potential for a resulting information overload, which caused some 
problems during the financial crisis of 2007.
25
 Therefore, it is asserted that promoting a 
culture of transparency is essential, because the requirements in securitisation have 
shifted from a trend towards the disclosure of all related data to the standardisation of 
transparency and the disclosure of specific information, in order to avoid information 
overload. Accordingly, there is a need to reform the REFL by adding a new article to the 
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 Chapter Six, Section 5. 
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24
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law to oblige the main participants in securitisation to identify information that will be 
disclosed for securitisation, rather than disclosing all information, in order to promote a 
satisfactory level of transparency and to facilitate an understanding of the risks that 
securitisation involves. The chapter then recommended that the Saudi authorities take 
advantage of their membership of financial organisations and institutions, such as the 
International Organisation of Securities Commission and the Board of the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions, which have already developed a number of 
mechanisms and methods for enhancing transparency in securitisation. The initiatives of 
these international organisations aim to minimise complexity by ensuring that only 
relevant information is disclosed, and, thus, avoiding the disclosure of all information.   
 
7.3 Conclusion  
 
It evident that any efforts or procedures aimed at addressing the housing shortage and 
enhancing the effectiveness of the housing finance market in Saudi Arabia will lack the 
confidence of the public, due to the modest consequences of prior initiatives.
26 In addition, 
the policies and initiatives regarding housing and housing finance invite concerns as to 
their eventual implementation and effects, because they indicate a lack of any coherent 
vision, as seen in the LFL (2016) and the application of the LTV article (12) of the 
RREFL. This thesis, therefore, offers a strong theoretical basis, coupled with the practical 
recommendations to provide methods to improve and develop the housing finance 
market. This thesis is the most detailed and systemic response to the development of 
housing finance in Saudi Arabia undertaken, because it covers several aspects whilst also 
taking into account the general principles of Islamic law and the Saudi legal system.  
It would seem that this thesis is the first to deal with the development of the housing 
finance market in Saudi Arabia. Surprisingly, so far, there has been no significant research 
devoted to reviewing the housing finance market so as to provide a framework to develop 
the housing finance market from a legal perspective. However, having completed this 
investigation, it is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the field, and build a foundation 
on which clear guidelines can be constructed, and be used for further research into the 
subject. 
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